TALAT STILL TROUBLED BY GREEK CYPRIOT MOTIVATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000649

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT STILL TROUBLED BY GREEK CYPRIOT MOTIVATIONS

REF: NICOSIA 628

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "I believe Christofias sincerely desires a
solution," Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat informed
the Ambassador at his farewell call August 6, "but I doubt
his ability to manage the process and control Greek Cypriot
hard-liners." Formal negotiations would commence on
September 3; in that mostly-ceremonial gathering, Talat
continued, the leaders would determine their frequency of
meeting, other modalities, and possibly craft a broad agenda
for the first phase of talks. Despite Christofias agreeing
on July 25 to the start of full-fledged talks -- a bold
decision that the G/C hard-liners only grudgingly accepted --
Talat voiced great doubt over Greek Cypriot motivations.
"They have no reason to negotiate, really, since they 'have
it all' now," he lamented. As proof, Talat claimed
Christofias had been intent on abandoning preparatory talks
had he not won "concessions" from the T/C side on the unified
state's single sovereignty and citizenship. Talat evinced
comfort with the state of U.S.-Turkish Cypriot relations, but
continued to spew vitriol toward the British, whose
"anti-T/C" MOU with the Republic of Cyprus had proven they no
longer functioned as honest brokers. Changing subjects at
the conclusion of the call, the Turkish Cypriot leader
predicted the "TRNC Parliament" would conclude deliberations
on key anti-TIP and anti-money laundering "legislation" by
October, and hoped rare August rains might stave off a water
crisis. END SUMMARY.

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Optimistic, But Not Blindly So
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2. (C) Talat looked tired and distracted early on, perhaps
the product of overseeing "the social event of the year in
'Northern Cyprus,'" as T/C media described the July 31
wedding of his daughter, Aysenur. He hoped to rest and
recuperate at an August 11 follow-on ceremony in Tunisia, the
groom's home country. In response to congratulations from
the Ambassador for success in re-starting the formal
negotiation process, Talat voiced optimism and doubt
simultaneously. "I believe Christofias and his close
advisors sincerely desire a solution to the Cyprus Problem,"
he ventured. Problems in Greek Cypriot "society," however,
meant success was far from assured. Hard-liners in the
south, such as Archbishop Chrysostomos, would continue to
challenge Christofias's authority and ability to compromise,
Talat argued. His own side's most-celebrated hard-liner,
former "TRNC President" Rauf Denktash, had warned him that
Christofias's recent meeting with the Primate and
Chrysostomos's subsequent, public acceptance of the
President's Cyprus Problem management was proof that the two
Greek Cypriots' positions were converging -- and not for the
better. (Comment: Our own interpretation of the
Archbishop's newfound support for Christofias is that any
"convergence" of views would likely be on the non-taxation of
Church property. End Comment)


3. (C) Significant progress had occurred since Christofias's
election, Talat concurred. Formal negotiations under UN
auspices would begin with a mostly-ceremonial meeting on
September 3, with newly-named UN Special Adviser Alexander
Downer present. At the initial gathering, Talat hoped to
hammer out modalities for the coming process. His earlier
suggestion for twice-weekly leaders' meeting had met with
pushback from Christofias, the latter claiming he had "other
duties" apart from negotiating which precluded such a heavy
schedule. "I demanded that the weekly meeting last a full
day, however, and he accepted." Also meriting the leaders'
study September 3 were additional modalities, such as the
size of the negotiating teams. Last, Talat hoped the two men
could iron out a tentative agenda for the first phase of
talks. Christofias's expected departure for the UN General
Assembly in mid-September would affect the rhythm of
negotiations, but Talat hoped to "double-up" meetings either
the previous or successive weeks. He had no intention
himself to attend the General Assembly, since the "TRNC's"
unrecognized status meant high-level meetings were
unattainable. (Note: Talat revealed that "TRNC Foreign
Minister" Turgay Avci would participate in an
on-the-UNGA-margins meeting of Organization of the Islamic
Conference FMs. End Note.)

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Doubts Aplenty Over G/C Intentions
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4. (C) While hoping for success in the current negotiating
effort, Talat clearly had not abandoned planning for failure.
"A key question for all," he posited, " is what happens if
the process falls apart, especially if the Greek Cypriots are
to blame?" Talat argued that G/Cs -- prosperous,
internationally-recognized, and full EU members -- had no
incentive to negotiate in good faith. "Except for
Christofias's ideology (his AKEL party favors a federal
solution, and for much of its history welcomed T/C
membership),there's nothing compelling him to deal." As the
negotiators began to tackle prickly issues, such as property
and security/guarantees, both sides would be forced to
compromise, he explained. Only the Turkish Cypriots had been
willing to make concessions so far, however.


