VISITING ANALYST HEARS MIXED REVIEWS OF CHRISTOFIAS

UNCLAS NICOSIA 000465

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, INR/B

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CY
SUBJECT: VISITING ANALYST HEARS MIXED REVIEWS OF CHRISTOFIAS


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In meetings with officials and academics,
visiting INR biographical analyst Zayda Madriz heard both
praise and skepticism of RoC President Demetris Christofias,
in office four months. Though Greek Cypriots praised the
"change in climate" that accompanied Christofias's election
and expressed widespread relief at predecessor Tassos
Papadopoulos's departure from power, many doubted the new
president could overcome fierce loyalty to his party and show
real leadership on the Cyprus Problem. Turkish Cypriots were
even more Christofias-skeptic and concerned by his
foot-dragging on setting a start date for negotiations. End
summary.

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After Papadopolous, G/C leaders welcome a thaw
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2. (SBU) EmbOffs and visiting biographical analyst Zayda
Madriz met with G/C officials and academics on both sides of
the island June 9-11 to discuss the political climate since
Christofias's election and to study Christofias's behavior
and background. Committee for the Protection of Competition
Chairman and longtime Christofias friend Costakis
Christoforou emphasized to Madriz that the president was a
"people person" -- but more importantly a party person, for
whom party interests were paramount. Christofias's kinder,
gentler MO had palpably improved the atmosphere surrounding
bi-communal dealings in the G/C community in recent months.
However, Christofias' first and strongest loyalties were to
his AKEL party -- would he take steps for the good of the
Republic if it meant harming AKEL somehow? Boding favorably
for a solution, Christoforou doubted the president would give
much credence to coalition partners (but generally
anti-solution) parties DIKO and EDEK, since their popularity
numbers were on the decline.


3. (SBU) Government Spokesman Stephanos Stephanou praised
Christofias's leadership on the Cyprus issue but noted that
developments on the ground could complicate negotiations.
Christofias was willing to do "everything possible" to reach
a settlement, he claimed, but Turkey remained the main
obstacle. Stephanou did not question T/C leader Mehmet Ali
Talat's commitment to a solution but rather, Talat's
independence from Ankara. On the other hand, Christofias had
moderated his rhetoric to shore up Talat's position vis--vis
Turkey, for instance reducing his criticism of Turkey's
military presence in the north. He also mentioned the
challenge Christofias faced with his electorate, stating that
G/Cs often misunderstood the content of a "federal solution"
and that the government intended to remedy public
misperceptions. Above all else, Christofias had run for
president to solve the Cyprus problem, Stephanou asserted;
for this reason he would not balk at confronting difficulties
along the way.


4. (SBU) According to DIKO MP Nicos Cleanthous, Christofias
was determined to solve the Cyprus problem but will need
considerable U.S. and international support to do so.
Cleanthous acknowledged "conflicting views" in DIKO over
their support for Christofias's push for a solution but did
not foresee DIKO leaving the government in the near future.

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Elsewhere in the RoC, caution and uncertainty
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5. (SBU) DISY MP Sotiris Sampson had kind words for neither
Turkey nor Christofias in his meeting with Madriz. Remarking
that Christofias had DISY's support "as long as he is worth
it," Sampson said the president must make progress toward
"the right kind of a solution" -- in Sampson's view, a
unified government for the island (Note: he likely was
referring to a unified, vice federal, state.) Sampson
criticized Christofias's focus on bi-communal measures;
Cypriots need reunification, not a good-neighbor policy. He
spoke harshly of Turkey and dismissed Christofias's talks
with Talat, since Turkish PM Tayyip Erdogan wields the real
power in the north. Sampson called repeatedly for the U.S.
to exert its supposed influence over Turkey and contain it.


6. (SBU) One-time fringe presidential candidate Costas
Themistocleous was cautiously optimistic on Christofias's
political will. He could not predict whether the president's
short-term political interests would eclipse his desire to be
the architect of a settlement. How and when Christofias sets
a date for full negotiations would signal how he will handle
tough choices -- if Christofias delays the talks and
disparages progress now, he will be unlikely to show
necessary leadership later. Regarding the Christofias-Talat
dynamic, Themistocleous observed that, though the two worked
well enough together, the ideologically similar CTP's earlier
emergence from under AKEL's wing still irked Christofias, and
he tried to remind Talat he was "the boss" sometimes.
Themistocleous said Talat had been flexible on negotiation
start dates to accommodate Christofias' desire for a slower
pace, but that he had not offered a blank check; Talat would
not accept an indefinite delay.


