Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT582
2008-10-09 19:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

MORE POLITICAL MOMENTUM

Tags:  PREL PGOV MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0179
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000582 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MORE POLITICAL MOMENTUM

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 000582

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV MR
SUBJECT: MORE POLITICAL MOMENTUM

Classified By: CDA Dennis Hankins reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Summary: The French share Mission view that slow
movement towards a political resolution is underway. General
Aziz, while ever stubborn on key points, has shown most
flexibility to date in meeting with the French Ambassador.
The EU Article 96 process is key leverage while the
Mauritania-AU dynamics may undermine Addis' effectiveness for
now. Independent mediation efforts of varying credibility
are multiplying with similar messages. An opportunistic
Afro-Mauritanian threatens a shift to violence if the
military stay in power -- demands fundamental change if
Abdallahi returns. End Summary

Meeting with French Ambassador


2. (C) Charge met October 9 with French Ambassador
Vandepoorter after receiving a request from FNDD co-leader
Ould Maouloud to discuss "interesting French ideas" on
October 10 and to get a readout of Vandepoorter's publicized
October 8 meeting with General Aziz. Vandepoorter, in his EU
Presidency role, had met Aziz to lay out the seriousness of
the upcoming EC Article 96 negotiations warning that this
offered the final chance to avoid sanctions that would be
painful and irreversible. Aziz told the Ambassador that he
wanted to avoid those sanctions and confirmed he had multiple
feelers our for negotiations with the FNDD. Vandepoorter
emphasized that these initial contacts on the eve of Article
96 talks and the anticipated "National Dialogue" now being
discussed for October 15 would not be sufficient -- there had
to be something concrete. Vandepoorter emphasized the
constant requirement for the return to democratic legitimacy
through the return of President Abdallahi to which the
general did not get the customary "absolutely not" response.
The Ambassador suggested to the general that while a National
Dialogue might some day have its role, now was the time for
discrete talks with the opposition which will require, sooner
than later, the direct participation of President Abdallahi.
He allowed that President Abdallahi would likely not see the
possibility to complete his mandate that would necessarily
require new elections. If done via Abdallahi's resignation,
Vandepoorter told Aziz that President of the Senate Ba
Mamadou was, as constitutionally prescribed, is the only

appropriate interim president leading to those elections --
to which Aziz responded, "Mauritania is run by Moors, a
Pulaar President (Ba is an Afro-Mauritanian of the Pulaar
tribe) is unacceptable even if temporarily." Vandepoorter
went on to say that, from the EC perspective, the members of
the HSC would have to eliminate themselves from future
elections to which Aziz responded "that may not be
constitutional." Vandepoorter retorted that "it may not be
constitutional but it is a political reality" since any
transition leading to the election of a coup maker would have
no credibility. Finally, Vandepoorter floated the idea of a
National Security Council that would provide the military and
security services some voice in major national political
issues. Aziz dismissed the idea outright saying "we are not
Turkey" adding that what was needed was constitutional
changes that would place more checks on presidential powers
so the military would never again "need" to intercede.


3. (C) While Vandepoorter did not see Aziz ready to leave
quite yet, he remarked that the general did not revert to his
standard litany of the sins of Abdallahi and received quite a
lecture without closing the conversation. The Ambassador
told Charge he saw a real possibility for movement towards a
resolution in which the Article 96 process would be key.
While he did expected the regime to come to Brussels speaking
only vaguely of political dialogue, he imagined the EU could
leave the first meeting with no relaxation of condemnation
but setting specific benchmarks to avoid sanctions before a
later meeting.


4. (C) Vandepoorter lamented that the last visit of the AU's
Lamamra had resulted in an impasse driven as much by
personality as by substance. For EU-AU reasons, Paris wanted
to see the AU in the lead but, despite Pings efforts to
suggest some continued room for dialogue, he saw the EU venue
the best for the moment. The ambassador believed that there
was indeed a need once the two sides are really ready to talk
for an internal mediator (showing no preference for any of
internal initiatives that have come to the fore and unsure
who might play that role from outside Mauritania). The
ambassador saw the various currents heading towards discrete

NOUAKCHOTT 00000582 002.2 OF 003


talks between the FNDD and the HSC with a future need to
include other party leaders including Ould Daddah. Charge
noted the FNDD's Ould Maouloud had suggested talks starting
between General Ghazwany and National Assembly President Ould
Boulkheir -- Vandepoorter thought that would be a good
"representative" start. The ambassador said he saw new
elections as a near given saying he found nobody, even within
the FNDD, voicing interest in Abdallahi continue any longer
than needed to re-establish constitutional legitimacy. He
thought Abdallahi would himself agree to this one he had
contact with his advisors. As for who might succeed
Abdallahi, he saw that as a "problem for later on" but
offered that "Vall will lose to just about anyone" having
been a bit too transparent in his posturing.


