POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NICOSIA 000106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGED PASS LINE)

ANKARA PASS TO ADANA
DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PRGOV PREL TU SR CY
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION WEIGHS
HEAVILY ON TALAT


Classified By: Amb. Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4 (a) and 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary: Turkish Cypriot leader "President" Mehmet
Ali Talat expressed doubt that substantive Cyprus Problem
negotiations would resume in the event of a Papadopoulos
re-election February 24, but assured that Turkish Cypriots
were ready to start talks regardless of which Greek Cypriot
prevailed. In an hour-long February 6 meeting with the
Ambassador at the "Presidential" palace, Talat welcomed the
deployment of a UN assessment mission and voiced support for
an accelerated July 8 process leading to full CyProb
negotiations. He was less welcoming regarding possible
confidence building measures, however, and danced around
allegations that the Turkish military's intransigence
underpinned the failure so far to open the Ledra Street
crossing point. Turning to other matters, he blamed European
Union meddling for the Republic of Georgia's decision to pull
its flag from a Turkish Cypriot ferry operating between
Famagusta and coastal Syria, and accepted our offer to
comment on the less-than-satisfactory "TRNC draft law"
regulating casinos. Oddly -- and refreshingly -- Talat did
not raise Turkish Cypriot "isolation" during the
conversation. End Summary.

Papadopoulos stuck on a "vision"


2. (C) Appearing fit and in good spirits, Talat told the
Ambassador that the fate of negotiations depends on the
outcome of February 17/24 Greek Cypriot (G/C) presidential
elections. "There is little likelihood of progress," he
warned, if RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos is reelected.
He compared Papadopoulos to long-time T/C leader Rauf
Denktash in his intransigent adherence to a "vision" -- in
this case, G/C political domination and not political
equality -- which was unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots.
Talat warned that the negotiations "will face difficulties"
progressing under accepted UN parameters if the G/C incumbent
is re-elected, but promised the T/Cs were ready for
negotiations regardless. The Ambassador urged Talat to "stay
one step ahead" of the Greek Cypriots, and reiterated U.S.
support for both the July 8 process and UN Secretary
General's "established set of ideas".

"Revitalization of July 8 or my September 5 proposal"


3. (C) Talat was more upbeat in the event of a win by
challengers Dimitris Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides, and
quipped that he hoped his "comrade"
(Christofias) emerged victorious. In the event of a
Papadopoulos defeat, he believed that the July 8 Agreement
could be revitalized as a time-controlled preparatory process
leading to substantive negotiations -- a position he had
outlined at his September 5 meeting with Papadopoulos and the
UN Special Representative. The Ambassador noted that "one
had to go through the July 8 process to get beyond it to
substantive negotiations," to which Talat nodded.

"Need New U.N. Initiative"


4. (C) Talat welcomed the suggestion of a U.N. assessment
mission after the RoC presidential elections and called for,
without further elaboration, engagement of the two sides in

that process. He again expressed concern that, if reelected,
Papadopoulos would work to dilute established UN settlement
parameters and deny T/C political equality by demanding that
all G/C refugees be allowed to return to their homes and by
seeking voting rights based on residency, not native language
or ethnicity. Talat added that only Annan V safeguarded T/C
concerns, while under earlier versions of the Annan Plan, T/C
welfare had been in danger. The Ambassador told Talat that
the UN mission should focus on a narrow mandate of getting
substantive negotiations started; the end-goal must remain
the establishment of a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution
along established UN parameters. Both sides should endeavor
to make the assessment mission a success and give UNSYG a
positive reason to make Cyprus a higher UN priority. Both
should refrain from posing conditions and preconditions to
meaningful engagement.

