DISY CHIEF STILL UNCONVINCED ITS CANDIDATE WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000091

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: DISY CHIEF STILL UNCONVINCED ITS CANDIDATE WILL
ADVANCE

REF: 07 NICOSIA 869

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 6 meeting with the
Ambassador, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Nikos
Anastassiades claimed that candidate Ioannis Kasoulides's
presidential prospects were improving, but continued to worry
he might not advance to the second round. Harming Kasoulides
were DISY's inability to maintain discipline amongst members
in Nicosia and Limassol, its weakness (and incumbent Tassos
Papadopoulos's strength) with civil servants, and the Cypriot
electorate's general aversion to change. Anastassiades next
turned to campaign finance, lamenting the ever-growing cost
of ferrying overseas Cypriots home to vote; such fees were
more easily borne by the wealthier Papadopoulos and Dimitris
Christofias (AKEL) campaign teams. Should his candidate fail
to advance to Round 2, the DISY chieftain was contemplating
assembling the party politburo to conduct a "way forward"
secret ballot to choose between Papadopoulos and Christofias

SIPDIS
in the run-off round. As is customary in his meetings with
the Embassy, Anastassiades held court on the Cyprus problem,
fretting that solving it looking increasingly difficult. And
a Papadopoulos re-election would make matters worse. END
SUMMARY.

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Kasoulides's Chances? Improving, But Not Great
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2. (C) The always expansive Anastassiades welcomed the
Ambassador February 6 for a presidential campaign / CyProb
tour d'horizon. While still not thrilled with Ioannis
Kasoulides's chances, he admitted the candidate's recent
upswing in polling had buoyed party morale somewhat. DISY
cohesion remained suspect, however, especially in Nicosia and
Limassol, where the President was succeeding in co-opting
traditional DISY voters of the commercial elite. Winning
back these deserters was key to ensuring Kasoulides's advance
and Papadopoulos's ouster, Anastassiades asserted. DISY
internal polling showed Kasoulides currently trailing
Papadopoulos, but running neck-and-neck with Christofias.
Potentially halting the party's upward swing were its
weakness among civil servants -- always susceptible to
pressures or inducements from the governing party, especially
this one -- and Cypriot voters' general aversion to
abandoning the status quo.


3. (C) DISY was losing the campaign finance battle as well,
Anastassiades fretted. It would cost the party some two
million euros to fly home over 5,000 overseas voters from the
UK, Athens, and points further, just for the first round. At
least another million would be required for a similar Round 2
operations. While Papadopoulos was independently wealthy and
the Christofias campaign could count on AKEL-owned
businesses' earnings to cover these costs, DISY was nearly
tapped out. The cash crunch limited the campaign team's
ability to secure increasingly more-costly media access, he
explained.


4. (C) In case of a Kasoulides first-round defeat, DISY would
summon its political bureau to determine next steps,
Anastassiades revealed. He saw three possible outcomes
emerging from the resulting secret ballot: 1) a
recommendation to endorse either Papadopoulos or Christofias
and call for the rank-and-file to support him; 2) a call for
a special DISY congress where party members could debate
endorsement; and/or 3) instructions to the membership "to
vote according to their conscience." Anastassiades welcomed
an informal tie-up between ideologically-dissimilar DISY and
AKEL since, in his opinion, such an arrangement would ensure
that any CyProb solution that Greek Cypriot negotiators
secured would enjoy broad-based political support in
Parliament. "AKEL probably doesn't have the courage to
dance, however," he charged. Further, he predicated that
many Kasoulides voters might prefer Papadopoulos over
Christofias because of "AKEL's attitude" (i.e., its
historical animosity toward the right-wing party) and
Christofias's demonization of DISY.

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It's All About The Cyprus Problem
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5. (C) Echoing points the Ambassador often makes publicly,
Anastassiades lamented that time to reunite the island under
a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal arrangement was running out.
"And Cyprus has lost multiple opportunities to better the

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climate for negotiations," he added. Recent polls showed
that 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots wanted a separate state,
Anastassiades continued, and T/C leader Mehmet Ali Talat's
positions had hardened recently. Attitudes within the G/C
community were tilting towards partition as well. Such a
scenario represented the worst-possible outcome,
Anastassiades moaned, with the Turks "enjoying a partnership
with the south and absolute control of the north."


6. (C) In regards to Papadopoulos's expected (February 8)
announcement of a new Cyprus initiative, Anastassiades
doubted the measures would convince voters that he was the
leader to reunify the island. "If Papadopoulos were the one,
then what has he been doing the last five years?" he quipped.
And why didn't his campaign ads focus on the future, instead
of his "heroic" acts of saving Cyprus from the
"internationally-imposed" 2004 Annan Plan?

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Comment:
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7. (C) Anastassiades never has given Ioannis Kasoulides much
chance of winning the presidential race. Even with
Kasoulides's steady rise the past four weeks, the DISY
leader's support for him still seems lukewarm. Why? Certain
Embassy contacts speculate that Anastassiades might prefer a
Christofias win for personal reasons: Kasoulides's defeat
would make him damaged goods within the party and unable to
mount a serious challenge for the DISY presidency, the theory
asserts, and rumors have circulated that Christofias might
"bequeath" his House Speaker position to Anastassiades in
exchange for DISY leadership's support in the runoff. While
we agree that Kasoulides as president would cause
Anastassiades some discomfort, we're skeptical over claims he
would sabotage the campaign over personal ambition, since a
first-round loss could harm DISY -- and his own future --
long-term. Advance deliberation over the party's moves
should it fail to advance seems prudent, however, and we
agree with Anastassiades that some semblance of political
cooperation between AKEL and DISY raises hopes that G/C
negotiators could work a deal more flexibly, free of fear
that the opposition would rubbish their efforts.
SCHLICHER