Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NICOSIA929
2008-11-25 15:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CYPRUS: "TRNC PM" WARNS OF MID-2009 EARLY ELECTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV TR CY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0929/01 3301534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251534Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9363
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1266
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEFNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000929 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: "TRNC PM" WARNS OF MID-2009 EARLY ELECTIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 558

B. NICOSIA 650

C. NICOSIA 621

D. NICOSIA 675

Classified By: Ambassador Franck C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000929

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV TR CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: "TRNC PM" WARNS OF MID-2009 EARLY ELECTIONS

REF: A. NICOSIA 558

B. NICOSIA 650

C. NICOSIA 621

D. NICOSIA 675

Classified By: Ambassador Franck C. Urbancic for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: "TRNC PM" and "governing" Turkish Republican
Party (CTP) leader Ferdi Soyer on November 21 informed the
Ambassador he might be forced to call early elections in
mid-2009 absent extraordinary budget support from Turkey.
The "PM" was awaiting the return of Turkish Cypriot leader
Mehmet Ali Talat from Ankara, who had traveled there in
search of a bailout, but hinted an early vote was the only
realistic option for his cash-strapped and unpopular
administration. Erdogan supported the CTP-led "government,"
Soyer claimed, but others in AKP argued that another party
might better reform the bloated T/C "state" sector. Soyer
feared that early elections would destabilize the present
UN-brokered process and energize anti-solution, rightist
parties. Turning to the settlement talks, Soyer assured that
Ankara had given Talat a green light to negotiate freely, but
admitted that Turkish Cypriots had to respect mainland
redlines such as continuation of security guarantees. The
Turkish military also backed the settlement process, he
asserted. END SUMMARY.

"We cannot get that much money"


2. (C) "TRNC PM" Ferdi Soyer told the Ambassador on November
21 that his nearly bankrupt administration, which already
consumed 400 million USD in Turkish assistance annually (Refs
C, D),faced grave financial shortfalls. It could not
generate sufficient tax revenues in 2009 to meet budgetary
needs, he warned, since domestic economic conditions would
continue to deteriorate. Were Turkey not to cough up extra
cash, he saw no alternative for his unpopular government but
to call for elections by mid-2009 (elections are currently
scheduled for February 2010). He was awaiting Talat's return
from Ankara, but doubted the "President" would return flush
with funds. Soyer himself had failed to secure a
low-interest, long-term 100 million-dollar loan from the
Turkish parastatal Ziraat Bank during a November 4-6 trip to
Ankara (Note: Turkish "credits" to the "TRNC" are almost
never repaid.)

Paying Paul to make it to early elections



3. (C) Preserving "public sector" employment and avoiding
clashes with the north's powerful unions was politically
vital to Soyer. He had told Ankara (which consistently has
pressed the Turkish Cypriots to reform the bloated state
sector) that he would cease any fiscal and structural reforms
in 2009. Absent an infusion of Turkish cash, the ideal
scenario was to go early elections, "without cutting
personnel," in hopes of limiting electoral losses for the
CTP. Soyer sketched out a Ponzi scheme under which he hoped
to obtain all Turkish 2009-10 aid in January, then
immediately pay state employees and retirees the COLA
differential for the next six months. (Note: By doing this,
he would agree to Ankara's demand to make COLA payments twice
a year vice the present once every two months, while also
flooding the economy with needed cash. He also might avoid a
clash with powerful public sector unions, which had stymied a
July 2009 effort to reform COLA payments with a general
strike (Reftels).) Soyer also hoped to pay the bonus "13th
salary" for 2009 -- which Ankara also wants to ax -- out of
the 2010 budget.

"Erdogan understands, others don't"


4. (C) Soyer said that Turkish PM Erdogan understood the
importance of a pro-solution CTP "government" to the
negotiations. Others in the AKP did not argued that "another
government" (presumably led by the nationalist, right-wing
National Unity Party-UBP) might do a better at "running
things" and tackling urgent structural reforms in the "state"
sector, the biggest employer in the north. Soyer voiced
worry that UBP, which does not support the present
UN-brokered process and is running neck-to-neck in polls with
CTP, would sabotage Talat's effort at the negotiating table
in an ugly example of "government" cohabitation.

"We must support things Turkey wants"


5. (C) In response to a question from the Ambassador, Soyer
said that Ankara had given the lead in the negotiations to
Talat, but that Turkish Cypriots also had "to support things
Turkey wants." On major issues, such as the continuation of
guarantees, Turkish and T/C opinion coincided. On other less
existential issues, Soyer argued, the Turkish Cypriots often
were able to prevail. For example, he said that Ankara was
against the start of the 2006 UN-brokered "Gambari/July 8
Process," but Talat was able to exert his will. Soyer also
said that at November 15 "TRNC Independence" celebrations,
Turkish Naval Commander Metin Atac voiced support for the
present process, provided Turkish guarantees continued.

Comment


6. (C) Since PM Erdogan's visit to the island in July, we've
heard talk of early elections in the north owing to Turkey's
refusal to bail out the spendthrift "TRNC government."
Erdogan's then-refusal to offer additional aid, at least not
without painful reforms, unsettled our "pro-solution"
contacts, but most believed Turkey would bail them out in the
end. If the AKP-led government did not, they argued, Turkey
clearly was not interested in a solution. From our perch, it
seems that Turkey, in drawing a tighter financial line, truly
wants to improve the functioning of the bloated, inefficient
"state apparatus" in the north, not to scuttle the settlement
talks. Some in Ankara may also believe a harder-line T/C
"government" can wring more concessions out of the Greek
Cypriots. Nevertheless, the possible fall of Soyer's
pro-solution "government" due to a lack of Turkish aid --
after decades of open spigots -- makes rapid progress on the
settlement track in early 2009 even more important.
Urbancic