"Problem lack of fundamental agreement, not confidence"


5. (C) Ambassador urged Talat, along with the G/C

presidential candidates, to undertake CBMs, either jointly or
unilaterally, even before the assessment mission. This would
better the general atmosphere for engagement, "give the
assessment mission something positive to assess," and in the
T/C case help them to get back to a "one step ahead" posture.
Talat, however, was largely pessimistic about the efficacy
of confidence-building measures (CBMs). CBMs "were not
helpful," he argued, because the problem between the Cypriot
communities was not a lack of confidence, but rather a lack
of agreement on fundamentals, namely "political equality."
That said, he appeared willing to seek further CBMs and told
us that the UN recently had approached him to start talks on
military de-confrontation measures. The UN had wanted to
commence these discussions before broader settlement talks
resumed, but Talat favored conducting the two concurrently,
out of fear that wider talks would be stalled forever if the
CBM discussions went nowhere. He then added - somewhat
sheepishly - that focusing solely on military-related CBMs
might portray the CyProb as solely a matter of Turkey's
military presence on the island. The Ambassador again urged
Talat to deliver on CBMs after the elections but before the
start of a U.N. assessment mission, and the T/C leader nodded
in response.


6. (C) Talat voiced bewilderment as to why the Ledra Street
crossing had not yet opened, attributing the delay to G/C
pressures on the UN over demarcation of the Buffer Zone (BZ).
In his only agitated moment during the meeting, he asked why
demarcation had been mentioned in the last UNSC resolution on
Cyprus, implying that it reflected badly on the TC/Turkish
side. Talat brushed off a question regarding the role of the
Turkish military on Cyprus and rhetorically asked the
Ambassador, "What is the Turkish military doing? Nothing
more than before." He claimed that simple brush-cutting in
the BZ by Turkish forces in 2007 was "being used against us
to this day" by falsely showing the T/Cs wanted to extend
their control further south. Ultimately, he asserted,
Papadopoulos did not want Ledra opened, period. The
Ambassador replied that the UN had not mentioned any G/C
pressure regarding BZ demarcation at Ledra and urged the T/C
leader to take measures, even unilaterally if necessary, to
open it soonest after the G/C elections.

G/C Pressure EU on Ferry to Syria


7. (C) Talat was certain that EU pressure had forced the
Government of Georgia to de-flag a T/C ferry that
sporadically has made trips between Famagusta and Latakia,
Syria. The EU's office in Georgia had lobbied Tbilisi hard,
he asserted, a "fact" he had decided to keep from the Turkish
Cypriot population. (Note: On February 12, "TRNC Foreign
Minister" Turgay Avci announced that the ferry service will
recommence shortly, with the boats flying Turkish flags. The
route is heavily subsidized by "TRNC" authorities and has
served as a conduit for illegal migration.)

Willing to Listen on Casino Law Draft


8. (C) Though joint US/UK pressure is one big reason that
Talat and his CTP addressed the issue to begin with, Talat
knew little of a much-awaited "bill" to regulate Turkish
Cypriot casinos, currently under committee study in
"Parliament." (Note: International observers claim the
"bill" does little to introduce mechanisms necessary to
monitor flows of money and audit casino operators.) Talat
admitted that he had "lost the opportunity" to stop the
establishment and spread of casinos years earlier, but asked
for our help in improving the "bill" and promised to work
with the head of the "parliamentary committee" -- an old
friend -- to that end (Post is working through a USAID
contractor to
provide detailed commentary).

Little talk of "TRNC Isolation"


9. (C) Oddly, Talat did not directly bring up the issue of
"TRNC isolation" or seek direct U.S.-to-Ercan Airport
flights, a frequent but unrealistic T/C request. He listened
eagerly, however, when the Ambassador told him that that T/C
"isolation" had to be addressed by the EU, and that a 2004
European Commission decision on direct trade should not be
allowed to "wither and die" simply because the Greek Cypriots

did not favor the idea. Talat also welcomed the Ambassador's
suggestion that the internationally-recognized T/C Chamber of
Commerce engage the French Embassy (as France will occupy the
EU Presidency in the second half of 2008) on implementing the
Direct Trade Regulation.


10. (C) Comment: Like many pro-solution Turkish Cypriots we
have engaged of late, Talat is troubled by the prospect of a
Papadopoulos re-election and its potentially negative effect
on Cyprus Problem negotiations. We can empathize. That
said, we have attempted to impress upon him that, regardless
of who wins February 24, Turkish Cypriots must be prepared
for real and immediate negotiations with their G/C
counterparts and the UN, and not continue with the stalling
tactics which gave Papadopoulos a significant tactical and
public-relations advantage throughout 2007. End Comment.
SCHLICHER