5. (C) Vandepoorter suggested some lingering problems with
Spain noting "as soon as we denied a visa to a pro-coup
parliamentarian, they ran over to the Spaniards to get a
Schengen visa." Noting that, like France, Spain has
significant commercial, migration and drug concerns in
Mauritania Vandepoorter said, "if we go forward on Article 96
every embassy will be required to deny visas."

The "NiNi" initiatives
--------------


6. (C) At least two more internal negotiation initiatives in
addition to that of former foreign minister Ould Benhmeida
have surfaced in the past week. At an October 7 event at the
Qatari vocational training center, Charge was introduced to
NGO leader Sid'Ahmed Ould Habot who, with three other civil
society leaders involved in good governance, had already met
with the FNDD, "Prime Minister" Laghdaf and Ould Daddah and
were to meet October 8 with Aziz to put together a dialogue
(Comment: it was not clear to Charge if this was a chance
meeting or whether it reflected a subtle Qatari initiative).
On October 9, Charge met with three members of the newly
announced "National Salvation Front" who presented themselves
as a "third option" movement who has also met with both sides
aiming to create a national dialogue. Both initiatives
shared several policy stands: the need for a temporary
return of Abdallahi leading to new elections (with Ould Habot
highlighting what he termed an ADIL proposal for a national
referendum "Do you wish President Abdallahi to complete his
electoral mandate?" to determine whether to hold elections;
the dismantling of the HSC; some type of interim government
based either on Senate President Ba or some type of national
coalition. Both fell under the "NiNi" heading being cited
increasingly by Mauritanians -- "Ni (neither) Abdallahi, ni
Aziz." With both groups, Charge indicated that the U.S. and
international role of forcing the regime towards dialogue
seemed to be showing initial effects that was leading to
these initiatives. The U.S. firmly believed any solution
needed to have the re-establishment of constitutional
legitimacy through the return of President Abdallahi as a
point of departure but that it was up to Mauritanians to find
their own democratic path from that point. Charge demurred
from endorsing any of the initiatives and cautioned that they
not let mediator proliferation be used to undermine common
objectives.

And Something Disturbing
--------------


7. (C) Charge met October 9 with anti-coup Senator Youssouf
Tijani Sylla -- senator of Mbout in Gorgol Province. Sylla
has an Afro-Mauritania Solinke father and a White Moor mother
but presents himself as a leader of both Afro Mauritanians
and Black Moor "Haratines." Sylla had been clubbed by the
police during the October 5 anti-coup protest. He said he
was beginning a round of diplomatic contacts to say
Mauritanian blacks were firmly behind President Abdallahi and
were ready to move from peaceful to armed resistance to the
military. Sylla viewed the coup in racial terms as a White
Moor response to Abdallahi's outreach to Afro-Mauritanians
and Black Moors. He denounced the concentration of all power
and wealth in the White Moor community which, because of his
mixed blood, he said he understood well. Sylla claimed to be
in contact with the hard-line Afro-Mauritanian FLAM movement
in Senegal to prepare to shift to violence against the coup.
Charge stated unequivocally that the U.S. does not advocate
violent opposition to the coup. The isolation of the coup by
the international community was starting to bear fruit and
violence now would be counter-productive. Charge emphasized

NOUAKCHOTT 00000582 003 OF 003


the obvious -- that the military has most of the weapons --
but also cautioned racially-based violence could only spell
disaster. Sylla said, "we will use sticks and machetes if we
have to," but then pulled back on the immediacy of any
transfer to violence. He also added that, even if the
military steps down and democracy is restored, "we will no
longer accept the one Pulaar one Wolof, one Solinke and one
Haratine" tokenism of past governments and demand full
integration reflective of White Moors' minority status.


8. (C) Comment: An Afro-Mauritanian local Mission employee
from Sylla's constituency told Charge Sylla is not seen by
Afro-Mauritanians as a significant leader both because his
mixed blood and because of multiple opportunistic loyalty
changes in the past. Sylla had worked with Taya, then became
a Sidi Baba supporter, then jumped in with Ould Daddah. He
was elected to the Senate as an independent (our LES says
because the military had been to overt in supporting his
opponent in an 80% black district) and first allied himself
with Ould Maouloud and, just recently, became an Ould
Boulkheir supporter. Sylla is not a contender but his
statements underline the risk that continued political
impasse can bring out negative elements -- new "counter
coups" or the emergence of race-baiting opportunists.
HANKINS