G/C NEGOTIATOR TROUBLED BY TURKISH SIDE'S REFUSAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: G/C NEGOTIATOR TROUBLED BY TURKISH SIDE'S REFUSAL
TO DEAL

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "They're not empowered to think or even
speculate, much less negotiate," complained Greek Cypriot
negotiator George Iacovou in a May 12 meeting with the
Ambassador, referring to the Turkish Cypriots staffing the
working groups and technical committees currently conducting
preparatory discussions under the UN-brokered March 21
agreement. The T/C side's lack of autonomy and practice of
consulting superiors over even the smallest points was
costing the groups and committees precious time, Iacovou
warned, and put into doubt whether full-fledged negotiations
could commence on June 21, as stipulated in the March accord.
Regardless of the paucity of progress in most bodies, T/C
leader Mehmet Ali Talat appeared insistent on demanding
formal negotiations, which Republic of Cyprus President
Demetris Christofias politically could never accept in the
absence of a modicum of progress in the current process. Not
all the news was gloomy, however. Iacovou revealed that
working groups tackling the economy and European Union
affairs had made great strides, an opinion shared by the
Embassy's T/C contacts. Much more characteristic of the
broader process, however, was the friction plaguing the
territory, property, governance, and security/guarantees
working groups, which Iacovou attributed to Turkey's
indifference or outright opposition to reaching a solution.
At the upcoming (May 23) leaders' meeting, Christofias would
deliver a tough message to Talat: either engage fully to
ensure that the committees and working group delivered
measurable progress in the remaining six weeks, or risk
another negotiations impasse of his own (Talat's) making.
The international community should press the Turkish Cypriot
leader along similar lines, Iacovou concluded. In response,
the Ambassador lamented that media in both communities were
preparing for a failed process and attempting to assign blame
to the other. It was vital to preserve the positive momentum
that had arisen with Christofias's February election, he
added; as such, Iacovou should consider potential
repercussions before demanding a delay and/or blaming the
other side. The Ambassador ended the call by questioning
whether the "Straw Rule" was still in play -- the RoC
prohibition on visiting foreign dignitaries seeing
Christofias if they also intended to visit Talat at the "TRNC
Presidential Palace." Iacovou, seemingly pained by the
inquiry, promised to provide guidance soon. END SUMMARY.

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G/Cs "Already" Sensitized to T/C Needs
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2. (C) Iacovou began the 90-minute discussion by noting a
major concession Greek Cypriots had made to ensure the
leaders would reach agreement on March 21. "They didn't want
specific mention of the July 8 (2006) Agreement, so we took
it out. But implicit was the understanding that we would
follow July 8's basic outline -- committees and working
groups preparing the ground for full-fledged negotiations."
At that time, he believed the 90-day preparatory period
stipulated on March 21 would allow the sides sufficient time
to make measurable progress. "I never thought it would take
a full month just to determine the slate of committees and
working groups and give them mutually-acceptable names,"
Iacovou lamented.


3. (C) He had clear expectations for the March 21 talks.
Iacovou had understood from the outset that the sides would
remain far apart on "core" Cyprus Problem components such as
property restitution, territorial adjustments and
security/guarantees. He only hoped to narrow these gaps
slightly, and prepare the leaders with clear outlines of each
community's positions in advance of full-fledged
negotiations. For the "easier" issues, however, he hoped to
bring the sides close to a deal. Once he and Nami and had
finalized the working group slate, Iacovou assigned highest
priority to economic affairs and EU matters, since these
seemingly presented the greatest prospect for success.


4. (C) Even during the month-long delay, the G/C negotiator
had attempted to put a positive spin on the process. "I
don't see the other side as my adversary, but as my partner,"
Iacovou maintained; he had instructed his teams to think and
act similarly. Early on, however, he began to temper his
optimism. Continued Turkish "intransigence" was resulting in
a Turkish Cypriot side leery of engagement and incapable of
making quick decisions. Iacovou, in comments that track with
UNFICYP's, claimed that the April 3 inauguration of
much-anticipated Ledra Street Buffer Zone crossing remained
in doubt until hours before its scheduled opening, owing to

NICOSIA 00000306 002 OF 003


Turkish military opposition to crossing modalities. "It took
Talat two hours to get the simplest of answers from the
(Turkish) generals," Iacovou explained.

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Slow-Going in Most
--------------


5. (C) Ankara exercised similar control over the working
groups and technical committees, he alleged. "I have an
excellent working relationship with (Turkish Cypriot
counterpart) Ozdil Nami. And there are some qualified,
knowledgeable staff on the T/C side. But these people are
not allowed to think, to brainstorm, to ponder our
suggestions, which are many." Rather, Iacovou continued, the
Turkish Cypriot experts read opening positions from prepared
texts, take note of our positions, and engage only to inform
that they must seek guidance from their superiors. One
exception -- the T/C leader of the economic technical
committee, who readily exchanged thoughts with his G/C other
-- lasted only two meetings before he suddenly resigned from
team. Iacovou attributed the Turkish Cypriot go-slow tactics
to two factors. First, most team members were active "civil
servants," meaning they were obligated by chain-of-command
considerations to seek guidance (the G/C side, on the other
hand, is populated by former politicians, retired diplomats,
and academics.) And then there was the hand of Ankara.
Iacovou asserted that Turkish MFA Under Secretary Ertugrul
Apakan had recently paid a one-week visit to the island,
during which he had given specific negotiating instructions
to the Turkish Cypriot negotiators, and posted extra
diplomats in the Turkish "Embassy" to "help" the T/C side.


