Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NICOSIA628
2008-08-01 13:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CHRISTOFIAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011303Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9030
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0536
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1184
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000628 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING
UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. SCHLICHER-FRIED EMAIL OF JULY 31

B. NICOSIA 531

C. NICOSIA 558

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000628

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC REGARDING
UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. SCHLICHER-FRIED EMAIL OF JULY 31

B. NICOSIA 531

C. NICOSIA 558

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: If he and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat could not reunite Cyprus, then who could? RoC President
Demetris Christofias told the Ambassador during the latter's
farewell call July 31. President Christofias, while pleased
with the outcome of the March-July preparatory phase and
subsequent leaders' decision to commence full-fledged
negotiations in September, recognized that areas of
disagreement still exceeded points of convergence in the
sides' positions on many fundamental issues. Making the
settlement track more difficult still was Talat's tenuous
political situation in the north, although the decision in
the AKP closure case and ally Turkish PM Erdogan's survival
spelled some relief for the T/C leader. Christofias
confidently claimed he enjoyed greater maneuvering room, with
even hard-liners like the Archbishop now publicly supporting
the drive for a solution. Regarding appointment of a U.S.
Special Envoy for Cyprus, the RoC president felt the time not
yet right, but did not oppose the move in theory. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
Moving Forward, But Challenges Remain
--------------


2. (C) Archbishop Chrysostomos II only minutes before had
departed the Presidential Palace. "I received his 'blessing'
for my negotiating efforts," the long-time Communist
chuckled, "since he thinks I'm doing my utmost to protect
Greek Cypriot interests. He even had accepted the notion of
a federal solution, as long as it had the appropriate
content." Benediction aside, Christofias considered the
hard-line, camera-hungry Primate a political threat capable
of withdrawing his support at a moment's notice.
Unsurprisingly, the President voiced his intention to keep
the Church out of politics while at the same time maintaining
close relationships with more friendly members of the Holy
Synod.


3. (C) Christofias turned next to the latest gathering of
the leaders, held July 25. "I'm satisfied, both with the

meeting and the statement that emerged," he informed the
Ambassador. Full-fledged negotiations commencing next month
would begin with a protocolary meeting that the President
hoped would be low-key, despite the presence of new UN
Special Adviser Alexander Downer. The leaders and their
representatives would begin work in earnest on September 11,
and Job 1 would entail setting the ground rules for the
negotiations. Once per week Talat and Christofias would
meet; Talat had wanted an increased frequency, the President
revealed, but the staffwork such a schedule demanded would
have proven excessive.


4. (C) "Reservedly optimistic" described Christofias's
outlook vis-a-vis the process. "If old comrades like Mehmet
Ali (Talat) and I cannot succeed, then who can?" he reasoned.
That said, the President recognized that points of
convergence during the preparatory, working groups/technical
committees exercise occurred mainly on non-controversial
matters. Tougher issues -- property returns, territorial
adjustments, and security/guarantees, inter alia -- the
leaders had put off, in order to build confidence between the
negotiating teams. Christofias even doubted that Talat had
Ankara's permission to negotiate on particularly sensitive
topics like Turkish troop withdrawals.


5. (C) The T/C leader felt constrained not only by Ankara,
but by his opposition at home as well, Christofias asserted.
Nationalist parties DP and UBP saw electoral benefits in a
failed process and would oppose Talat at every opportunity.
When the T/C leader had agreed on July 1 to mention of the
unified Cypriot state's single sovereignty and citizenship,
DP and UBP quickly trumpeted that Talat had violated his
"oath of office" mandating he protect the "TRNC" and uphold
its "constitution." Talat had shown a willingness to take on
the Deep Staters before, the President continued, such as
when he announced that no federal state worldwide maintained
multiple international personalities and citizenship. He
would need to exhibit continued political courage if the
negotiations were to succeed, Christofias thought. Buoying
Talat somewhat was the recent Turkish court decision that
spared AKP and PM Tayyip Erdogan, the T/C leader's ally in

NICOSIA 00000628 002 OF 003


Ankara. "Talat even told me he'd asked Erdogan to come to
Cyprus to help him politically, Christofias revealed (Ref C).
While the Deep State would continue to oppose good-faith
Cyprus negotiations, the President thought Erdogan had
regained the upper hand. "Now he's got to let Talat
negotiate," he argued.


