CYPRUS: FM KYPRIANOU DESIRES CLOSE U.S.-ROC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000731

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU GE
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: FM KYPRIANOU DESIRES CLOSE U.S.-ROC
RELATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Frank C. Urbancic, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "Nothing should divide us" asserted
Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou at
Ambassador Urbancic's September 10 introductory call. The
United States and Cyprus shared numerous interests, Kyprianou
continued, and could cooperate in spheres ranging from
science and technology to the Middle East peace process.
Regarding the nascent Cyprus settlement negotiations, the
Foreign Minister held no illusions they would prove quick or
painless, since the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot positions
remained distant in many core areas. Not unexpectedly, when
asked where the U.S. might best assist, "in Ankara" was his
response -- T/C leaders, he argued, had short leashes and
zero authority to negotiate issues where Turkey had equities.
Kyprianou next tackled the Caucasus conflict. Steadfast in
its "principled" position, Cyprus would continue to demand
respect for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
despite "the whole mess having started with Saakashvili."
The RoC supported quick deployment of an EU monitoring
mission to "Georgia proper," but continued to oppose efforts
by harder-line states to isolate Russia. Kyrpianou noted the
RoC wanted the U.S. to conclude a bilateral agreement to
govern all USAID activities, especially in the north.
Hedging his comments somewhat, he thought the U.S. had not
coordinated its programs with the Cypriot government. In
response, the Ambassador assured the FM that appropriate
Ministry personnel had been briefed on aid program
particulars; since the Embassy had not received a response,
it planned to proceed with implementation. END SUMMARY.

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Lots of Room to Cooperate
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2. (C) "You have arrived at an interesting time," Kyprianou
began, referring to the September 3 start of full-fledged
negotiations on the island but also to improved bilateral
relations between Cyprus and the United States. He assessed
that the two countries shared various interests and could
further improve cooperation. Of EU member states, only
Cyprus was located in the Middle East, making it a useful
(and willing) partner on initiatives that focused on the
unstable region. Kyprianou pointed to other areas of recent
progress, such as a bilateral Science and Technology
Agreement that the RoC's Council of Ministers had recently
initialed (Note: State Department officials are currently
studying a number of Cyprus-proposed edits. End Note.) On
talks geared toward extending the U.S. Visa Waiver Program to
include Cyprus, the Minister actually accepted some
responsibility for delays, claiming the European Union's
desire to negotiate VWP membership for its members as a group
-- rather than allowing them to negotiate bilaterally, as
Cyprus recently had done with Russia -- had proven untenable.
Securing visa-free U.S. travel for Cypriot citizens remained
an important RoC goal, however.

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On CyProb Talks, No Surprises: Problem Lies in Ankara
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3. (C) Like most Greek Cypriot politicians, Kyprianou
maintained that the Cyprus settlement effort must remain "by
the Cypriots, for the Cypriots." And again not deviating
from the norm, he identified one key area where U.S. efforts
could best help: in pressuring Ankara to give Talat
negotiating flexibility. Many aspects of the process
directly affected Turkey's perceived interests on the island,
the FM maintained, and while the GoT did not sit at the
table, its leadership exerted great influence over Turkish
Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat and other members of the T/C
negotiating team. Talat enjoyed little maneuvering room on
most core issues, and none on issues of security, Kyprianou
asserted. In such a scenario, he hoped the USG might push
Turkey to act more constructively and allow T/Cs more freedom
for deal-making.


4. (C) The process would hit potholes, and leaders in both
communities must be prepared to face them, Kyprianou
ventured. Breaking ranks somewhat from the G/C mainstream,
who argue for no foreign arbitration or mediation at all, he
envisioned the sides seeking assistance from the
international community to break deadlocks. Kyprianou blamed
an incomplete preparatory phase of negotiations for what he
expected to be a rough road ahead: while certain working
groups had reached convergence on multiple issues, others had
tallied far fewer successes and some, none at all. President
Demetris Christofias had made a judgment call to consent to

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the start of full-fledged negotiation. "He really had no
other choice," the FM believed, although the decision had
rankled various G/C parties, including Kyprianou's DIKO.
"And I support him in his decision."


5. (C) Kyprianou next outlined the short-term way forward on
the negotiations. Talat and Christofias had proven unable to
commit to a firm schedule for the talks, but would continue
meeting weekly unless developments mandated a different
tempo. The working groups would reconstitute in order to
support the leaders' deliberations. In a best-case scenario,
Christofias and Talat would reach a tentative, basic
agreement late in 2009, with the "gaps" to be plugged
thereafter. As long as the negotiations were delivering
measurable progress, he saw no reason to push the process.
Such a tortoise-paced approach had the benefit of not raising
public expectations to unreal levels, a problem in prior
negotiations, he added.

