CONGRESS INSIDER GIVES BLEAK VIEW OF NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 000993

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: CONGRESS INSIDER GIVES BLEAK VIEW OF NUCLEAR
CHANCES

REF: 07 NEW DELHI 4182

Classified By: A/Political Counselor Joel Ehrendreich for Reasons 1.4 (
B and D)


1. (C) Manish Tewari, Secretary in the All India Congress
Committee (AICC),told poloff April 3 that there was no
chance the UPA government would risk the downfall of the
government in order to complete the nuclear initiative. If
the Congress Party called the Left's bluff, he thought that
"90 percent of the UPA allies" would seek to form a Third
Front government immediately. He asserted that general
elections would take place in one year as scheduled, and
dismissed any speculation that the Congress Party would risk
Left withdrawal from the government to force early elections.
An interim or minority government would have no credibility
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or IAEA, he contended. Poloff
pointed out that U.S. officials have assured that they would
work with any Congress-led government in power to complete
the initiative. Tewari responded that while such a position
might have clarified the U.S. view, it came across as
desperate -- that all the U.S. cared about was finishing the
nuclear deal.


2. (C) Tewari also expressed concern about the viability of
completing the steps following the submission of the
safeguards agreement to the IAEA, and particularly doubted
the ability of the U.S. to craft a simple Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) exception. "There is no sense that you will be
able to swing a clean exception," he related, and cited
reports that recent meetings of the NSG focused on technical
details and possible conditions to impose on India. He
wondered why the Congress Party would risk power in the
center when it was apparent that the U.S. could not guarantee
an NSG exception. "It is not as done a deal as it seems," he
cautioned.


3. (C) After poloff talked Tewari through his misgivings
about the Hyde Act, NSG exception and the timeline, Tewari
softened his stance and attempted to find a way around the
Left's intransigence. Given that "there is no way the Left
is going to allow us to initial the draft," he asked if the
IAEA could circulate the draft agreement without India's
consent. Circulating the draft would enable the NSG and IAEA
Board of Governors process to begin, and if India could claim
that the IAEA can distribute draft safeguards agreements
without explicit permission, Tewari thought the Congress
Party might be able to find a way forward. Poloff underlined
that the IAEA Board must first approve the safeguards
agreement before the NSG granted the exception. Moreover,
while he suspected that India would have to give permission
to the IAEA, he promised Tewari to provide a more definitive
answer.

Comment: Tewari's Fears Likely Reflect the Congress Party's
- - -


4. (C) Tewari is known as a rising star in the Congress
Party. Since poloff met him in August 2007 (reftel),he has
acquired the role of Congress Party spokesman, as evidenced
by frequent interruptions on his cell phone during which he
strongly deflected accusations against Congress Party
President Sonia Gandhi. His vocation as an attorney has also
given him insight into the details of the 123 Agreement and
Hyde Act, which likely shapes Congress Party views about the
nuclear initiative as a whole. His apprehensions about the
NSG likely reflect the Congress Party's, and his suspicion
that the U.S. cannot deliver the goods may inform the
Congress Party's political calculations and Gandhi's
reluctance to risk a move forward. If possible, we should
seek to reassure Congress leaders that the U.S. can indeed
lead the charge in the NSG and produce a clean and direct
exception for India without further belaboring specifics, but
only after the draft safeguards agreement gets circulated and
a Board meeting scheduled.
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