FM TAKING HARD LINE OVER GAERC'S KOSOVO CONCLUSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000115

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL EU UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: FM TAKING HARD LINE OVER GAERC'S KOSOVO CONCLUSIONS

REF: A. STATE 15648

B. STATE 15111

C. STATE 14284

D. STATE 13716

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: RoC Foreign Minister Erato Marcoullis
informed the Ambassador February 15 that Cyprus opposed GAERC
conclusions that suggested a common EU platform to recognize
Kosovo's independence declaration and thereby flout UNSCR

1244. END SUMMARY.

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Demarching at the Highest Levels
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2. (C) The Embassy this week had sought to engage
working-level MFA contacts and Political Director Euripides
Evriviades on Kosovo-related demarches (Reftels). On
February 14, however, the Ministry canceled these calls and
summoned the Ambassador for a meeting with Marcoullis
(subsequently, we learned the Foreign Minister had also
summoned EU chiefs of mission, the Russian ambassador, and
other local diplomats for similar discussions).


3. (C) The Ambassador opened the February 15 call by asking
for confirmation of what he'd earlier heard from Evriviades
and others -- that the RoC was not yet prepared to engage
with EU counterparts in order to reach consensus on Council
conclusions in the February 18 GAERC. Marcoullis replied
affirmatively; moreover, she claimed that all 27
member-states had not seen a text to consider. The British
had been playing a "dirty game" by circulating language only
to some of the 27, she charged. That text was replete with
language suggesting the EU as a common platform for the
recognition of Kosovo, which Cyprus and the others could
never accept. It also went well beyond the understandings
hammered out earlier in the development and approval of the
Ops Plan for the ESDP mission; Marcoullis made clear that USG
representations on the ESDP issue had been an important part
of RoC calculations in that negotiation. Cyprus already had
made an important compromise in not blocking the ESDP mission
-- which was a "totally done and undo-able deal" -- but would
never countenance an effort to revisit the idea of a common
platform to recognize Kosovo's UDI/CDI and thereby flout
UNSCR 1244.

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Don't Isolate Yourselves, We Urge
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4. (C) The Ambassador urged Marcoullis to reconsider
Cyprus's positions. By staking out such a hard-line position
both on recognition and on possible GAERC conclusions, he
argued, Cyprus was isolating itself within the EU, stoking
tendencies on the ground in Serbia and Kosovo which could
destabilize the region, and harming everyone's interest.
Cyprus's policy had even parted company with Athens, he
added. Repeatedly the U.S. and its allies had noted that
Kosovo was sui generis, and that the only state suggesting a
comparison with Cyprus was -- ironically enough -- Russia.
This was the gratitude Cyprus had earned for staking out a
Kosovo position so far from the European mainstream.


5. (C) The Ambassador regretted that, just as it appeared
there was a real chance to get the UN Cyprus negotiating
track moving again, it appeared that RoC attention might be
diverted to a Kosovo issue that most thought had no bearing
on Cyprus. The ROC would be much better served to focus on
its real interests. He therefore urged Marcoullis to adopt a
flexible GAERC stance that would permit the adoption of
conclusions with language all member-states could accept.

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Flexibility, But Only a Bit
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6. (C) Marcoullis replied that Cyprus might be amenable to
drafting efforts in this direction, but would not use the
&British crypto-text8 that London had circulated to some
but not all member-states. She was certain Cyprus would not
be isolated at the GAERC, however. Perhaps five states -- at
a minimum, Spain and Romania -- would support the Cypriot
position. She also mentioned Cyprus's upcoming (February 17
and 24) elections as a factor in the RoC's hard line,
believing the precedent value of recognizing secessionist
entities a hugely important electoral issue.


NICOSIA 00000115 002 OF 002


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Comment
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7. (C) The Cypriots are deeply dug in on any issue or
language that smacks of Kosovo recognition, and are fully
prepared to be isolated in the GAERC, though they do not
think they will be. This equation might change if a
combination of "motherland" Greece, Spain and Romania take a
softer line and work toward a text which, like the Ops Plan,
explicitly leaves the recognition determination to
member-states.
SCHLICHER