Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI3265
2008-12-31 10:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
MENON WELCOMES END USE MONITORING TALKS, HAS NOT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003265
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS PK IN
SUBJECT: MENON WELCOMES END USE MONITORING TALKS, HAS NOT
BUDGED ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES
REF: CONFIDENTIAL EMAIL SHIVERS-MULFORD (12/30/08)
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003265
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS PK IN
SUBJECT: MENON WELCOMES END USE MONITORING TALKS, HAS NOT
BUDGED ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES
REF: CONFIDENTIAL EMAIL SHIVERS-MULFORD (12/30/08)
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon told Ambassador
Mulford December 31 that he welcomed a visit by Department of
Defense Assistant Secretary Mitch Shivers on January 7 to
seek an agreement on End Use Monitoring (EUM),and confirmed
that he planned to meet personally with Shivers early in his
visit. Menon expressed confidence that he could work an
agreement through the Indian inter-agency system provided it
adequately addressed two outstanding issues, access to and
use of the transferred equipment. Ambassador Mulford read
verbatim the two "non-negotiable" U.S. principles related to
the outstanding issues of access and use that A/S Shivers
conveyed to Ambassador Mulford in advance of the Menon
meeting (ref B): first, the United States needs the
assurance of physical access to transferred defense hardware;
and second, India must be willing to agree to only those
end-uses consistent with U.S. law (e.g., self-defense,
internal security, and civic action).
2. (C) On access, Menon stressed the difficulty of physical
access to all deployed equipment at any time, saying,
"Clearly we cannot grant access to all the articles all the
time; we need to express that in the EUM agreement language
somehow." He suggested, for instance, that the Indian
government could share records of how the equipment was used
and deployed that would constitute verification of use, but
it could not accept the "categorical access to all sites at
all times, as it is currently written." (Ambassador Mulford
understood this to mean that a particular piece of equipment
might be at a site which for other reasons -- location,
secrecy, etc. -- might not itself be accessible at the time
requested or the equipment might be imbedded in such a way as
not to be practically accessible.) Menon stressed that he
believed this issue was "solvable" and that he hoped Shivers
would come prepared to work out language that could address
this concern.
3. (C) On use, Menon expressed his opinion that the Indian
formulation proposed by Foreign Minister Mukherjee to
Secretary Rice on October 4 exceeded the requirements of U.S.
law. He explained that the GOI viewed the principle of "use"
in terms of who used the equipment, rather than how it was
used, and that limiting use of the equipment to the Indian
Armed Forces should be sufficient. Nevertheless, the GOI
could agree to "a simple definition of use, including the
three elements" -- i.e. self-defense, internal security, and
civic action -- but that the Indian government could not
agree to enumerate all the conceivable legitimate uses to
which the equipment could be put. (Note: The October 4 GOI
formulation referred to uses "including" the three mentioned
without limiting potential uses to only those three.) Menon
said in any case the Indian government would interpret
"self-defense" broadly, suggesting that a specific list,
however long, would have no practical effect in
circumscribing uses of the equipment.
4. (C) COMMENT. Menon appeared not to have accepted a
specific list of authorized uses, despite acknowledging that
a broad interpretation of "self-defense" could reduce the
practical effect of this requirement. He also seems not to
have accepted the requirement for physical inspection, even
taking into account the manner in which such inspections work
in practice and that inspections would only happen at a time
and place of mutual agreement. However, unlike negations in
November, when he was unexpectedly out of town, Menon
stressed that he wanted to work out agreeable language and he
seemed personally committed to giving EUM one last chance
before the transition, realizing that failure could mean a
delay of many months. Menon appeared confident about what he
could sell to the Cabinet Committee on Security and how much
he could give away. His personal involvement gives us a
NEW DELHI 00003265 002 OF 002
chance to succeed, but his default to India's previous
positions suggests it is by no means guaranteed. END COMMENT.
MULFORD
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS PK IN
SUBJECT: MENON WELCOMES END USE MONITORING TALKS, HAS NOT
BUDGED ON OUTSTANDING ISSUES
REF: CONFIDENTIAL EMAIL SHIVERS-MULFORD (12/30/08)
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)
1. (C) Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon told Ambassador
Mulford December 31 that he welcomed a visit by Department of
Defense Assistant Secretary Mitch Shivers on January 7 to
seek an agreement on End Use Monitoring (EUM),and confirmed
that he planned to meet personally with Shivers early in his
visit. Menon expressed confidence that he could work an
agreement through the Indian inter-agency system provided it
adequately addressed two outstanding issues, access to and
use of the transferred equipment. Ambassador Mulford read
verbatim the two "non-negotiable" U.S. principles related to
the outstanding issues of access and use that A/S Shivers
conveyed to Ambassador Mulford in advance of the Menon
meeting (ref B): first, the United States needs the
assurance of physical access to transferred defense hardware;
and second, India must be willing to agree to only those
end-uses consistent with U.S. law (e.g., self-defense,
internal security, and civic action).
2. (C) On access, Menon stressed the difficulty of physical
access to all deployed equipment at any time, saying,
"Clearly we cannot grant access to all the articles all the
time; we need to express that in the EUM agreement language
somehow." He suggested, for instance, that the Indian
government could share records of how the equipment was used
and deployed that would constitute verification of use, but
it could not accept the "categorical access to all sites at
all times, as it is currently written." (Ambassador Mulford
understood this to mean that a particular piece of equipment
might be at a site which for other reasons -- location,
secrecy, etc. -- might not itself be accessible at the time
requested or the equipment might be imbedded in such a way as
not to be practically accessible.) Menon stressed that he
believed this issue was "solvable" and that he hoped Shivers
would come prepared to work out language that could address
this concern.
3. (C) On use, Menon expressed his opinion that the Indian
formulation proposed by Foreign Minister Mukherjee to
Secretary Rice on October 4 exceeded the requirements of U.S.
law. He explained that the GOI viewed the principle of "use"
in terms of who used the equipment, rather than how it was
used, and that limiting use of the equipment to the Indian
Armed Forces should be sufficient. Nevertheless, the GOI
could agree to "a simple definition of use, including the
three elements" -- i.e. self-defense, internal security, and
civic action -- but that the Indian government could not
agree to enumerate all the conceivable legitimate uses to
which the equipment could be put. (Note: The October 4 GOI
formulation referred to uses "including" the three mentioned
without limiting potential uses to only those three.) Menon
said in any case the Indian government would interpret
"self-defense" broadly, suggesting that a specific list,
however long, would have no practical effect in
circumscribing uses of the equipment.
4. (C) COMMENT. Menon appeared not to have accepted a
specific list of authorized uses, despite acknowledging that
a broad interpretation of "self-defense" could reduce the
practical effect of this requirement. He also seems not to
have accepted the requirement for physical inspection, even
taking into account the manner in which such inspections work
in practice and that inspections would only happen at a time
and place of mutual agreement. However, unlike negations in
November, when he was unexpectedly out of town, Menon
stressed that he wanted to work out agreeable language and he
seemed personally committed to giving EUM one last chance
before the transition, realizing that failure could mean a
delay of many months. Menon appeared confident about what he
could sell to the Cabinet Committee on Security and how much
he could give away. His personal involvement gives us a
NEW DELHI 00003265 002 OF 002
chance to succeed, but his default to India's previous
positions suggests it is by no means guaranteed. END COMMENT.
MULFORD