CYPRUS: VISITING IO A/S HEARS BOTH SIDES OF STORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000877

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: VISITING IO A/S HEARS BOTH SIDES OF STORY

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs Brian Hook visited Cyprus October 22-24
to meet Greek and Turkish Cypriot political leaders and
witness firsthand peacekeeping operations of the UN Force in
Cyprus (UNFICYP). UNFICYP military, police, and civil
affairs officials gave Hook an overview of the mission
mandate and a summary of recent activity in the Buffer Zone.
Similarly, representatives of the UN Good Offices mission
recounted political developments since the September 3
commencement of full-fledged settlement negotiations,
lamenting the slow pace and the sides' divergent positions
and hinting that a more robust UN role was forthcoming.


2. (C) A/S Hook next engaged the political leadership of the
two communities. Greek Cypriot negotiator George Iacovou
insisted that RoC President Demetris Christofias possessed
the requisite political will to conclude a deal, but felt
frustrated by Turkish Cypriots' "extreme positions," which
Ankara likely had mandated. Foreign Minister Markos
Kyprianou lobbied for a continued UNFICYP presence on the
island, dismissing arguments that it might actually preserve
the status quo; he favored a yearly (vice twice-yearly)
mandate renewal, however. Continuing to talk Turkey,
Kyprianou voiced concern over the GoT's recent election to a
non-permanent Security Council seat.


3. (C) North of the Green Line, "TRNC President" Mehmet Ali
Talat presented a predictably opposite view on Cyprus Problem
developments. He argued that UNFICYP was anachronistic; the
operation ought be downgraded to an observer mission. As to
the talks, Greek Cypriots deserved blame for the lack of
progress, as they refused to negotiate using the 2004 Annan
Plan -- "the culmination of 40 years of UN negotiations on
Cyprus" -- as a jumping-off point. A/S Hook's visit ended
with a call on hard-line T/C party leader Tahsin
Ertugruloglu, who spouted typical "TRNC Forever" rhetoric.
Unification of the island could only occur as the merging of
two equal, sovereign states, he insisted, and Turkish
guarantor/intervention rights must continue. END SUMMARY.

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Trip Has Two Purposes
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4. (SBU) In his private comments and a brief statement to
media after his call on Kyprianou, IO Assistant Secretary
Brian Hook explained his reasons for visiting the island.
First, as the State Department official ultimately
responsible for U.S. participation in international
peacekeeping operations, he felt it vital to obtain firsthand
knowledge of their missions, challenges, and requirements.
That the UNFICYP mandate renewal would occur in seven weeks'
time made it more timely to see Cyprus, Hook added. Of equal
importance was gauging progress in the nascent Cyprus Problem
settlement negotiations. The United States valued the
leaders' noteworthy efforts, Hook explained, and sought to
utilize its good offices to support them.


5. (C) The chiefs of UNFICYP's military, civilian police,
and civil affairs branches detailed the mission mandate:
preventing a recurrence of hostilities on the island, and
providing a constructive atmosphere for political
negotiations. Chief of Staff Colonel Gerard Hughes broke
down UNFICYP's 850-man force by specialty and geographic
sector, and offered his estimate of Turkish troop levels
(21,000),which differed greatly from Greek Cypriot
assertions (40,000-plus). Dealings with oft-stubborn Turkish
military leadership on Cyprus had improved of late, Hughes
revealed, owing to a recent command swap-out. Civilian
Police Commander Carla VanMaris explained that her forces
were responsible for law and order in the 120-mile long
Buffer Zone (BZ),although they depended on cooperation with
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot police since the UN
contingent lacked arrest powers. UN CivPol also functioned
as a regular liaison, since the G/C force refused direct
contact with its T/C counterpart. Another element of
UNFICYP's mandate lay in returning the BZ to civilian use,
Civil Affairs Director Kyoko Shiotani explained, to include
allowing farming and light construction. Large-scale BZ
development by G/Cs was clearly provocative, however, and
thus not consistent with UNFICYP's primary role of preventing
renewed conflict.


6. (C) UNFICYP Senior Adviser Wlodek Cibor and Force
Commander Mario Sanchez-Debernardi briefed A/S Hook on
settlement talks developments, from Christofias's February
election and the subsequent establishment of working groups

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and technical committees to the leaders' meetings this summer
and the July 25 decision to commence full-fledged talks.
Regrettably, discussions were not proceeding at a pace that
pleased either the two sides or the UN. Both leaders could
make compelling arguments why their positions were correct
and the others' off-base, Cibor allowed. In general,
underpinning Talat's stance was the desire for
decentralization and strict bi-zonality of the unified
Cyprus, while Christofias required a stronger federal entity
that ensured more workable governance. In the two areas so
far discussed -- competencies of the federal and component
state governments, and the structure of the federal
administration -- great differences in the sides' positions
existed. In response to Hook's inquiry whether UN Special
Adviser Alexander Downer's hands-off tactics and relative
scarceness (he's officiated at only half the leaders'
meetings) contributed to the slow pace, Cibor revealed that
Downer likely would devote greater time to the talks after
January 1 (Note: he did not/not say, however, that Downer
would relocate to Cyprus in 2009, as many contacts speculate.
Further, UKHC Peter Millett told the Ambassador on October
28 that Downer was loathe to abandon lucrative speaking
engagements in his native Australia to work in Cyprus
full-time.) As to tactics, Cibor hinted at a greater role,
in stating that "we are facilitating, but not expressing our
views....yet." United Nations subject-matter experts had
been identified and funding allocated to pay them, should
circumstances merit a more direct UN role.
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G/C Side: It's Turkey, Turkey, Turkey
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7. (C) Three-time former Foreign Minister and current G/C
negotiator George Iacovou had first crack at A/S Hook.
Iacovou explained how President Christofias had pinned his
campaign on a promise to immediately engage the T/C side on
Cyprus substance. Christofias had delivered, with Iacovou
pointing to the opening of the Ledra Street BZ crossing as
proof. Further progress was being blocked, however, by
Ankara's hard lines. "Even on Phase II of Ledra, which
involves shoring up decrepit buildings and beautifying the
passage, I feel the breath of the Turkish Army," he decried.
Iacovou repeated an oft-heard complaint that Talat could make
promises to Christofias in the negotiating rooms, but real
decision-making authority remained in Turkish hands; for
example, despite the T/C leader's commitment to open another
crossing at Limnitis, he had failed to obtain TGS buy-in and
the project had stalled. "I got my fingers burned badly on
Limnitis," Iacovou exclaimed.