6. (C) The half-way point of the 90-day process already had
passed, yet significant progress had occurred only in two of
six working groups, Iacovou reckoned. And even in the EU and
economy groups, the T/Cs were sticking to unrealistic
positions, such as a demand for permanent Acquis derogations
over competition -- "the heart of the European Union
project," he blasted. Turkish Cypriots' lines were even
harder and their tactics more robotic in the territory group,
where they insisted only on "a better deal than Annan gave
us" and refused even to consider Greek Cypriot suggestions.
In the governance group, T/Cs continued to demand a place for
foreign judges on the Cypriot Supreme Court. "Can you
imagine? In a EU state in 2008?" Iacovou chided.

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Righting the Ship on May 23
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7. (C) Christofias and Talat will meet under UN auspices May
23, their first formal gathering since hammering out the
March 21 arrangement. "Worried" barely describes the Greek
Cypriot leader over the state of the current process, Iacovou
related. Christofias was convinced that full-fledged
negotiations would quickly stall were they to commence
without sufficient preparation. Further, the President
questioned why Talat did not feel the same. Instead, Iacovou
continued, Talat seems set on demanding formal negotiations
regardless of the prospects for progress, and if he does not
get them, he will blame the G/C side. It appeared as if the
T/C leader was convinced he had the international community's
support for his position. The Ambassador quickly
interjected, noting that neither he nor anyone from the
Embassy had taken that stance. What we have said is that we
look forward to the two sides' agreement to resume
full-fledged negotiations. Apparently satisfied with the
response, Iacovou argued that the local P-5 should focus
their efforts where truly needed: on convincing Turkey to
allow Talat to engage.


8. (C) Iacovou considered the May 23 meeting an opportunity
for the leaders to take stock of the ongoing process. "If
your side won't engage in the working groups," Christofias
would question, "why should I believe you'll do more in
face-to-face talks?" Both men knew they were incapable of
resolving differences on complex themes outside their areas
of expertise, whether economics, EU matters, or the
environment, Iacovou insisted. As such, the working groups
and technical committees had real roles, and they must be
allowed to carry out substantive discussions. Iacovou
favored increasing the frequency of their meetings, from the
current twice-per-week to a M-W-F arrangement. "With more
time to meet and more progress, we'll serve the leaders
better," he contended.

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NICOSIA 00000306 003 OF 003


Maintain the Momentum is our Message
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9. (C) The Ambassador praised Iacovou and Christofias's
efforts to re-energized Cyprus Problem negotiations after a
near-four year impasse. Like the G/C side, the U.S. hoped
Turkey would give Talat free rein for give-and-take, and
understood Nicosia's need for a modicum of progress in the
preparatory process. Media on both sides of the island
weren't exactly helping, he fretted. Outlets like leading
daily "Phileleftheros" were poisoning the climate with
repeated warnings that failure was imminent. A
self-fulfilling prophecy must be avoided, the Ambassador
reckoned.


10. (C) He counseled Iacovou to exercise caution when
considering the G/C approach toward the coming deadline.
"There is an international aspect to the talks," the
Ambassador noted, "and you're best served by keeping the (UN)
Secretary General focused and contributing to the process."
Implicit in his message was that, should the sides fail to
agree either to call for full-fledged negotiations or request
a short extension of the preparatory period, the SYG might
determine that the communities' political will was
insufficient to merit continued, high-level UN attention.



11. (C) On the U.S. side, however, there was growing interest
in Cyprus, the Ambassador confided. While he still could not
offer dates, a high-level DoS official planned to visit the
island by mid-June. He would want to call on both
Christofias and Talat to encourage progress in the process.
Was the "Straw Rule" governing high-level visitors' access to
the President still in force? the Ambassador queried.
Iacovou responded by revealing he had asked the Foreign
Ministry for a formal opinion. Pressed, he clarified that,
were the Secretary of State to visit Cyprus, the prohibition
would remain in force. (Note: we inferred that the Cypriots
would in fact waive the rule for lower-level officials, as
they had two weeks ago for Deputy Russian FM Vladimir Titov.
We will continue to follow up, however.)

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Comment
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12. (C) It comes as no surprise that this latest "era of
good feelings" on Cyprus is petering out somewhat -- despite
good personal relations between Christofias and Talat, and
between Iacovou and Nami, the sides remain miles apart on
most core CyProb elements, and engagement on substance was
bound to cause friction and name-calling. Nor are we
surprised that the Greek Cypriot negotiator -- like President
Christofias, in a days-earlier meeting with local P-5
representatives -- laid blame squarely on the Turkish
Cypriots for the working groups/technical committees'
perceived lack of progress. Yet we're not prepared to
swallow Iacovou's story whole. In the past ten days, Embassy
staff have engaged four different UNFICYP facilitators with
first-hand knowledge of the groups' workings and activities.
Their observations differ on details, but in general support
Iacovou's claim that G/C participants are more experienced
and have a "deeper bench," while T/C staff request guidance
from their superiors more than their Greek-origin
counterparts do. But by no means do Turkish Cypriots alone
deserve the title of "intransigent party," our UN colleagues
argue -- the sides have alternated being stubborn and
accommodating. Further, when the Ambassador sees Ozdil Nami
on May 20, we expect to hear an exact-opposite account from
the T/C negotiator. In such a scenario, maintaining momentum
entails urging both sides to remain engaged while refraining
from visceral blame-game urges. We will continue to look for
opportunities to pass this message both publicly and
privately.
SCHLICHER