7. (SBU) When Madriz raised AKEL's 2004 Annan Plan "no" vote,
Themistocleous explained that Christofias had been unwilling
to sacrifice AKEL's position in the government for a solution
the party had believed had no chance of success. Though
unwilling to say decisively that Christofias had changed,
Themistocleous noted conditions facing Christofias had;
AKEL's position of power and the absence of Papadopolous
might let Christofias do in 2008 what he would not in 2004.

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Academics, NGOs laud climate change, but see clouds ahead
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8. (SBU) Professor Joseph Joseph of the University of Cyprus,
an international relations expert and Jean Monnet Scholar,
was effusive in his praise for Christofias, calling him a
"visionary" who had the "openness, flexibility, and
determination" to reach a solution. He said without
hesitation that Christofias would sacrifice his political
popularity for reunification. Professor Hubert Faustmann,
also of the University of Cyprus, stated that Christofias's
election had made the Turks' and T/Cs' job more difficult --
faced with a reasonable, personable counterpart, they could
no longer blame everything on Papadopoulos's intransigence.
He noted, however, that Christofias and the international
community could not take a Turkish Cypriot "yes" on any new
agreement for granted. Mainland Turkish "settlers," the
Turkish Army presence, and Turkey's right of
guarantee/intervention will pose the greatest challenges, and
pleasing both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on any of
them might be impossible.

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In the North, a chillier climate
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11. (SBU) During his meeting with Madriz, Cyprus Policy
Center Director and Eastern Mediterranean University
Professor Ahmet Sozen was deeply skeptical of Christofias'
determination to reach a settlement. Sozen argued that
Turkey's domestic distractions had created a perfect window
for negotiations, but Christofias was wasting that
opportunity, even telling a G/C working group member to slow
down the group's efforts. He noted that Christofias had
undermined the Annan plan to maintain AKEL's position in
2004, and doubted that he would act otherwise now. However,
neither did Christofias want to be "the man under whose watch
the partition of Cyprus became permanent." Christofias's
rhetoric of brotherhood and compatriotism between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots actually rankled Turkish Cypriots, who would
rather have civil coexistence than close familial ties with
their G/C neighbors. Sozen said Christofias' training in
Moscow and loyalty to AKEL concerned him; he felt the
"politburo mentality" and "dogmatism" this produced had made
Christofias an inflexible negotiator.


12. (SBU) Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) researcher
Ayla Gurel considered the "climate change" in the south
superficial; Papadopoulous had lost not because he failed to
solve the problem, but because he ruined the RoC's image
abroad. Whereas the Turkish Cypriots felt real urgency now,
the Greek Cypriots thought time was on their side for a
solution. With Cyprus in hand, G/Cs believed a solution
involves simply "fitting the Turkish Cypriots in somewhere"
-- a view which contradicts a federal solution. Gurel did
not doubt that Christofias genuinely believed what he was
saying, but said he failed to see the Turkish Cypriot
position at the same time. In her view, the international
community needed to provide not just resources but direction
to the process -- Christofias' "Cypriot solution" was not
feasible.

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Comment
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13. (SBU) Though many Embassy contacts whom analyst Madriz
met on her visit were still bullish on Christofias -- and
absolutely no one longed for hard-liner Papadopoulos's return
-- there were signs, especially in the T/C community, of
growing uncertainty and even impatience with the president.
G/C interlocutors wanted to believe Christofias had the
gumption to seize the opportunity for a solution, but saw
little from his past suggesting he will. Those in the north
were tiring of Christofias's "goodwill" gestures and are less
willing to take Christofias at his word when he says he wants
a solution above all else. The president's actions this
summer -- whether he sets a date for negotiations, if he
makes concessions during the talks, and how he presents his
actions to the public -- will give more clues to his
leadership ability, all think, but they are not especially
optimistic. End Comment.
SCHLICHER