Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI641
2008-02-29 09:56:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY

Tags:  PTER PGOV ASEC CASC PREL KTFN KCRM IN 
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VZCZCXRO0930
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #0641/01 0600956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 290956Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0675
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 2540
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 1849
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 1644
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000641 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, S/CT/ALLAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC PREL KTFN KCRM IN
SUBJECT: THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY

REF: A. KOLKATA 65/9

B. 07 KOLKATA 386/327/325/324/218/196/191/144

C. 07 CHENNAI 569/559/500/385/83

NEW DELHI 00000641 001.2 OF 003


Summary
--------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000641

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DS/DSS/ITA, S/CT/ALLAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC CASC PREL KTFN KCRM IN
SUBJECT: THINK-TANKERS MULL WAYS TO CURB NAXALITE INSURGENCY

REF: A. KOLKATA 65/9

B. 07 KOLKATA 386/327/325/324/218/196/191/144

C. 07 CHENNAI 569/559/500/385/83

NEW DELHI 00000641 001.2 OF 003


Summary
--------------


1. (U) The challenges for India in confronting the
Naxalite/Maoist threat were highlighted in a seminar at the
Indian think-tank Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
(IPCS),an independent well-respected Delhi-based
institution. The discusants agreed: the primary driver of
the Naxalite/Maoist insurgency is the poor socio-economic
environment; the insurgency is strongest in remote and
isolated areas; the modus operandi of the insurgency is to
inflict small, localized attacks on personnel and facilities
of state government; the response of state governments has
been largely ineffective; the response of the central
government has been mostly absent; and the approach needed is
to "plan centrally and act locally." We forward the views
presented by the seminar participants as part of an overall
reporting campaign on the Naxalites/Maoists. These views
track closely with those presented in previous mission
reporting (reftels). End Summary.

The Driving Force Behind the Naxalite/Maoist Insurgency
-------------- --------------


2. (U) D.M. Mitra, an official in the Ministry of Home
Affairs and a leading expert on Indian left-wing extremism,
was the featured speaker at a February 22 IPCS seminar that
lasted for approximately three hours and was attended by
former Indian governors, government secretaries, generals and
several Delhi-based diplomats. Mitra set the stage by
describing the socio-economic factors behind the
Naxalite/Maoist movement and how these factors drive ideology
and recruitment. Naxalites and their supporters come from
remote villages and usually represent the poorest members of
society, those who are not represented in the official state
structure. Modern economic activity does not reach these
remote villages and the populations remain isolated. There

is significant fragmentation within these villages, based on
class and wealth with no common unifying force to bring the
village together. The lack of a unifying force results from
the absence of government or institutions of state and civil
society such as schools. The Naxalite/Maoists enter such
villages, promise political representation and are soon given
tacit support by the villagers. The Naxalite/Maoists are the
only force that is able to unify the village and its people.
While some of the support is based on fear, much of it is
inspired by the promise of political change brought by the
Naxalite/Maoists. Villagers have tried to seek the help of
government officials before, but their attempts mostly end in
vain and are left helpless. The only time government
officials attempt to help these remote areas is during
elections, but this interest quickly fades. The villagers
are left with few options but to throw their allegiance to
the insurgents.

Goals, Modus Operandi and Strategic Positioning
-------------- --


3. (U) According to the Mitra, the Naxalite/Maoists believe
that elections in the current environment support a
bourgeoisie structure instead of representing the poor.
Government programs for the benefit of the remote rural
populations are rare and those that are implemented generally
fail. The Naxalite/Maoists ride the villagers' natural
impulse for a better life for themselves and their children.
They preach to the villagers that the most effective way of
achieving their objective is through violence directed at the
state. The violence is targeted narrowly -- a majority of
Naxalite/Maoist attacks are directed at police stations.
Such attacks on police stations are systematic and highly
visible to the villagers. All in all these attacks have been
extremely successful. The Naxalite/Maoists have decided to
stick with what works -- isolated incidents on smaller
targets instead of high profile targets that generate
national and international responses. This strategy limits

NEW DELHI 00000641 002.2 OF 003


central and state government response to a minimum and keeps
negative public opinion at bay.


