MAINTAINING POSITIVE MOMENTUM ON CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NICOSIA 000348

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: MAINTAINING POSITIVE MOMENTUM ON CYPRUS

REF: EMBASSY NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 02/14/08

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: Prospects for substantive
progress toward a Cyprus solution appeared bleak in December

2007. RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos enjoyed a clear lead
among Greek Cypriot voters, and re-election of the celebrated
hard-liner seemed likely. North of the Green Line, an
opposition "parliamentary" boycott and continued political
infighting presented real threats to Mehmet Ali Talat's
pro-solution CTP "government." The July 8 (2006) Agreement
lay unimplemented, the sides unable even to agree on names
for its envisioned technical committees and working groups.
And doubts over UN Special Representative Michael Moller's
continued employment -- Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots long
had believed Moller harbored pro-Greek sentiments -- left
UNFICYP in lame-duck status.


2. (C) Fast-forward to today and the picture grows
considerably brighter. Voters disgruntled by Tassos's
arrogance and his CyProb policies' failures dumped the crusty
septuagenarian in February and replaced him with pro-solution
leftist Demetris Christofias. Calls for early T/C elections
in 2008 have mostly disappeared, as "opposition" UBP and DP
have failed to capitalize on CTP's weaknesses. Christofias
and Talat met March 21 and green-lighted a modified July 8
process; their representatives subsequently developed agendas
for six working groups and seven technical committees that
are meeting regularly and making headway. Ban Ki-Moon in
April designated respected UN diplomat Taye-Brooke Zerihoun
as Moller's replacement, a move both Cypriot communities
welcomed, and is considering nominating a figure "of
international standing" as his Special Adviser on Cyprus.


3. (C) Leaders Christofias and Talat met again on May 21
amidst a still optimistic (though guardedly so) climate.
Emerging from the "summit" was a joint statement that
clarified points of concern for both sides and called for
additional stock-taking gatherings between the community's
representatives. Left unclarified, however, was the
64,000-dollar question: whether and when full-fledged Cyprus
Problem negotiations would commence, and on what basis. Both
men have invested significant political capital in the
preparatory process and desire it to morph into formal talks,
yet the pressures they feel and the timetables they confront
are distinctly different. For a variety of reasons, Talat
needs an early start to negotiations and claims his side was
ready yesterday. Christofias, on the other hand, must
satisfy demands from his nationalist partners for ill-defined
"progress" before he can agree to upgrade the process. The
UN will not take a stand either way, committed as it is to
facilitating, not imposing, a "Cypriot Solution."


4. (C) In February, the Embassy offered thoughts on
re-energizing the then-stalled Cyprus process (Ref). Our goal
was to see the impasse broken and the sides engaged in
serious, substantive negotiations before the end of 2008, an
outcome that now seems reachable. This telegram recaps
events on the island and elsewhere in the last four months,
evaluates elements of our strategy as employed thus far, and
provides additional suggestions to spur success. END SUMMARY
AND INTRODUCTION

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Change in Leadership Spawns Improved Climate
--------------


5. (C) Christofias's June 2007 decision to break the
coalition and challenge Papadopoulos in the February 2008
presidential elections destroyed the sense of inevitability
surrounding the incumbent's re-election prospects and offered
hope that a more constructive CyProb stance might materialize
on the G/C side. Still, most predicted the veteran
politician would manage to emerge victorious on the strength
of his nationalist credentials and proven capacity to resist
"imposed" Cyprus solutions. It therefore came as great
surprise when Tassos not only lost, but failed to advance to
the second round. Reasons for his eventual defeat were many,
but most analysts attributed the outcome to the incumbent's
unsuccessful Cyprus policies -- he had failed to deliver a
better solution than the 2004 Annan Plan, which he had
actively demonized -- and to his personal arrogance. Local
analysts here, perhaps optimistically, surmised that the
two-thirds of the electorate voting against Papadopoulos
preferred a new, less confrontational approach to the
national issue.