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Georgia: Cyprus On Board for EU Observers
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6. (C) Dominating the Cypriots' policy formulation equation
on Georgia was its iron-clad support for states' territorial
inviolability and sovereignty, Kyprianou maintained. The RoC
had vigorously opposed Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence, fearing it would unleash a domino effect across
the globe, and with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its fears had
come true. Issues of secession and independence must be
tackled bilaterally or multilaterally via negotiation, not
unilaterally and/or via force of arms. Cyprus would continue
to support measures that called on all nations to respect
Georgia's borders, a position that had earned it Moscow's
ire, he claimed.


7. (C) That said, the RoC opposed punitive measures against
Russia. "Active engagement, not isolation and sanctions, are
in order," Kyprianou argued, an ironic message since the RoC
has vigorously employed both weapons against the "Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus." He didn't expect the EU to
harden its stance, owing to Europe and Russia's significant
and growing interdependence. Kyprianou stated flatly that
Cyprus now supported an EU civilian monitoring mission for
Georgia, despite rumors in some member states to the
contrary. He had first favored adding monitors to the OSCE
mission, since establishing an autonomous European Union
force could lead to the EU, OSCE, and UN stumbling over each
other. So as not to delay their deployment further,
Kyprianou favored acceding to Russia's demands that the EU
force limit activities to "Georgia proper" and not venture
into the disputed territories.


8. (C) In a moment of candor, Kyprianou asserted that
Georgia deserved blame for provoking the latest Caucasus
conflict. "They delivered a present to Russia" via their
attack in South Ossetia. "It would be like us attacking
Turkish Cypriots here, and not expecting Turkey to strike
back," he reasoned. "Saakashvili took the bait -- what did
he think would happen?" the Minister questioned. Time in
Brussels working regularly with Moscow -- Kyprianou served as
EU Health Commissioner until early 2008 -- had shown him that
Moscow bristled when confronted directly. "Better to give
them a way to save face," he concluded.

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Unspecified Concern with USAID Programs
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9. (C) Although admittedly shy on the details, Kyprianou
stated that elements of the U.S. assistance program in Cyprus
concerned some in his ministry. "I've been told that the
problems have been building up over many years" he explained;
first among them was the MFA's perception that USAID
providers were not adequately consulting their Cypriot
interlocutors over program goals and implementation. The
Ministry favored a Memorandum of Understanding that
formalized the consultative procedure, he added. The
Ambassador forcefully countered that U.S. assistance aimed to
create improved conditions for the island's reunification and
therefore benefited Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots alike.
Embassy personnel regularly offered program briefings to
high-level MFA staff, including details of all active and
planned programs, but had received no response. The U.S.
would continue to consult, the Ambassador pledged, but would
not seek RoC approval before funding programs. He reminded
Kyprianou that USAID had left a full briefing with the
Ministry several months earlier. Since no comments had yet

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been received, the Embassy planned to proceed with
implementation.

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Comment
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10. (C) We are encouraged that Kyprianou began the meeting
by praising the Embassy's role in putting U.S.-Cyprus
relations on an upward track since its Annan Plan-era nadir.
Further, in arguing that "nothing should divide us" and
voicing desires to support key U.S. policy priorities like
Middle East peace, he has helped alleviate somewhat our fears
that the February election of the Soviet-educated Demetris
Christofias and elevation into power of his anti-American,
Communist AKEL could threaten hitherto solid cooperation in
international security and counter-terrorism. Kyprianou's
eventual decision not to block the EU monitoring mission --
possibly bucking Moscow's pressure in doing so -- shows a
realization that Cyprus cannot cozy too close to Moscow
without negative repercussions among the EU 27.


11. (C) On the Cyprus Problem, it came as no surprise that
Minister Kyprianou, hailing from nationalist DIKO and the son
of a hard-line former RoC president, spouted the same, "the
problem lies with Turkey" rhetoric common in the G/C
community. What was most interesting, however, was his
acknowledgment that "pressure Ankara" was not the only role
for the international community; despite Greek Cypriots'
desire for a "Cyprus Solution," the sides eventually will
face deadlocks that only third-party help can resolve.
Kyprianou also offered a realistic picture of the pace of
negotiations and need to manage public expectations.
Urbancic