4. (U) The areas which the Naxalite/Maoists control coincide
with the major forested and mountainous areas of India.
These highly inaccessible areas are usually remote border
areas. The remoteness of these regions creates a natural
advantage for the Naxalite/Maoists as it provides a ripe
recruiting ground as well as ready-made forest-based defense.
These forested areas also contain some of India's most
important natural resources. Some Naxalite/Maoist
strongholds are near coal and iron ore mines in Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh.

Government Response
--------------


5. (U) The participants concluded that the current central
and state government response to the insurgency has been
wholly inadequate. Although Prime Minister Singh has
publicly called it the most serious internal security threat
to the nation, the central government has yet to devise a
comprehensive plan. The response is limited to the state
governments, which have neither the expertise nor the
resources to mount an effective effort. Since the attacks
occur in remote areas, the police stations which are attacked
are ill-prepared and ill-equipped to counter any threat.
These remote police stations are not properly fortified,
their power supplies are intermittent, vehicles to patrol or
seek help in the case of an attack are insufficient, and
telephone connections are either spotty or non-existent.
These remote police stations are an easy target for
Naxalite/Maoists, whose forest-based attacks are perfect
considering most of these stations border the woods. Local
and state governments have not addressed many of the problems
which have left these police stations vulnerable to attacks.


6. (SBU) The only major success stories have come from
Andhra Pradesh and the establishment of elite
anti-Naxalite/Maoist police units, known as "greyhounds".
These greyhound units are very small, comprised of locals who
speak the local dialect, are familiar with the terrain, carry
minimal supplies and can stay out for five days at a time.
These highly-mobile units have become very effective in
countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat, or at least in pushing
the Naxalites into neighboring states. Many other state
governments have been using a traditional military approach
of large and cumbersome units which are slow and ineffective
in these particular circumstances.

What is Required
--------------


7. (U) The general consensus at the seminar was that to
counter the Naxalite/Maoist threat the state needs to "plan
centrally and act locally." Because of the growing
insurgency, the central government needs to create a
strategic, long-term plan to counter the Naxalite/Maoist
threat and empower the state and local authorities to counter
specific threats within their regions. The participants also
generally agreed that both security and development plans are
needed to address the strength and growth of the insurgency.
They disagree on whether or not security should be first
followed by development or whether they should be implemented
together. One retired military general commented on the use
of military construction units that should be used to open up
accessibility to the region through road construction. Once
these areas are been made more accessible, development and
security operations can be conducted together.


8. (U) Several guests highlighted other areas which need to
be addressed as well, including staffing gaps at police
stations. Infrastructure at the police stattions also needs
to be upgraded. Even minor fixes for some police stations
will create a better security environment. The stations that
have increased defensive measures have been successful in
thwarting attacks. More groups like the Andhra Pradesh-based
greyhound units need to be created. These units have shown
remarkable skill in countering the Naxalite/Maoist threat,

NEW DELHI 00000641 003.2 OF 003


while traditional large military units have been largely
ineffective. Other areas that were stressed were the need
for an increase in local ground intelligence and the quick
dissemination to indigenous units who can react on a moments
notice.

Comment: Naxalites in the Forefront
--------------


9. (SBU) Naxalite/Maoist activity has received increased
media attention in the past year. There are several reasons
for this new-found media interest in the long-running
Naxalite/Maoist insurgency: although still local and
small-scale in its ambition, it is increasing in breadth and
intensity resulting in lurid press coverage of massacres; PM
Singh has drawn attention to it by calling it the most
serious internal security threat to India; and the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) has made terrorism an important part of
its election campaign and loudly faulted the Indian National
Congress for its failure to address the Naxalite/Maoist
threat. End Comment.
MULFORD