TURKISH CYPRIOTS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000128

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOTS GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC OVER
PAPADOPOULOS'S ELIMINATION

REF: A. NICOSIA 106


B. NICOSIA 67

C. 07 NICOSIA 980

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.
4 (a),(d)

1.(C) Summary: Solution-minded Turkish Cypriots (T/C)
expressed guarded optimism after the first-round defeat of
Republic of Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos on February

17. "President" Mehmet Ali Talat and "Prime Minister" Ferdi
Sabit Soyer publicly expressed hope that a change in Greek
Cypriot leadership would break the current CyProb
negotiations logjam. Embassy contacts in the T/C community,
even those ideologically aligned with AKEL challenger
Dimitris Christofias, believe it easier to reach a deal with
his opponent, the pro-business (and in 2004, pro-Annan Plan)
Ioannis Kasoulides (DISY). All expect (and desire) some type
of cross-community goodwill gesture from the G/C victor early
in his tenure. Despite visceral good feelings over the
despised Papadopoulos's loss, one Talat insider claimed the
"President" remained troubled by growing T/C nationalism, a
deteriorating economy, and impressions in Turkey that some
sort of Kosovo-like scenario for northern Cyprus still was in
play; all conceivably could limit Talat's ability to engage
substantively the new G/C leader, we believe. Principal
opposition party UBP dismissed the first-round RoC results as
meaningless, certain only the messenger had changed, not the
message. Ultimately, we argue, Turkish Cypriots are likely
to judge the RoC President by his willingness to negotiate
along the general lines of the Annan Plan -- albeit
repackaged, renamed, and reintroduced -- and by his ability
to respect T/Cs and positively re-engage Turkey. End Summary.

T/Cs Hope that the Deadlock can be overcome

2.(C) Pro-solution Turkish Cypriots breathed a collective
sigh of relief at the February 17 defeat of RoC President
Tassos Papadopoulos. "President" Mehmet Ali Talat, who had
told us (Ref A) there was little likelihood of progress
should Papadopoulos be re-elected, stated publicly February
18 that the incumbent's defeat raised hope that the deadlock
in the negotiation process could be overcome. A more
exuberant "Prime Minister" Ferdi Sabit Soyer dubbed
Papadopoulos's defeat a "turning point" and said the T/Cs
must push for a mutually acceptable solution. On February
20, Talat announced he was ready to meet whomever prevailed
in the RoC election.

Kasoulides: Pro-Annan and More Rational

3.(C) A significant number of our T/C contacts seem to favor
a Kasoulides presidency thanks to his earlier support of the
Annan Plan and modern, pro-European image. Asim Akansoy,
Talat's private secretary, told us that Kasoulides looked
more positive, although the "Presidency" had no official
position. He labeled Christofias an "ideological and rigid"
politician who favored a unitary Cypriot republic, not a
federation. That said, AKEL and CTP still enjoyed good
party-to-party relations. Kasoulides, on the other hand, was
"rational, business-minded, and flexible," Akansoy claimed,
clearly showing a preference. Mehmet Cakici, the leader of
the pro-solution Communal Democracy Party (TDP) told us that
in the past Christofias had appeared more moderate, but now
the opposite was true. He added that if Kasoulides won, he
would perhaps discuss the Annan Plan as a basis for future
negotiation -- a huge plus for the T/Cs. Cemal
Bulutoglulari, the T/C Mayor of Nicosia, also supports
Kasoulides because of DISY's earlier support for the Annan
Plan. The pro-solution positions of former President Glafcos
Clerides and DISY leader Nikos Anastassiades, and the fact
the former had visited Talat in the "Palace," also won
Kasoulides points. Some T/Cs, however, despite the countless
Turkish flags visible in the north, took umbrage at the
omnipresence of Greek flags at Kasoulides rallies, and the
candidate's recent assertion that "Cyprus is Greek."

Turkey: On Board or Not?

4.(C) We have heard conflicting accounts of what role Turkey
-- or more accurately, the various factions within the state
and government -- will play in future talks. Akansoy told us
that hard-liners in the Turkish MFA and military were upset
by Papadopoulos's defeat. They had hoped that the G/C

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leader's intransigence would have led to a Kosovo-like
solution for the "TRNC." Cakici, a critic of Turkey but no
radical, said that Turkey did not want a solution on Cyprus
before it itself was assured of EU membership. Omer
Kalyoncu, CTP's General Secretary, told us that Turkey was
still adhering its "one step ahead policy" on Cyprus, and
stuck by its January promise to Talat to support negotiations
along established UN parameters.

