AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER PRESIDENT ELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000480

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER PRESIDENT ELY
MOHAMED VALL

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (B and D).

Ambassador's Meeting with Former President Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall


1. (C) Ambassador met with former President Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall at the latter's residence on September 7. Vall,
recently returned from Ireland where he has been studying
English, indicated that he would be remaining in Nouakchott
at least through Ramadan. Vall wanted to discuss the current
political crisis and to offer his thoughts about a possible
solution. The former president regretted the coup d'etat and
said that international community was right in insisting that
it not stand. He said that it was important that this be the
"last coup" in Mauritania and he praised the firm position
taken by the US and others. Vall noted that while the
concerns of the international community were an essential
element in resolving the crisis, it was only one of three
elements, all of which needed to be resolved.


2. (C) The former president insisted that any successful
resolution of the crisis would also have to deal both with
national political expectations and the coup-makers
themselves. Vall said that the ultimate solution had to be
"made in Mauritania" and could not be imposed from outside.
He said that it was clear that President Abdallahi had to be
freed and restored as the international community demanded
"in order to teach the lesson" that coups were no longer
acceptable. He went on to say, however, that the restoration
could not be definitive and with a view for completing the
full original mandate. President Abdallahi, he argued, had
squandered his legitimacy through poor leadership. Vall said
that the restoration period had to be transitional and brief,
leading necessarily to early new elections. Finally, Vall
said that the coup-makers themselves had to be considered and
that pressure to force them out had to be complemented by
giving them a way out. He opined that, in the end,
convincing Aziz would be the key as the others would be "less
of a problem."


3. (C) Ambassador Boulware thanked Vall for his insights and
noted that there was a fair amount of convergence between the
USG's appreciation of the situation and his own. He noted
that details of post-coup arrangements would be important and
that a "pro-forma" restoration leading quickly to a
resignation by President Abdallahi would not meet with our
approval. Vall agreed that President Abdallahi had to play a
role in finding a solution and observed that his detention
complicated that. Pressed to expand his thoughts about how
to convince the junta to relinquish power, Vall said that the
important thing was to maintain a strong position and to
demonstrate firm solidarity in the international community,
both locally and internationally.


4. (C) Comment: Vall's proposals are consistent with an
emerging compromise scenario but he offers little specific
advice. The broad outlines of a potential political solution
are relatively clear, but it remains to be seen whether
General Aziz can be convinced to yield and, if he does,
exactly what sort of post-coup arrangements would be broadly
acceptable both to Mauritanians and to the international
community.
Boulware