PARLIAMENT ENDORSES CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000503

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT ENDORSES CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (U) Parliamentary Resolution: On September 14 the
Emergency Session of the National Assembly, with 56 of its 95
members present, adopted a resolution supporting the report
of a Special Commission established to review the causes of
the political crisis and laying out recommendations for an
exit strategy. The Resolution (full text forwarded to AF/W)
is non-binding. Highlights of the resolution include:

Condemnation of President Abdallahi: "Notes the negative
results of the political crisis for which former President
Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi is considered responsible"
and cites the President for authoritarianism, systematic
blockage of the Parliament, bad management, excessive travel,
worsening living conditions, and "adventurous management"
that threatened a "bloody confrontation among our military
and security forces."

Accepting the coup: "Notes" the measures taken -- without
bloodshed -- by the military and security forces to
"temporarily" assume the powers of the presidency while
maintaining other democratic institutions and liberties
intact "to the great satisfaction of the majority of the
Mauritanian people."

Support for return to constitutional order: "Affiliates
itself with the strong and urgent demand expressed nationally
and internationally for the rapid return to the natural
constitutional order."

National Dialogue towards new presidential elections: Calls
for establishment of a "credible mechanism for consultation
and follow-up" consisting of delegations from (a) a
delegation of the parliament groups weighted to reflect their
representation, (b) a delegation of the government and High
State Council, (c) a delegation of major political parties
"whose lists will be determined by the parliamentary
commissions," and, (d) representatives of Mauritania's
partners: the UN, AU, EU, Arab League, and OIC. That
dialogue should consider roadmap based on following elements:

(a) presidential elections in 12-14 months,
(b) political neutrality of the administration and high State
Council and exclusion as candidates of judges and military as
well as those that exercise executive responsibilities that
could influence the vote,
(c) re-establishment of the National Independent Electoral
Commission with appropriate funding. Invitation to the
largest number possible of African, Arab and Islamic
institutions to observe the elections.
(d) upon agreement on a roadmap, creation of a new national
unity government for the transition to elections.

Rejection of Military authority on parliament: Rejects
Article 8 of the High State Council's Constitutional Charter
that claims the right to legislate by edict if the parliament
is blocked.


2. (C) Context: The resolution passed after several days of
parliamentary gridlock. Locals suggest that there was extra
pressure from General Aziz following weekend meetings with
the Tunisian and French Ambassadors. Ahmed Ould Daddah's RFD
parliamentarians boycotted the session although many of the
demands Ould Daddah made are included -- particularly the
call for a set date. The RFD still did not associate itself
with the resolution for lack of a clear statement that
members of the High State Council (i.e. Aziz) cannot run and
the lack of any language that would define the role of the
military in future governance.


3. (C) Wrong on so many levels: Advocates of the coup are
likely to champion this as an example of the remaining
constitutional institutions playing their role to ensure a
rapid return to national constitutional legitimacy. On basic
questions of procedure, this is wrong. The "Emergency
Session" was called by a "High State Council" with no
legitimacy. The Presidents of the Senate and Chamber of
Deputies reject the validity of the session; hence, both
sessions are now chaired by Vice Presidents. The Resolution
reflects but 59% of the deputies since the others are
boycotting. And, the session takes place under the yolk of a
military regime. Even if taken on its merits, the resolution

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has many failings. The "National Dialogue" is heavily skewed
in favor of the coup makers with the parliamentary delegation
being weighted in favor of the majority, the High State
Council and its government having a third of the votes, and
the participation of other political parties being dictated
by the pro-coup parties in the parliament. Such a mechanism
clearly excludes anti-coup parties. Civil Society, labor and
business are not considered as parties to this national
dialogue.
Boulware