5.(C) Akansoy hinted at a linkage of Turkey's EU accession
process with the Cyprus Problem, but quickly added that he
was merely "thinking out loud". If some EU Acquis chapters
were opened simultaneously with Turkey's opening of its ports
to RoC shipping, there would be a thaw that would facilitate
a comprehensive solution. A more circumspect Kalyoncu told
us that positive movement in negotiations perhaps might open
"a" port, but warned that the "one-step ahead" policy would
not continue if the Greek side did not soften its "excessive"
demands. Our Turkish "Embassy" contact rejected any linkage
between Turkey's EU journey and CyProb negotiations and
reiterated GoT support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution
under established UN parameters.

We Want Annan

6.(C) Regardless of who emerges victorious on February 24,
the vast majority of our pro-solution T/C contacts want the
2004 Annan Plan as the main point of reference for future
negotiations. While they realize it may have to be
repackaged, renamed, and fine-tuned, they fear any attempt to
move beyond its basic parameters. Professor Ahmet Sozen, a
bi-communalist of long standing, told us he would oppose
publicly any plan that radically strayed from Annan. Kalyoncu
said that a new solution would also have to be put to the
vote on the T/C side of the island; to get to YES, the T/C
electorate, as well as Ankara, must be "at ease." Cakici
chuckled "it could be called the (Ban Ki) Moon Plan, for all
I care," as long as it remained true to Annan's basic
principles.

7.(C) Regarding the July 8 Agreement, Akansoy said that it
still could be used as a time-limited preparatory process
leading to substantive negotiations -- basically, the same
message Talat gave the Ambassador February 6 (Ref A). The
T/C side stuck by its signature, and if the July 8 process
showed some progress, they would continue to support it. He
warned, thought, that if July 8 talks continued along
"Papadopoulos lines" -- i.e., a strict adherence to the
working group/technical committee framework, delaying
movement toward substantive negotiations -- they would push
hard for modifications. Soyer, however, seemed to contradict
this position when he called on February 20 for negotiations
"to start right away."

Help Us!

8.(C) Akansoy also made a plea to support the embattled T/C
leader and, indirectly, the CTP. They faced a failing
economy, rising sentiments for a two-state solution, and
forces in Turkey that did not want a solution. U.S. support,
even if symbolic, was a must. He cautioned that Talat's
earlier anti-Papadopoulos statements should not be confused
with antipathy towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution, a
mistake the EU had made.

No Optimism Amongst Opposition, Not Even Guarded

9.(C) Opposition UBP, which rejected the Annan Plan and does
not participate in bi-communal activities as a party, was
largely dismissive of Papadopoulos's defeat. General
Secretary Nazim Cavusoglu questioned publicly whether the G/C

SIPDIS
mentality had changed, or just its spokesman. According to
contacts here, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan allegedly told
UBP leader Tahsin Ertugruloglu February 16 "not to make a lot
of noise" on CyProb talks. UBP therefore looks unable to
cause Talat much trouble in the first stage of any renewed
negotiations.

10.(C) Comment: Regardless of who prevails February 24,
Turkish Cypriots will judge the new RoC President by his
ability to engage them on what matters most, negotiations
based on the general lines of the Annan Plan; both G/C
presidential candidates, however, have made it clear they
will not accept the Annan Plan per se being put back on the

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table. We should leave it to the UN and the parties to find
a mutually-agreed basis for substantive re-engagement, a
basis with no direct allusions to the UN's last, failed
effort.

11.(C) Turkish Cypriots also will judge the new RoC President
by his willingness to treat them with respect, which
Papadopoulos rarely did. Akansoy claimed that, if the new
President actually went to Kyrenia for coffee with Talat (as
Kasoulides has promised) or made a similar, conciliatory
gesture to T/Cs early in his tenure, the opening of the Ledra
Street crossing soon would follow. Two factors complicate
Talat's hand in engaging his G/C interlocutor productively,
however. First, it is unclear from here if all of Ankara is
on-board with renewed talks toward a federal solution,
official GoT pronouncements notwithstanding. Optimistically,
many in CTP believe Erdogan can deliver backing even as he
faces challenges (like headscarves) at home, and allowing
Ledra to open would be early proof. Second, the economic
situation in the north is increasingly perilous. An
implosion this year or next would imperil CTP,s electoral
chances, and could bring to power either an intransigent UBP
"government" or a fractious UBP-CTP "grand coalition." End
Comment.
SCHLICHER