AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH JUNTA'S "FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000478

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2011
TAGS: PGOV PREL CPAS MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH JUNTA'S "FOREIGN
MINISTER"

Classified By: Ambassador Mark M. Boulware for reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Ambassador met on September 2 with the junta's
"Foreign Minister," Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou at the
latter's request. Noting the historically good relations
between the United States and Mauritania, Ould Mohamedou
hoped that these could continue even under the current
"difficult circumstances." Launching into the regime's
standard denunciation of President Abdallahi, he
characterized the coup as regrettable but necessary,
professed understanding for the West's principled position
but also pleaded for understanding, help and the avoidance of
"confrontation." Calling Mauritanian society fragile and
divided, he said that public statements of condemnation and
threats of sanctions were not helpful.


2. (C) Denying that the USG sought confrontation, Ambassador
Boulware said that, with the coup, Mauritania had embarked
upon a path that neither the USG nor the international
community could accept. He reiterated our demand that
President Abdallahi and Prime Minister Waghef be released and
restored to their functions and that Mauritania return to
constitutional order. Noting that time was extremely short,
Ambassador urged that Mauritania accept the hand of
friendship extended to them. Insisting that the regime was
committed to democracy, Ould Mohamedou asserted that
parliament represented the people and could be the vehicle
for a return to constitutional order. Ambassador Boulware
said that President Abdallahi was the legitimate elected
leader of Mauritania and that parliament operating under the
shadow of the military junta could not confer a legitimacy
that the constitution did not provide. He said the USG
understood that the return to constitutional order would not,
in itself, resolve all of Mauritania's political problems but
that it was an essential point of departure from which to go
forward. In response to Ould Mohamedou's plea that the US
identify possible options, Ambassador Boulware replied that
although AU Commissioner Jean Ping had raised different
potential exit strategies with General Aziz there had been no
serious Mauritanian response. The Ambassador urged that the
AU be seriously engaged and the sooner the better.


3. (C) Ambassador Boulware noted that several people had now
visited President Abdallahi and said that his own request to
visit him still stood. Ould Mohamedou promised to try to
arrange a visit. When Ould Mohamedou recalled his positive
experiences while living in the US, Ambassador inquired
whether he had acquired US citizenship when living there.
Ould Mohamedou said that he had but preferred that the fact
not be made public. The Ambassador said that he did not
intend to do so, but thought that Ould Mohamedou's US
citizenship might make his own situation particularly
delicate in view of potential personal sanctions.


4. (C) Ould Mohamedou, himself only recently returned from
the US, did not radiate confidence during the meeting and
seemed unprepared for the firm US response to arguments we
have heard all too often already. He seemed particularly
unsettled by the inquiry about his US citizenship. We do not
expect Ould Mohamedou to play a significant role in the junta
government and suspect that his selection was inspired by the
hope that his US academic credentials and connections could
temper the USG's response to the coup.





Boulware