INSPECTOR GENERAL SEES MILITARY CORRUPTION AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 000488

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MR
SUBJECT: INSPECTOR GENERAL SEES MILITARY CORRUPTION AS
REASON FOR THE COUP

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for Reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) DCM met September 8 with Mauritanian National
Inspector General Mohamed Abba Ould Sidi Ould Jeilany at the
IG's request. A clearly disgusted Jeilany (strictly protect)
told DCM that he was convinced the generals had gone after
President Abdallahi because they were afraid they would be
prosecuted for corruption his office had uncovered in the
Military Command. Jeilany said he had found over seven
billion ouguiya (over $30 million) in illegal payments to
senior military officers over a six month investigation. He
had documented payments from substantial Mauritanian
businessmen channeled to the High Command through Col. Ahmed
Ould Eleya -- half brother of former President Col. Ely
Mohamed Vall (Comment -- DCM noted that relations between
General Aziz and Col. Vall were understood to be very poor.
Jeilany said that was the image Vall tried to portray to
outsiders but that the two remained well connected at least
for money matters. End Comment) Just prior to the coup,
President Abdallahi had instructed the Central Bank to
cooperate fully with the Inspector General's Officer in the
investigation. Jeilany is convinced that knowledge of the
investigation was behind the military's efforts to oust
Abdallahi. He said that on August 20 he had forwarded a
report detailing a single $1 million transaction from Groupe
de Banque Mauritanian (owned by Mohamed Ould Bouamatou) to
Col. Ould Eleya and that he was called by General Aziz
directly and told to stand down. Jeilany added that Aziz had
called him the day following the coup to provide a list of
persons he should investigate. Jeilany had refused saying
his investigations could not be politicized.


2. (C) DCM asked whether an investigation had been launched
into the KB Foundation of President Abdallahi's wife that
seemed the focus of so much attention. Jeilany said "the
petty theft of the wife is paltry compared to the military"
adding that he had started an investigation prior to the coup
that had uncovered inappropriate land transfers to the
Foundation and an inappropriate travel expense of $6000 paid
to a Foundation official. Jeilany had suspended the
investigation when General Aziz had sought to politicize the
initial findings. Jeilany thought a full investigation over
several months would have found further but relatively modest
corruption related to the Foundation. He was quick to note
that he had found no wrongdoing by President Abdallahi adding
that the President had authorized interviews and audits
related to the investigation of his wife's foundation.


3. (C) Jeilany said General Aziz had funneled substantial
funding before and after the elections to establish his
"Parliamentary Brigade" inside the National Assembly.
Looking at the current emergency session, he said Aziz's
intent was to have his "Brigade" pass a constitutional
revision for indirect election of the President by the
Parliament and then have himself elected President. Jeilany
agreed that the strategy had been hampered by the split of
Ahmed Ould Daddah from the generals -- he said Aziz had 55 of
the 95 members of the Assembly in his "Brigade" which was
sufficient to set the agenda but not enough to meet the
2/3rds majority needed for a constitutional reform.


4. (C) Jeilany noted that for all the "getting hard on
corruption" rhetoric in the Laghdaf "government" he had yet
to be seriously engaged by the new Prime Minister. He agreed
that the Secretary General of the Presidency Mohamed Lemine
Ould Guig had a good reputation on fighting corruption but
noted that the new head of the National Petroleum Company
Mohamed Ould Bahiya (former Minister of Hydrology and Energy
under Waghef) was particularly corrupt -- Jeilany had
documented a $1.5 million payment to a fictitious vendor
perpetrated by Bahiya. In discussing possible targeted
sanctions, Jeilany offered that sanctions on businessmen
would have the greatest effect -- eventually making support
of General Aziz too costly. He noted that some of the
military, including General Aziz, have property outside
Mauritania but provided no details.


5. (C) Jeilany had ostensibly asked to meet to discuss the
status of a $500,000 ODPAT program we had proposed to support
the work of his office. DCM advised that, since funded by
Development Assistance funds, U.S. legal restrictions applied
following the coup would necessarily cancel the initiative.

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The IG said he had assumed that to be the case. DCM noted
that even if there was a policy waiver available, the Mission
would not try to move forward on the program adding that
while we had faith in Jeilany, we were not confident anymore
in his office. Jeilany agreed saying he expected to be fired
any day now (if not worse) and he was sure whoever replaced
him would follow the generals' bidding.
Boulware