Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NICOSIA144
2008-02-28 13:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

CHRISTOFIAS SEEKS EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH TALAT

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY 
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DE RUEHNC #0144/01 0591302
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281302Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8621
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1087
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000144 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS SEEKS EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH TALAT

REF: A. STATE 18922

B. NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL 2/26/08

C. NICOSIA 94

D. NICOSIA 123

E. NICOSIA 134

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000144

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2023
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY
SUBJECT: CHRISTOFIAS SEEKS EARLY ENGAGEMENT WITH TALAT

REF: A. STATE 18922

B. NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL 2/26/08

C. NICOSIA 94

D. NICOSIA 123

E. NICOSIA 134

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "If Mehmet Ali (Talat) and I cannot solve
the Cyprus Problem, who can?" pondered RoC President-elect
Dimitris Christofias in his February 26 meeting with the
Ambassador, their first gathering since the February 24
election. Greek Cypriots had selected Christofias due
primarily to his moderate, pro-solution views and close ties
with Turkish Cypriots, the President-elect claimed; he
intended to justify their decision by winning early CyProb
progress. His first tete-a-tete with Turkish Cypriot leader
Talat, likely in late March, represented a vital first step
in re-invigorating moribund negotiations. The Ambassador
solicited a follow-on meeting to explain U.S. interests and
programs in Cyprus, and Christofias welcomed the offer. END
SUMMARY.

--------------
POTUS Congrats Appreciated
--------------


2. (SBU) The Ambassador sought the sit-down with Christofias
to deliver President Bush's congratulatory letter (Ref A) and
convey the Embassy's hopes that 2008 see significant progress
in solving the Cyprus Problem. Surprisingly energetic and
showing no signs of campaign exhaustion, the President-elect
accepted the letter, read it appreciatively, and responded,
"I'm glad Mr. Bush is not afraid of a Communist Cypriot
president!" He immediately turned to the national issue,
claiming that Greek Cypriots considered him a moderate,
pro-solution politician whose uninterrupted, productive
relations with Turkish Cypriot leaders made him better able
to bring the sides together. "This is the significance of my
victory!" Christofias asserted. A refugee from "occupied"
Kyrenia himself, the President-elect understood that the
island's de facto division had caused pain in both
communities. With pro-solution leaders in place on both
sides for the first time, however, the prospects for progress
seemed bright.


3. (SBU) "Greek and Turkish Cypriots are children of the

same land," Christofias reasoned. While they might have
different ethnicities, faiths, and languages, their customs
and traditions were similar. "My friends the Turkish
Cypriots have more in common with us than with Turks," he
argued. Bringing the sides together on a settlement
therefore was not impossible. The Ambassador agreed. To
complement the formal negotiating process and build a more
conducive environment for rapprochement, he suggested that
Christofias state publicly his desire for increased contacts
between the T/C and G/C communities. A further, positive
step might entail the government giving the green light to
Greek Cypriot newspapers to carry advertisements from Turkish
Cypriot firms (currently this practice is not illegal, but
G/C publishers normally refuse the ads out of fear they'll be
deemed "traitors").

--------------
Seeking a Formal, Vice Social, Meeting
--------------


4. (C) Media reported recently Christofias's pledge to seek
an early meeting with Talat; the Ambassador asked whether
they had set a date. Late March/early April was his reply.
Talat had telephoned on election night to congratulate the
historic victory, Christofias revealed, and they briefly
discuss the get-together. It would not be "to drink a coffee
at Talat's house in Kyrenia," a commitment that presidential
challenger Ioannis Kasoulides had made in order to break the
inter-communal ice. Rather, Christofias sought a formal
gathering under the UN's auspices, and would express this
wish to UNFICYP head Michael Moller shortly.


5. (C) The July 8 agreement would dominate the leaders'
gathering, Christofias predicted. He had to hear --
"directly from Mehmet Ali's mouth -- the Turkish Cypriots'
version of why the sides had reached deadlock, and how they
might break free. Could July 8 realistically bring progress?
he wondered. Christofias aimed to find out first-hand at the
late March meeting. He also agreed with the Ambassador that
Talat's tone and message were spot-on in his February 25,
negotiations-related press conference, boding well for future
talks.

NICOSIA 00000144 002 OF 002



--------------
An Unhelpful Step Backward?
--------------


6. (C) Not so perfect was Talat's most recent letter to UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (Ref B),the Ambassador warned.

SIPDIS
Talat's letter discounted the usefulness of the July 8
agreement and demanded reinstatement of the Annan Plan as a
basis for future negotiations, the latter a clear G/C
non-starter. Local P-5 ambassadors and UNFICYP's Moller had
agreed the letter was unnecessary, inappropriately timed, and
contradicted the T/C leader's press conference remarks.
"That sounds like the voice of Turkey, not Talat,"
Christofias replied. His fellow community leader had a
tendency to speak rashly, getting himself -- and now
Christofias -- in trouble. The President-elect recollected
an anecdote from an old comrade: "Talat began his political
life as a Cypriot. Later he became Turkish Cypriot. Now
he's a Turk." Christofias, by personally engaging the Talat
early and often, hoped to make him Cypriot again. He promised
to treat the latest letter coolly and impassionately.

--------------
Opposition Subdued?
--------------


7. (C) Christofias concluded by discussing post-election
internal politics. Relations between his AKEL and right-wing
opposition DISY were bound to improve, he thought, a product
of his outreach efforts, as House Speaker, to DISY leader
Nikos Anastassiades. The right-wing party looked ready to
rejoin the National Council, a consultative body of former
presidents and representatives from all major parties which
debates the RoC's Cyprus Problem policy. With DISY back on
the Council, its support for any eventual settlement plan
seemed more assured, Christofias ventured.

--------------
Comment:
--------------


8. (C) Still aglow from his February 24 victory, Christofias
remains convinced that he, unlike Tassos Papadopoulos, can
solve the Cyprus Problem. We agree that the
President-elect's pro-dialogue pedigree and friendly
relations with Turkish Cypriots give him advantages the
crusty Papadopoulos lacked, but Christofias should not
underestimate the task. With Talat's recent letter to Ban,
it would seem the inter-communal honeymoon may have ended
after only 48 hours. And should Christofias break his
"coolly/impassionately" pledge and respond by publicly
touting the G/C's own redlines, we worry another opportunity
for immediate CyProb progress could be lost.
SCHLICHER