6. (C) Victor Christofias belonged to this camp, and in

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substance and tone, sought to portray himself as the
anti-Tassos. In one of his first actions upon taking office,
he held a press conference for island and international
journalists in which he made brief comments in Turkish --
unthinkable under the previous regime. He dumped hard-line
Papadopoulos acolyte Tassos Tzionis as negotiator and
replaced him with the more moderate (at least in G/C eyes)
former Cypriot Foreign Minister, George Iacovou, then
instructed Iacovou to engage T/C counterpart Ozdil Nami in
hopes of energizing the July 8 process. Only three weeks
into his tenure, Christofias managed to accomplish what
Papadopoulos had failed to do in 18 months: secure a deal
with the Turkish Cypriot side that would enable the working
groups and technical committees (WG/TCs) to form and begin
work. While Nami and Iacovou failed to reach agreement on
the sticky issue of terms of reference for the groups, they
did craft the agendas and a basic understanding on process.
Six groups and seven committees commenced meeting in April.

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Sides' Impressions of Process Progress Varies
--------------


7. (C) In the month since the WG/TC process began, the
Embassy has met Iacovou and Nami, a majority of the sides'
committee leaders, and a half-dozen UN facilitators, seeking
readouts and urging constructive engagement. Unsurprisingly,
accounts of the WG/TCs' activities and progress achieved thus
far have differed greatly, with the facilitators'
observations normally falling somewhere in between.
Underpinning in part the differing perceptions are the sides'
divergent approaches and goals vis-a-vis the current process.
Turkish Cypriots discount the need to "prepare the ground"
for full-fledged negotiations, a current G/C demand.
Forty-four years of CyProb negotiations mean few issues are
left to tackle, they argue, and the sides' positions on core
matters are clear to all. Further, the Turkish side argues,
the July 8 Agreement, which Talat contends he felt pressured
to sign, was but Tassos Papadopoulos's electorally-motivated
attempt to convince a then-skeptical international community
that there existed an active process. (Comment: Here,
Turkish Cypriots ignore the fact that the sides reached ad
referendum agreement to start the July 8 process in March

2007. The T/Cs backed out, however, after a secret visit to
the island by Turkish MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan
later that month. End Comment) T/Cs wish to commence formal
negotiations soonest, with Christofias and Talat regularly
meeting and instructing their respective teams to handle
technical and substantive details. It thus follows suit that
our Turkish Cypriot interlocutors mostly have praised the
WG/TCs' work so far, particularly that of the economy, EU
affairs, and governance working groups. Expected examples of
non-convergence in the property, territory, and
security/guarantees WGs were wholly expected, they explain,
since only the leaders themselves could hope to resolve these
complex, political-in-nature disputes.


8. (C) Papadopoulos likely was seeking electoral benefit
from July 8, and his minions did stall the process for months
with demands such as "Undertake a detailed study of federal
governments in place throughout the world" (the G/C side's
slow-down was roughly from July 2006 to March 2007, at which
point Talat, in hopes of subverting Papadopoulos's electoral
prospects, took his turn at delaying the process). Yet the
2006 agreement also reflected a more mainstream G/C aim: to
devise a new basis for a Cyprus settlement bereft of
"asphyxiating" timetables and international arbitration,
ensuring that new talks did not commence where the "imposed"
and "unworkable" Annan Plan left off. Christofias therefore
surprised many observers when he approved the March 21
arrangement, which stipulated that the leaders had "agreed to
meet three months from now to review the work of the working
groups and technical committees, and using their results, to
start full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the UN
Secretary General." Barely two weeks after Moller read the
statement, however, government officials applied caveats,
claiming that G/Cs would only allow formal talks if the
groups and committees had delivered tangible (but undefined)
progress. With few exceptions, Greek Cypriot media and some
staffers on the WG/TCs have called their T/C counterparts
intransigent, controlled by Ankara, determined to revive the
dead-and-buried Annan Plan, and unwilling to engage in
brainstorming or other constructive activities.


