CYPRUS SUPPORTS SUBSTANCE OF P5+1 PACKAGE, BUT MAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000461

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR ROLAND MCKAY, ISN/RA RICHARD NEPHEW,
EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS SUPPORTS SUBSTANCE OF P5+1 PACKAGE, BUT MAY
NOT LOBBY HARD

REF: SECSTATE 64530

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Ambassador on June 19 delivered reftel points and
contents of P5 1 Iran Package to Cypriot MFA Political
Director (P equivalent) Euripides Evriviades. Ambassador
emphasized the package's generous and wide-ranging nature,
building as it did on an already-robust 2006 offer. Should
Iran's leaders truly want to develop nuclear capabilities for
civilian, peaceful purposes, they ought to accept the latest
pitch pronto. Tailoring the demarche specifically for
Cyprus, he highlighted for Evriviades how Tehran's recent
efforts in Lebanon and elsewhere had emboldened the radical
regime, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the
region. Boding poorly for Cyprus, the area's other powers,
specifically Turkey and Egypt, might react to Iran developing
nuclear weapons by launching their own programs. Cyprus thus
benefited greatly by international efforts to prevent Tehran
from getting the bomb, and should lobby strongly in that
direction, both bilaterally and in Brussels.


2. (C) Evriviades agreed that the P5 1 proposal looked
attractive. It was encouraging that not only the EU and
U.S., but also the Russians and Chinese, were united behind
the effort. Yet he doubted the Iranians would accept the
package despite its obvious benefits. First, they were
unlikely to suspend uranium enrichment as a precondition for
talks, even if the Secretary were a participant. Evriviades
also believed that Tehran intended to wait out the current
U.S. administration, believing "better treatment" could await
them under a Democratic regime. As a compromise, he focused
on the adjective "formal" (as in "discussions") in the
package text -- perhaps "informal" talks could occur before
enrichment ended, giving Tehran a little political room to
maneuver? Despite his belief that Iran would push back,
Evriviades promised that Cyprus would urge Iran, both in
Nicosia and via its embassy in Tehran, to accept the deal.


3. (C) The Ambassador next turned to EU autonomous sanctions
against Iran, noting our understanding that designations
against Iranian institutions such as Bank Melli might
commence in Brussels on May 23. Evriviades was unaware of
this development. According to his sources, the Iranians had
taken legal measures against designation of the bank, a tack
that likely would delay formal actions many months. As such,
he thought unilateral EU sanctions against Iran had been
delegated to the back burner. "Besides," he concluded, "it's
best not to tip the scales too soon, before Tehran has
responded formally to the P5 1 package."


4. (C) COMMENT: Evriviades's body language betrayed his
pronouncement that the RoC would lobby the Iranians hard. In
prior meetings, he has confided that, as a small nation in a
tough neighborhood, Cyprus "had to accept sleeping with
strange bedfellows," a reference to its not-cold relations
with Syria and Iran. We'd therefore be surprised if Nicosia
made anything but perfunctory efforts in support of the P5 1
package.
SCHLICHER