5. (C) As proof of the Greek Cypriots' ostensible,
borderline-intransigent state, Talat revealed that, at the
leaders' July 1 meeting, Christofias had demanded that Talat
accept mention in the resulting joint statement of the
unified state's single citizenship and sovereignty; had he
(Talat) refused, Christofias would have walked out and
refused to countenance full-fledged talks, to which the G/C
leader had committed in their earlier May 23 meeting. "And
when I implored him to consider the implications of such a
move, he simply responded 'I don't care,'" Talat grimaced.
Sovereignty must emanate equally from the TWO peoples on the
island, he continued; any other model signified a unitary,
not federal state, unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots.


6. (C) Talat had felt compelled to accept the single
sovereignty mention in order to preserve momentum and
goodwill between the communities, he insisted. Christofias
had not budged an inch, for example refusing the T/C leader's
proposal for internal (constituent state) citizenship. The
Ambassador responded forcefully to Talat's charges. While
the Greek Cypriot leader answered ultimately to his own
constituency and would defend his own community's interests,
Christofias had shown flexibility and courage in taking on
the hard-liners, such as when he admitted that Greek Cypriots
deserved some blame for the destruction of the 1960 Republic.
Christofias, in stark contrast to his predecessors, also had
given his constituency clear public messages that painful
compromises would be required to achieve a settlement.
Rather than entering the negotiations suspicious of
Christofias's intentions and thereby wary of dealing, Talat
ought to instead be forthright in reminding the G/C leader of
what he had told his own people with regard to the need for
compromise.

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U.S. Good, UK Bad
--------------


7. (C) In his concluding words, the Ambassador expressed
regret at leaving the island at such a promising juncture. A
new ambassador would soon arrive, and interest in resolving
the Cyprus Problem would remain high in Nicosia and
Washington. Talat welcomed the news, thanked the Ambassador
for his service, and agreed that ties between the United
States and the Turkish Cypriot community remained close. Not
so warm were T/Cs' relations with the island's former
colonial master. Increasingly, it appeared that Britain did
not want a Cyprus solution, Talat bemoaned. Why else had
they signed such an inflammatory memorandum of understanding
with the "Greek Cypriot government," especially at a crucial
moment in the intercommunal talks? Convinced that Britain's
desires to improve its bilateral relations with the RoC had
led it to sell out Turkish Cypriots, Talat felt that that
country could no longer play the role of honest broker. The
Ambassador cautioned Talat to reconsider and not needlessly
alienate the UK, the Turks' and T/Cs' best friends in
Brussels and a guarantor power whose support the T/Cs ought
try to cultivate.

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Wrapping up with a Readout
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8. (C) Prompted by the Ambassador, Talat turned last to
actions his "government" and "legislature" soon would
undertake. "Parliament," currently on recess, would return
in a month and consider two pieces of key "legislation," one
regarding trafficking in persons and the other money
laundering. He hoped both would pass by October, helping to
bring the "TRNC" closer to international crime-fighting
norms. Regarding the water crisis currently gripping the
island, Talat considered August 15 a crucial date.
Historically, wells ran driest in mid-August; if there were
no rains before then -- highly unlikely, according to most

NICOSIA 00000649 003 OF 003


meteorologists -- northern Cyprus would face crisis
conditions, he admitted. Officials in Famagusta had reached
agreement with an Israeli firm to construct a desalinization
plant to meet much of eastern end of the island's needs, but
that plant would not come on-line before 2010.

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Comment
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9. (C) Regrettably, "Woe is me" is never far from even the
most pro-solution Turkish Cypriots' lips. While we did not
predict unbridled optimism from Talat -- anyone facing the
Greek Cypriots, tenacious negotiators, should be brighter
than that -- we also did not expect him to harp continually
on the G/Cs' lack of incentive to deal. For their part, the
Greek Cypriots worry the Turks have no real incentive
themselves, and will pressure Talat in ways that abort the
possibility of an agreement. Thus, each side desires a "Plan
B" that would protect its interests in the event of a
collapse in negotiations. In both our public comments and
private conversations, however, our line remains the same:
the sides should plan for success, not failure. Based on
their continued focus on the sovereignty issue, however,
which seems germane only if the new state were to fail,
they've not yet gotten the message.
SCHLICHER