Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NOUAKCHOTT323
2008-06-25 18:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nouakchott
Cable title:  

POLITICAL STORM SEASON IN MAURITANIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL KMCA MR 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 251838Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7358
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000323 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCA MR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL STORM SEASON IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NOUAKCHOTT 000323


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL KMCA MR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL STORM SEASON IN MAURITANIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Dennis Hankins for reason 1.4 (b and d)


1. (C) Over the past several weeks, Mauritanian media has
been rife with political intrigue. President Abdallahi is
said to have had a falling out with his security head General
Aziz leading to rumors of impending coups. The opposition is
trying to pull together the one-third majority of the
National Assembly needed to table a motion to censure the new
Waghef government which, if successful, would force the
collapse of that government. Members of the President's own
party of the majority are pulling out. Meanwhile, the media
and political observers complain that the new Waghef
government has yet to deliver the promised new momentum on
the political and economic agenda. Getting a clear picture
of the political machinations afoot is complicated -- all
contacts have a vested interest and paint the worst possible
picture of the opponents, intent. In the current political
maneuverings we have:


2. (C) The New Military Leadership: Generals Aziz and
Ghazwani likely see themselves as the midwives of the current
democracy -- both for their role in the coup against former
President Taya and, more importantly, their role in ensuring
the Transitional Authorities delivered on their promise of a
post-coup democratic transition. They are extremely leery of
the reappearance of Taya ministers in the newly-formed
government as a step to the past. Both generals are serious
in their counter-terrorism and counter-extremism concerns
hence the concern of Islamist ministers in the government
(even though all the ministers in question have a decent
track record of past performance). If we give the Generals
the benefit of the doubt, they are afraid the Abdallahi
government will lose the opportunity of democratic transition
by letting the wolves inside the chicken coup. If we take a
darker view, they do not want President Abdallahi to get too
comfortable in the idea that he drives "their" democracy.


3. (C) The Majority Parties: Most of the back and forth
between the members of the majority party is political
pork-barreling over jobs and influence with some elements not
feeling they got "enough" in the most recent government
reshuffle. Abdallahi,s decision to shift from the heavily
technocratic but politically inexperienced Zeidane government
to the more experienced (but colored by histories in past
undemocratic governments) Waghef government intentionally
opened the door to distribution of positions with a greater
emphasis on power-block balance. While Abdallahi needed a
government more able to implement policies, he did open the
door to efforts by coalition partners to get just that little
bit more.


4. (C) The Opposition: The opposition, headed by opposition
leader Ahmed Ould Daddah, sees the chance to force a
"government of national unity" by splitting off independents
and dissatisfied parties from the majority. While the
Mauritanian constitution has no legislative or judicial
method to force new presidential elections (absent an all out
impeachment trial for high treason that requires a two-thirds
majority for both chambers and is tried by a special court),
the bar for toppling the Prime Minister and his government is
relatively low. A vote of no confidence or motion of censure
passed by "one half plus one" in the National Assembly forces
the President to form a new government. Two such censures
within three years force new parliamentary elections which,
in current circumstances, the opposition would feel well
placed to dominate. Therffore, a successful censure now
would force Abdala hi to either form a government with far
more opoosition components or risk new parliamentary
elections.


5. (C) The President: President Abdallah is in a difficult
position of trying to move hi political agenda forward while
competing interet s seem more occupied with reinforcing their
relttive political weight. Abdallahi is likely asserting his
legitimate right to direct political polic even over the
objections of General Aziz. His ffforts to tighten his
political base through a nw" majority structure (versus the
loose coalitionoof backers he had coming from his election
victory as an independent) is having difficulty. Meanwhie ,
he is spending a lot of time talking to generals and party
heads (his own and the opposition) to resolve turf battles
and is being pulled away from his policy objectives.

Hankins