Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NIAMEY97
2008-01-24 09:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Niamey
Cable title:
NIGER: ENGAGEMENT WITH FRANCE IN TSCTP COUNTRIES
VZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNM #0097 0240923 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 240923Z JAN 08 FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4059 INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0159 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3417 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0430 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1895 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 1533 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 4789 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0646 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1725 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0191 RUZEHAA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NIAMEY 000097
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NG FR
SUBJECT: NIGER: ENGAGEMENT WITH FRANCE IN TSCTP COUNTRIES
REF: (A) NIAMEY 0081 (B) DAN EPSTEIN 1/4 E-MAIL
Classified By: Donald W. Koran, DCM, reasons 1.4 (b/d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NIAMEY 000097
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NG FR
SUBJECT: NIGER: ENGAGEMENT WITH FRANCE IN TSCTP COUNTRIES
REF: (A) NIAMEY 0081 (B) DAN EPSTEIN 1/4 E-MAIL
Classified By: Donald W. Koran, DCM, reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (U) Following is in response to ref b e-mail request for
information regarding engagement with France in TSCTP
counties.
2. (C) French security interests in Niger are far greater
than our own:
-- There are more French than American citizens in Niger.
Any security incident is therefore much more likely to affect
French than American lives. For example, the French were
concerned about the recent attack on Tanout (ref a) because
several of their citizens were visiting the town at the time.
In fact, the French citizens were staying with the Prefet,
who was the focus of the attack. (The French were not at the
Prefet's house at the time of attack and were unharmed.)
-- French economic interests are considerably greater. In
particular, Nigerien uranium, currently mined by two
companies affiliated with the French company Areva, plays a
key role in France,s electricity sector. Security threats
to the export of that uranium from northern Niger to the port
of Cotonou could lead to power outages in France and
considerable financial losses for Areva. Areva recently
signed a contract for an additional $1.6 billion investment
in Niger.
3. (C) Given its interests, France is very concerned about
all threats to Nigerien security and stability, to include
the Tuareg rebellion, crime and political turmoil (including
the rivalry between president Tandja and former PM Amadou),
as well as terrorism and Islamic extremism. It is also
concerned about people and drugs trafficked through Niger to
Europe. French Embassy officials generally believe that,
while AQIM personnel may occasionally pass through Niger,
there are no signs of current AQIM operations here, but the
threat remains. They are also concerned about Islamic
extremism coming from Nigeria.
4. (C) While France,s security interests are broader than
ours, there is no inherent conflict between their interests
and ours. French initiatives to foster internal security and
stability, as well as to interdict human and drug
trafficking, tend to reduce the threat of terrorism and
Islamic extremism. Following are some of France's activities
which have direct or indirect effects on terrorism and
Islamic extremism, although they are not generally labeled as
counterterrorism programs.
-- A military cooperation program to assist the Nigerien
armed forces.
-- A police cooperation program focused on training police,
interdicting human and drug trafficking, and enhancing border
security.
-- Development, educational and cultural programs which may
help stem Islamic extremism.
5. (C) We are in regular contact with our French counterparts
at all levels ) Ambassador, DCM, DAO, RAO, AID and Consular.
The one exception is the French police presence, which would
be the normal contacts of a Legatt or DEA office, if there
were one here. This is probably the area where the
Washington consultations could be particularly useful. It
may provide an opportunity to elicit information on subjects
such as smuggling networks and border security gaps that may
inform the counter-terrorism discussions.
ALLEN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV NG FR
SUBJECT: NIGER: ENGAGEMENT WITH FRANCE IN TSCTP COUNTRIES
REF: (A) NIAMEY 0081 (B) DAN EPSTEIN 1/4 E-MAIL
Classified By: Donald W. Koran, DCM, reasons 1.4 (b/d)
1. (U) Following is in response to ref b e-mail request for
information regarding engagement with France in TSCTP
counties.
2. (C) French security interests in Niger are far greater
than our own:
-- There are more French than American citizens in Niger.
Any security incident is therefore much more likely to affect
French than American lives. For example, the French were
concerned about the recent attack on Tanout (ref a) because
several of their citizens were visiting the town at the time.
In fact, the French citizens were staying with the Prefet,
who was the focus of the attack. (The French were not at the
Prefet's house at the time of attack and were unharmed.)
-- French economic interests are considerably greater. In
particular, Nigerien uranium, currently mined by two
companies affiliated with the French company Areva, plays a
key role in France,s electricity sector. Security threats
to the export of that uranium from northern Niger to the port
of Cotonou could lead to power outages in France and
considerable financial losses for Areva. Areva recently
signed a contract for an additional $1.6 billion investment
in Niger.
3. (C) Given its interests, France is very concerned about
all threats to Nigerien security and stability, to include
the Tuareg rebellion, crime and political turmoil (including
the rivalry between president Tandja and former PM Amadou),
as well as terrorism and Islamic extremism. It is also
concerned about people and drugs trafficked through Niger to
Europe. French Embassy officials generally believe that,
while AQIM personnel may occasionally pass through Niger,
there are no signs of current AQIM operations here, but the
threat remains. They are also concerned about Islamic
extremism coming from Nigeria.
4. (C) While France,s security interests are broader than
ours, there is no inherent conflict between their interests
and ours. French initiatives to foster internal security and
stability, as well as to interdict human and drug
trafficking, tend to reduce the threat of terrorism and
Islamic extremism. Following are some of France's activities
which have direct or indirect effects on terrorism and
Islamic extremism, although they are not generally labeled as
counterterrorism programs.
-- A military cooperation program to assist the Nigerien
armed forces.
-- A police cooperation program focused on training police,
interdicting human and drug trafficking, and enhancing border
security.
-- Development, educational and cultural programs which may
help stem Islamic extremism.
5. (C) We are in regular contact with our French counterparts
at all levels ) Ambassador, DCM, DAO, RAO, AID and Consular.
The one exception is the French police presence, which would
be the normal contacts of a Legatt or DEA office, if there
were one here. This is probably the area where the
Washington consultations could be particularly useful. It
may provide an opportunity to elicit information on subjects
such as smuggling networks and border security gaps that may
inform the counter-terrorism discussions.
ALLEN