9. (C) Feeling similarly intense but substantively different
pressure -- Talat to obtain a date for formal talks to
commence, and Christofias to win commitment for real progress
from the WG/TCs -- the leaders met again on May 23 and issued
a joint statement. Neither man got all that he wanted from

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the "summit," but the document in general was balanced. The
leaders "reaffirming their commitment to a bi-zonal,
bi-communal federation with political equality as defined by
relevant Security Council resolutions" calmed G/C fears that
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were working toward a loose
confederation or two-state solution. Meeting T/Cs' political
needs regarding terminology, the statement also described a
partnership having a federal government, as well as
politically equal Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
constituent states. Our contacts north of the Green Line
liked the communique, and press coverage spun generally
positive. Most Greek Cypriot media, many still hewing the
Papadopoulos line, argued the text heavily favored Talat's
positions, however. Surprised by the attack, the Christofias
team went immediately on the defensive and repeated its
demands for progress before the next leaders' meeting,
planned for the second half of June.

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Plenty of Reason to Push the Process
--------------


10. (C) While we're not yet chilling champagne or readying
fireworks, the sides have made notable CyProb advances the
last few months. In the run-up to the May 23 gathering,
however, we were worrying over a possible derailment. What
would happen if Talat, insisting on a strict interpretation
of the March 21 communique's 90-day negotiations calendar,
engaged a similarly dug-in Christofias, demanding unspecified
progress in the WG/TCs before he could bless formal talks?
Happily, that clash never occurred. In a May 28 lunch with
P-5 ambassadors, UNFICYP leader Zerihoun reasoned that the
leaders' recent meeting and their commitment to engage again
in mid-June had rendered moot the 90-day deadline. Besides,
the UN had no desire to box in either side based on a need
for a few additional weeks of preparatory talks. Turkish
Cypriot contacts expressed a surprisingly similar position,
with Talat spokesman Hasan Ercakica implying May 28 that T/Cs
would be "tolerant" of Christofias's domestic political
needs. A two- or three-week extension would be acceptable,
we inferred; two or three months would not.


11. (C) Even without an imminent deadline, pushing the
process forward makes sense for numerous reasons. Talat's
CTP may not face a serious political threat today, but by no
means are they comfortably ensconced in power. A decaying
economy, an inability to deliver measurable CyProb progress
despite a campaign platform promising it, and an opposition
recently buoyed by positive polling numbers all conspire
against the party's continued dominance in "parliament."
Should nationalist UBP somehow regain power via early
elections (unlikely before 2009, but not impossible),the
change would represent a step away from solution.
Christofias's grip on government is not nearly so tenuous.
That said, he, too, won election on a pro-solution stance,
and failure of the current process would undoubtedly spawn a
public and influential "I told you so" from the hard-line
camp.


12. (C) The international community's many "Type A"
personalities would love to roll up their sleeves and get
involved directly in the current process. Such an approach
looks counter-productive, however. While Papadopoulos's
ouster reduced somewhat the Greek Cypriots' aversion to an
proactive international role (especially by the Americans and
British),that sentiment has not disappeared. In fact, the
G/C side has cottoned to a phrase attributed ironically to
resident UK High Commissioner Peter Millet and repeated often
by top UNFICYP officials -- "the solution must be a Cypriot
one." Any overt pressure on the G/C side to agree by X date
to start full-fledged negotiations likely would put
Christofias into a corner and force him to push back.
Turkish Cypriots have not bought into the "Cypriot Solution"
model, however, and would prefer the UN to return to its
traditional mediation (vice facilitation) role.

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Revisiting the Short-term Strategy
--------------


13. (C) Four months ago, when a Papadopoulos re-election
seemed likely, the Embassy submitted its suggestions on
overcoming the President's intransigence in order to get to
full-fledged negotiations; the Department and our sister
missions subsequently contributed as well (Ref). While the
efforts of the Embassy and broader USG were not the driving
force behind the improved negotiating climate and recent
(albeit limited) substantive progress -- G/C voters deserve
that accolade -- they did convey a sense of reward to the

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sides for taking positive steps. Recapping our strategy
memorandum, in the 120-day interim we managed to:

-- Prevent U.S.-Cypriot relations from becoming a factor in
the presidential elections, maintaining cordial relations
with all candidates. Christofias privately believs this
stance helped him win the election;
-- Press both sides to voice continued support for spirit (if
not process) of July 8 agreement;
-- Lobby T/C authorities and resident Turkish leaders to take
bold step on Ledra Street crossing (it opened in April);
-- Convey message of USG support to newly-elected President
Christofias; he subsequently voiced his hope that bilateral
ties strengthen further;
-- Urge Christofias to meet Talat immediately;
-- Engage UN elements locally, in Washington, and in New York
for the deployment of an assessment mission; it was received
well here and generated a helpful UNSC Presidency statement;
-- Voice publicly USG support for an eventual UN Good Offices
mission;
-- Conduct necessary legwork for assigning a U.S. Special
Cyprus Coordinator; and
-- Help shape message in UNFICYP's June report to the
Security Council.


