OPPOSITION LEADER PLEDGES FULL SUPPORT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000273

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2023
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY TU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER PLEDGES FULL SUPPORT TO
GOVERNMENT'S NEGOTIATION EFFORTS

REF: 04 NICOSIA 792

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: New Cypriot President Demetris Christofias
could count on DISY supporting his Cyprus reunification
strategy "as long he shoots straight and doesn't play games
with us," DISY leader Nikos Anastassiades told the Ambassador
April 22. Being in opposition did not mean opposing every
government initiative in hopes of scoring political points,
Anastassiades explained, especially regarding the national
problem. Besides, Christofias had shown his determination to
find a solution via his appointment of serious, moderate
leaders to the working groups and technical committees now
conducting exploratory discussions. To provide the President
political cover in fending off Cyprus's still-strong
nationalists, it was vital the talks bear early fruit. DISY
aimed to improve the bi-communal political climate by
strengthening its links to CTP and other Turkish Cypriot
parties, and Anastassiades hoped to host T/C leader Mehmet
Ali Talat in his Limassol home in May. Turkey's current
political leadership was not inherently opposed to a Cyprus
deal, Anastassiades believed, a position at odds with most
G/C pundits. Despite the Greek Cypriots' best efforts,
however, the DISY chieftain was certain that any deal
emerging would prove less favorable to G/C interests than the
2004 Annan Plan, for which former President Tassos
Papadopoulos -- the DISY leader's archenemy -- deserved
blame. END SUMMARY.

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A New Kind of Opposition
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2. (C) Anastassiades showed no signs of disappointment over
favored candidate Ioannis Kasoulides February 24 loss and
DISY re-relegation to opposition status. Rather, throughout
the meeting he displayed the same go-it-alone-if-need-be
political gumption that often has brought short-term defeats
but also grudging respect for his courage. He began by
praising Demetris Christofias's early performance as
President. "Christofias made huge mistakes in the past,"
Anastassiades argued, "especially in his support of
Papadopoulos and abandonment of the Annan Plan in 2004." Yet
the AKEL leader seemingly had learned from his errors and
appeared determined to reach a settlement. Early proof lay
in the opening of a Buffer Zone crossing at Ledra Street in
the heart of old Nicosia, an action that carried significant
political risk had it gone bad.


3. (C) The Cyprus issue should transcend party politics,
Anastassiades maintained. As such, DISY intended to exercise
constructive opposition and give the President ample
maneuvering room, even if that meant foregoing opportunities
to garner short-term political wins. "Christofias (as AKEL
leader) took a different approach in 2004, and see where that
got us," Anastassiades lamented. DISY would play a different
game, as long as the President and AKEL did not abuse the
kid-glove treatment. He would tell Christofias to think like
a statesman, not a politician, keeping his eyes on the
long-term prize: a reunified, federal, and functional
Cypriot state.

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Latest Developments Give Rise to Guarded Optimism
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Reaching said outcome entailed hard work, sacrifice,
and compromise, Anastassiades agreed. But rather than
focusing on barriers to a solution and the sides' divergent
positions on core issues -- themes which dominate much
political discourse and most mainstream media of late -- the
DISY leader spoke more optimistically. Christofias's
appointments to the technical committees and working groups
should have shown Turkish Cypriots "that he meant business,"
for example. The list was short on ideologues and long on
experience and moderation, Anastassiades declared, and even
included personalities with clear DISY leanings. It was
vital the experts engage their T/C counterparts fully and
deliver early progress, Anastassiades thought, allowing
Christofias to withstand go-slow calls from nationalist
naysayers and eventually call for full-fledged negotiations.
Should they commence in June, as the UN-brokered March 21
agreement stipulated, it was plausible that the sides could
reach a deal by the end of 2008, Anastassiades ventured.