8. (C) Turning next to the core talks, the G/C negotiator
voiced similar sorrow that governance matters, thought to be
low-hanging fruit, had proven problematic. "I figured we
could finish competencies in an hour, since there had been so
much convergence in the working groups," he explained.
Talat, however, had chosen to start from scratch and was
deliberating nearly every point, seeking maximum
responsibilities for the constituent states. Similar
divergence of positions lay in the structure of the federal
government; the T/C demand for a presidential council
practically guaranteed unworkability, Iacovou declared. At
the heart of the issue was Talat's conviction that Cyprus's
federal government was a Greek Cypriot enemy, its powers to
be reduced at all costs. "But it's actually a shared
structure that should build trust and bring the communities
together," he reasoned.


9. (C) Assistant Secretary Hook commenced his call on
Foreign Minister Kyprianou by noting the UN had passed over
125 resolutions on Cyprus. At present, there was significant
interest in New York and Washington in the current settlement
process, and great desire to lend a hand in a mutually-agreed
(by the sides) fashion. Kyprianou raised the continuing
necessity of UNFICYP, claiming it provided not only security
to Greek Cypriots but also a useful conduit to Turkish
Cypriots and ultimately Turkey. UNFICYP's mandate should be
left as-is, the FM contended, with the only change being
yearly rollovers vice twice-yearly.


10. (C) Kyprianou showed that daylight existed between his
personal CyProb stance and Christofias's, observing that the
preparatory negotiations phase "was not significantly mature"
to mandate transition to full-fledged talks. As such, the
sides were not really negotiating currently, but rather
expressing opening positions. Echoing Iacovou, the FM
attributed the slow pace of talks to Turkish "intransigence"
and questioned whether the sides would conclude negotiations
on governance before Christmas. He doubted Ankara would
become more flexible, especially after its election to the UN

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Security Council, "a development that concerns us greatly."
Turkey, Kyprianou claimed, was acting schizophrenically,
voicing support for the process and its goal of a bizonal,
bicommunal Cyprus while also proclaiming the existence of two
peoples and two states on the island. A direct
Nicosia-Ankara communications channel might help, Kyprianou
conclude. Cyprus had tried numerous times to establish it,
lately through France, only to receive a Turkish rebuff,
however.

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Northerners Cite G/C Nationalism, Desires to Dominate
-------------- --------------


11. (C) A/S Hook next called on Talat and chief T/C
negotiator Ozdil Nami. Without prompting, Talat opened with
criticism of the Orthodox Church's influence on G/C society,
claiming there was no counterpart Islamic role in the Turkish
Cypriot community. Changing subjects, the A/S described his
interest in seeing UNFICYP operations up close and personal,
which drew an immediate reaction from his host. "UNFICYP
should become an observer mission staffed by police, not a
military peacekeeping mission," he charged. There was little
sense in UNFICYP escorting weekly humanitarian convoys to
enclaved Greek Cypriots in the north, for example, since the
goods transported -- which fueled a thriving black market in
the Karpass -- were widely available from T/C vendors.


12. (C) Talat shared UNFICYP and G/C dissatisfaction with
the pace of settlement talks but differed over root causes.
Greek Cypriots' refusal to utilize as a starting point the
2004 Annan Plan, which represented the culmination of 40-plus
years of UN effort, had resulted in a chaotic process in
which both sides were tabling extreme, opening positions
instead of starting with Annan and negotiating its
fine-tuning. Talat continued to see personal goodwill and a
desire to deal with counterpart Christofias, but worried the
RoC president lacked the spine to withstand expected
pressures from nationalist G/Cs.


13. (C) Hook's trip concluded with a visit to hard-line
Turkish Cypriot party UBP headquarters and its leader, Tahsin
Ertugruloglu. Ertugruloglu, who had just passed south for
the first time in 30-plus years to meet a G/C opposition
party, set the tone for the meeting when he opined there was
"nothing spectacular" about the government-controlled areas.
"Sure, it's more developed," he continued, "but what we've
accomplished under international isolation is far more
impressive." Turkish Cypriots took their "state" seriously,
Ertugruloglu asserted, any reunification must be a marriage
of equals, not absorption of T/Cs by the larger Greek Cypriot
community. His UBP now owned 40-45 percent of the Turkish
Cypriot vote, proof that attitudes had changed greatly since
the Annan Plan days, when his nationalistic party's fortunes
were on the decline.


14. (C) Ertugruloglu offered no surprises in describing his
preferred end-state. The new Cyprus must be a partnership of
two sovereign states, provide continued
guarantor/intervention rights for Turkey, and stipulate
global property exchange and/or compensation instead of
restitution and the subsequent dilution of bizonality as
Greek Cypriots moved back to their homes in the north. Only
this type of arrangement would prevent G/Cs from attempting
to subjugate T/Cs as they had done prior to 1974.


15. (U) A/S Hook has cleared this message.
Urbancic