NARAYANAN SAYS INDIA SEEKS 123 LANGUAGE IN IAEA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000354

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2018
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: NARAYANAN SAYS INDIA SEEKS 123 LANGUAGE IN IAEA
TEXT

Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)


1. (C) Summary: National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan told
the Ambassador February 4 that the Indian team negotiating
the safeguards agreement has stayed within the bounds of the
123 Agreement. While he admitted that the Indian side has
sought to include the 123 language in the operational
safeguards text, Narayanan recognized that the IAEA and the
U.S. would take issue with substantial changes to the
safeguards template. If the Indian team relented and
accepted the language on fuel supply assurance in the
preamble, Narayanan outlined, it would also seek a linkage
between the preamble and the operational text. Narayanan
also related that during the last round of talks, the IAEA
backtracked on settled points, and several people have cited
pressure from recalcitrant U.S. personnel. Narayanan also
let slip that India would likely restart IAEA talks on
February 10 or 11, which his assistant quickly corrected as
"not yet determined." End Summary.

Ambassador Presses Narayanan to Stay Within 123 Bounds
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2. (C) In a February 4 meeting with National Security Advisor
M.K. Narayanan, the Ambassador underlined that the U.S. has
respected India's domestic political process, but the
aggressive Indian approach to the IAEA safeguards talks has
caused frustration and confusion. The Ambassador related
that the Indian negotiating team appears to have pushed for
substantive changes to a template agreement that would
generate a precedent that could harm the global safeguards
regime. IAEA negotiators, he continued, have expressed doubt
that the team, particularly Narayanan's former assistant
Venkatesh Verma, even wants to conclude an agreement. He
also cautioned that India should not rely on the U.S. to push
an over-reaching safeguards agreement through the IAEA Board
of Governors (BOG). The Ambassador stressed that India had
better act quickly to complete the agreement.

Narayanan Seeks Linkage Between Preamble and Operational Text
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3. (C) Narayanan replied that he and the Ambassador "were on
the same wavelength" because India "has no intention of
pushing beyond the 123." He recognized the problem of
substantively r}vising the INFCIRC 66 template to fit India's
political needs; "we're sensitive to that requirement," he
claimed. While he acknowledged that India would eventually
accept the 123 language in the preamble, he admitted that the
negotiators have sought to put as much 123 text as possible
in the operational safeguards text in order to gain political
leverage when the agreement returns to Delhi for
consideration. In particular, India would like to see the
fuel supply assurances language "at minimum in the preamble,"
but was still "trying to see how much we could put in the
text." He defended Verma as exceptionally skilled at
drafting language that "says many things to many people."


4. (C) Because the IAEA has insisted on inserting the 123
text in the preamble, the Indian side has in turn sought to
strengthen the linkage between the preamble and the
operational language. "We are wordsmithing to make it seem
as if we had not altered the template more than necessary,"
he commented. "The preamble should be as clear as the
separation plan and 123 Agreement, and the link firm between
the preamble and the operational text," he asserted. The IAEA
safeguards agreement would then allow the Indian government
continue to de-emphasize the U.S. aspect of the civil nuclear
initiative, and tell the Left "we have got the stamp of
approval from an international agency." The agreement should
"not let a small recalcitrant domestic element have something
to try to trip us," he averred.

Did IAEA Backslide Because of U.S.?
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5. (C) During the last round of talks, Narayanan recounted,
the Indian side had a feeling of "slideback" after having
"more or less reached a modus operandi on issues." The team
got the impression that the backsliding had occurred because
"the U.S. put pressure on IAEA negotiators not to concede,"
but, Narayanan offered, he found it difficult to believe that
the U.S. would do such a thing. However, he alluded, like

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India, the U.S. Administration includes "elements" that have
other views on this initiative, but he believed that both
countries continue to implement the initiative from the top
down.

Next Round Scheduled for February 10-11 -- Or Maybe Not
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6. (C) The Ambassador recalled that India and the U.S.
concluded the 123 Agreement only when Narayanan and Foreign
Secretary Menon traveled to Washington, and asked if he

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expected to go to Vienna for the next round. Narayanan
replied that he would wait for the results of the next round,
which he divulged would take place February 10 or 11,
although his assistant Virendar Paul quickly corrected him
that the dates "are not fixed yet." The Ambassador asked if
the government could quickly convene the UPA-Left committee
to consider the safeguards agreement. Narayanan claimed that
the government could schedule a meeting as quickly as 24
hours after concluding the agreement. He also relayed that
he has requested Menon to encourage Under Secretary Burns to
urge the IAEA to accept language that adheres to the 123
Agreement.

Iran Pipeline Invitation Still Outstanding
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7. (C) The Ambassador warned that news reports about India
accepting an invitation to participate in tripartite talks on
the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline would further
complicate the effort to gain support from the U.S. Congress
for the nuclear initiative. Narayanan acknowledged that
Minister of Petroleum Murli Deora has received an invitation,
but he said that Deora has not yet accepted. "We recognize
the sensitivity," he assured.

Comment: Linkage Between Preamble and Operational Text?
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8. (C) While Narayanan has confessed that India has indeed
tried to insert 123 text into the operative safeguards
agreement, he is resigned to inserting the necessary language
in the preamble, provided that the Indians can demonstrate a
linkage between the preamble and the agreement itself. In
effect, they want a semi-operational preamble that would make
this safeguards agreement unique to India, answering the
Left's concerns that the IAEA would consider India as just
another non-nuclear weapons state. While Narayanan agreed in
one breath that the template of the agreement should not be
transformed, in the next breath he sought a linkage which
could compromise the template and set an unQelpful precedent.
The Indians hope that Director General El Baradei will
resolve this paradox by finding a middle-ground that
preserves the IAEA safeguards regime and satisfies the
political demands set by the Left.
MULFORD