6. (C) Christofias faced weaker opponents and had more room
to maneuver, he ventured. DISY leadership supported his
Cyprus Problem stance which, combined with support from AKEL,
meant he enjoyed the backing of 65 percent of Cypriot voters.
DIKO President Marios Karoyian had succeeded in delivering
that party's support, although it remained tenuous. Even
EDEK and leader Yiannakis Omirou had toned down its
anti-federal solution rhetoric. "Let's rest a bit in August
and then move forward," he ended, confidently.

--------------
Maintaining Momentum on U.S.-Cyprus Relations
--------------


7. (C) Changing subjects, Christofias welcomed that
relations between his government and Washington had steadily
improved since their nadir in the wake of the failed April
2004 Annan Plan referendum. "Many of the old suspicions,
much of the unpleasantness, is gone now," he explained.
Critics, especially those opposed to the solution effort,
were even claiming he was "under the Americans' and British
thumbs," the President chuckled, an allusion to his AKEL
party's anti-imperialist, anti-American bent. Christofias
hoped Cypriots could overcome their perceived slights at the
hands of the United States and move on.


8. (C) The Ambassador agreed the course of bilateral
relations pointed upward. On a wealth of bilateral and
multilateral fronts the United States enjoyed close
cooperation with the RoC, and he was certain his successor
aimed for even greater cooperation. The healthier
relationship augured well for Cyprus Problem negotiations as
well, the Ambassador reasoned, leaving the United States in a
better position to support the process. In that vein, he
lambasted recent efforts by a DC-based Greek Cypriot
journalist, Michael Ignatiou, whose recent columns alleged
that the possible naming of a U.S. Cyprus envoy was driving
Washington and Nicosia apart (Ref A). What was the
President's opinion regarding the position?


9. (C) Christofias, who knew Ignatiou well, promised to
contact the journalist to follow up; he was unsure what had
motivated the misinformation campaign. The President was not
against a US envoy in theory, but did not believe the time
was right. "Let's wait a bit, to see how things are going,"
Christofias offered, claiming he had said the same to
visiting EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried on July 7 (Ref
B). He was in no position to oppose the nomination anyway,
he explained. Probing further, the Ambassador inquired
whether a "regional" U.S. envoy, who would include the Cyprus
portfolio in addition to other confict-resolution
responsibilities, was preferable to a dedicated one. After
musing a minute, he responded that he favored a "Tom
Weston-type appointment." Christofias insisted, however,
that it was vital the Cypriots themselves maintain ownership
of the current process, since the &imposition8 of the 2004
Annan Plan had caused his community great harm.


10. (C) Christofias last offered his opinion on how the
international community might best support upcoming
negotiations. Unsurprisingly, he asked that the USG
concentrate its efforts in Turkey. A behind-the-scenes,
steady effort to convince PM Erdogan and other power players
to allow Talat freedom to negotiate constituted the most
valuable U.S. contribution to the process, the President
avowed. If "left alone," Talat would negotiate in good faith
and work toward a solution, he was certain.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Christofias seemed unusually candid and care-free
July 31, perhaps the product of carrying an 85 percent
approval rating into the August vacation period. His
observations on the difficulty of upcoming negotiations jibe
closely with ours and the UN's, however -- one UNFICYP
official claimed differences in the sides positions on core
issues outnumbered convergences 10 to 1. Getting to "Yes"
will require great compromises from both sides, and

NICOSIA 00000628 003 OF 003


Christofias, in working hard to ensure that even firebrands
like the Archbishop and DIKO at least nominally back him, has
taken an excellent first step. As the President rightly
noted, though, Talat's hand looks far weaker against his
opponents, both home-grown and in Turkey. If the current
effort to achieve a solution to the Cyprus Problem is to
succeed, the T/C leader will have to enjoy active support, or
at a bare minimum avoid vetoes, from both the civilian
leadership in Ankara and the generals.
SCHLICHER