14. (C) Two as-yet-unimplemented strategy elements merit our
immediate attention. In February, we envisioned deploying a
high-level U.S. official to visit Cyprus after the UN mission
departed, aiming to "spur movement via July 8 to get to
substantive negotiations ASAP." Cypriots in both communities
value Washington's attention, and rarely do we engage MFA
contacts or journalists and not receive inquiries over
planned visits by prominent USG officials. We continue to
believe that an A/S-level (or above) call holds great value
in leveraging our own efforts to break down the last barriers
to formal negotiations. His message would require careful
fine-tuning, voicing our desires and expectations for the
process without seeming overly demanding; we should aim
strongly to support a process, but not be saddled with
ownership of it. As to timing, we suggest late June; at that
point, the leaders will have just met, presenting our visitor
the opportunity either to congratulate or chide the outcome.
Our British colleagues have informed us that the RoC has
promised to repeal formally the "Jack Straw rule" that
prohibits visitors from seeing President Christofias if they
also intended to see Talat in the "TRNC Presidential Palace"
(the Brits recently were forced to postpone a visit by their
Europe Minister on its account). The success of our VIP call
depends on our ability to engage both leaders.


15. (C) As much as the Cypriots would appreciate a
high-level visitor, they would value the appointment of a USG
Special Cyprus Coordinator (SCC) even more. At this point,
however, we see little benefit in taking this step before the
sides agree to full-fledged talks. The UN would seem to
agree; while last week we heard from normally reliable
UNFICYP contacts that Ban Ki-Moon had offered the Special
Advisor on Cyprus job to former Australian Foreign Minister
Alexander Downer, Zerihoun informed us May 28 that the
decision had not yet been made. Perhaps the UN shares our
hesitancy -- without the commitment of the communities to
formal talks, what might their Adviser and our Coordinator
actually do? On the other hand, there may be some utility in
public mention of our intent to nominate, based on progress
in the local talks. Such a message could come either from
the DOS spokesman in Washington, the Ambassador, or our
high-level USG visitor.

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Help, Not Hindrance, From Ankara
--------------


16. (C) Nearly all Greek Cypriots publicly lament -- and
some Turkish Cypriots privately concur -- that Turkey truly
calls the shots in northern Cyprus. We know the interplay
between T/C authorities, civilian leaders in Ankara, and the
Turkish General Staff is more complex than that, yet we
cannot dispute that mainlanders play outsized roles in
shaping T/C thinking on the national problem. On security
matters, we would even argue the TGS has near-exclusive
authority, most recently shown in its handling of the Ledra
Street opening. Turkey has genuine interests at play in the
negotiations, of course. It will even have a formal role,
when and if the sides begin tackling final status and the
1960 founding treaties, which gave Ankara guardianship
responsibilities in Cyprus. Yet at this stage in the
process, a light, "enabling" touch from the mainland would
benefit the process immensely. It would allow Talat needed
room to maneuver, to make the tough compromises necessary to

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satisfy G/C demands for progress from the WG/TCs. South of
the Green Line, a halt in "provocative" acts and statements,
such as the recent pronouncement of Turkey's NSC-equivalent,
would help insulate Christofias from his own nationalist
"allies" and dispel somewhat the belief that Ankara stands in
the way of a deal. Last, Ankara itself stands to benefit,
especially as its EU accession review grows nearer, since all
signs point to Brussels and member-states demanding that
Turkey more actively support a Cyprus solution. We therefore
urge that the Department, Embassy Ankara, USEU, USUN, and
others convey this message in their high-level interactions
with Ankara's political and military leadership.
SCHLICHER