5. (C) Conventional wisdom here alleges that Turkey's latest
bout of political instability stemming from the judiciary's

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attempt to ban AKP and leaders Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah
Gul bodes poorly for progress in Cyprus. Anastassiades
offered a different take. In South Africa recently for an
international meeting of parliamentarians, the DISY leader
had engaged AKP counterparts and heard that Erdogan was
"serious" on Cyprus and determined to take on the military.
Anastassiades clearly was impressed with the Turkish prime
minister. "This man has brought Turkey closer to Europe than
any of the secularists. And they're calling him an
Islamist?" He was less rosy toward Gul, however, citing the
Turkish president's comments last autumn acknowledging the
presence of two religions on the island. The Cyprus Problem
as an inter-ethnic conflict was a tough enough nut,
Anastassiades reasoned; adding a heretofore unmentioned
Christianity-Islam element to it seemed disastrous.


6. (C) Anastassiades saw great benefit in increased
cross-Green Line outreach. DISY intended to buttress its
ties to the CTP and other T/C parties via a series of
upcoming meetings, seminars, and social events. He was
clearly pleased by his well-received stroll into north
Nicosia via the Ledra passage, and envisioned other
high-profile encounters with Turkish Cypriot leaders.
Regrettably, T/C leader Talat had had to cancel his April 30
visit to Anastassiades's Limassol home for dinner; they hoped
to reschedule for late May (Note: a Talat confidant told us
April 29 that Talat would come south on May 7.)
Anastassiades also claimed that Turkish- and Greek Cypriot
authorities, spurred in part by DISY, were inching closer to
a deal to restore the Apostolos Andreas monastery on the
remote Karpass Peninsula in the T/C-administered area,
Christian Cyprus's holiest site.

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Always Ready to Bash the Enemy
--------------


7. (C) Greek Cypriots voting NO in the 2004 Annan Plan
referendum believed -- or were led to believe, Anastassiades
avows -- that a better deal surely awaited. The DISY leader
argued the opposite was true. He was certain that any deal
emerging from the latest settlement effort would prove less
favorable to Greek Cypriot interests than Annan, an outcome
he laid squarely at Tassos Papadopoulos's feet. "He was
stupid beyond belief not to negotiate that plan in good
faith," Anastassiades decried, his voice colored by anger.
The intervening four years had seen the Turkish Cypriot
community developing economically and winning the battle for
international public opinion. G/Cs who believed the other
side would come to the table eager for a solution and
offering compromise after compromise were dead wrong, he
asserted. Rather, they would seek concessions. Thankfully,
Papadopoulos was out of the picture, and Anastassiades took
great pride in contributing to his February 24 electoral
defeat. "The 'ethnarch' is dead," he contended, and
historians would laud his efforts to bury him.


8. (C) Renegotiating the basis of a Cyprus solution thereby
seemed contradictory to Greek Cypriot goals. Anastassiades
actually favored retabling the Annan Plan and aiming for
changes designed to assuage G/C concerns over Turkish-T/C
non-implementation. At the tactical level, he thought the
negotiators ought first to seek areas of commonality in order
to build confidence and the climate necessary for compromise
on the harder, core issues, such as security and guarantees,
property, and governance.

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Comment
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9. (C) Of active Greek Cypriot political leaders, Nikos
Anastassiades is consistently the most courageous and
forward-thinking. We are therefore heartened to hear that
Christofias's February win and DISY's relegation again to
opposition status have not left him bitter and bent on
political revenge. The party's pledge of CyProb support to
Christofias allows the President flexibility in staking out
reasonable negotiating positions and accepting compromises
that are bound to spawn protests from Papadopoulos and his
nationalist G/C allies, a positive development. We're less
certain Anastassiades is thinking rightly over the "labelling
game" of the Annan Plan, however. While it may in fact
contain the best basis for a deal advantageous to G/C
interests (and Reftel indicates that Christofias shared this
opinion in the period after the referendum),no Greek Cypriot
politician could withstand the political firestorm its
retabling per se undoubtedly would stoke. Further, should

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Anastassiades mention it publicly -- or even privately, only
to see it later leaked -- the subsequent condemnation might
marginalize the talented politician at a crucial time. We
think he is better served by lobbying for inclusion of Annan
elements, but not the Plan and its terminology, into the
negotiators' in-baskets.
SCHLICHER