Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI2905
2008-11-12 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE

Tags:  MARR PREL PROV MASS KOMC IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4146
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7131
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5483
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2882
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5877
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002905 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PROV MASS KOMC IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE
MONITORING, FOR NOW

Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002905

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PROV MASS KOMC IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT UNWILLING TO AGREE TO END-USE
MONITORING, FOR NOW

Classified By: AMB David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: While Indian National Security Advisor M.

K. Narayanan and Defense Secretary Vijay Singh stated their
urgent interest on reaching agreement on end-use monitoring,
talks led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Asian and Pacific Security Affairs) Mitchell Shivers failed
to make any significant progress. Defense Secretary Singh
concluded his final meeting with PDASD Shivers with a promise
to take the matter to the Prime Minister's Office and Defense
Minister to seek political clearance of the language, which
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of
External Affairs were clearly unwilling to approve at their
level. In a November 10 meeting, the Ambassador and Foreign
Secretary Menon looked for ways to move forward in advance of
Menon's plans to go to Washington before the end of the
month. End Summary.


2. (C) On November 6, PDASD Shivers and CDA White received
a meeting with National Security Advisor Narayanan late in
the day and provided Narayanan the U.S. end-use monitoring
(EUM) text. While Narayanan was cordial and explicitly
stated that the Government of India (GOI) was eager to do
business with the United States, it was apparent that he had
not been fully briefed on developments. He seemed most
concerned with mischievous uses of the EUM text to enable the
United States to probe into Siachen glacier bases or Indian
forward bunkers. PDASD Shivers assured him that was not the
intent of the program. Narayanan told PDASD Shivers that the
GOI sought to conclude the EUM agreement during this U.S.
administration. PDASD Shivers stressed that the U.S.
government had little flexibility beyond the draft text,
which was drafted to be as flexible as possible while still
fulfilling U.S. law. Narayanan directed MEA Americas Joint
Secretary Gaitri Kumar and Ministry of Defense
Director-General for Acquisitions Shashi Kant Sharma to meet
with the U.S. team and finalize the text on the following day.


3. (C) PDASD Shivers and CDA White had a courtesy call with

Defense Secretary Singh prior to the beginning of talks on
November 7, where Singh reiterated the GOI,s desire to agree
to EUM text. Once talks begin, chaired on the Indian side by
MoD Joint Secretary for Air Acquisitions Ghose and MEA
Americas Joint Secretary Kumar, it became apparent that the
Indian side had concerns with every alteration of their
October 4 text. The Indian side had three primary concerns,
all of which directly conflicted with U.S. requirements under
the Arms Export Control Act. First, the GOI objected to
language that would guarantee U.S. access to transferred
defense articles in order to conduct end-use monitoring. The
GOI sought to use vague language, which had the effect of
making U.S. access optional rather than mandatory. Second,
the GOI opposed the U.S. delineation of a broad number of
authorized end-uses (internal security, self-defense, civic
action, etc.) detailed in the Arms Export Control Act. The
GOI argued that defense articles once purchased by India
should be useable in any operation of the Indian Armed Forces
without restrictions. PDASD Shivers stressed that it was
almost inconceivable that the GOI would use articles in a way
not permitted under the broad U.S. text. Finally, the GOI
objected to language that the U.S. would "retain the right to
verify credible reports" of unauthorized uses of transferred
defense articles. The GOI side proposed a variety of means
to condition the U.S. right, but none of them could satisfy
the strict requirements of U.S. law in this area.


4. (C) PDASD Shivers concluded the session as it became
clear that no additional progress could be made at that
level. In his outcall with Defense Secretary Singh, PDASD
Shivers indicated his disappointment in not resolving the
issue and that as a consequence the U.S. could not move
forward with several defense transfers to India. After
inquiring as to the areas of greatest contention, Defense
Secretary Singh expressed optimism that approval might be
achievable at the political level. He promised to take the
matter to the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister's
Office. He said he would discuss the matter with National
Security Advisor Narayanan over the weekend, when they would
travel together for the Prime Minister's visit to Oman. He
thought the Indian political leadership might be able to

NEW DELHI 00002905 002 OF 002


bridge the current divide (implicitly indicating the
political leaders would be willing to accept text
unacceptable to lower-levels in the government) and the GOI
would respond in seven-to-eight days. The U.S. side noted
that Foreign Secretary Menon, who was noticeably absent from
Delhi despite having provided the dates for these talks, was
scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C. for the G-20 summit
on November 15, which might provide a possible opportunity to
resolve the matter.


5. (C) On November 10, Ambassador Mulford met with
Foreign Secretary Menon to see whether there was a way ahead
following the Shivers, discussions. Menon acknowledged that
he had not had a chance yet to get a full debrief on the
talks, but said he feared that the issue was becoming
potentially unsolvable because positions were hardening in
such a way as to make further discussions unhelpful. Instead
of being a "language" problem, it was now looking like EUM
had raised "substantive" problems. Menon said the GOI,s
perception was that the USG-suggested draft language had
become "harder" over the course of the negotiations and that
language in existing agreements had not been as restricted.
He asked why the language had changed over the past three or
four years. The Ambassador reviewed the issues raised by the
USG suggested language on use and stressed that the U.S.
already had agreements on EUM with over 80 other countries.
Menon responded that India continued to be interested in
resolving the issue as soon as possible and said New Delhi
did not want to wait until the next Administration takes
office to get this done. Menon said he was planning to go to
Washington in the near future to discuss transition issues
and would like to be able to bring a resolution to this
issue. The Ambassador acknowledged that India needed to find
a politically palatable way of addressing our language and
agreed that we should make the effort to resolve this issue
now to enable strong defense cooperation in the future.


6. (U) PDASD Shivers has not cleared this message.
MULFORD