Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NEWDELHI1726
2008-06-23 11:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA IN COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES: NOT SATISFIED

Tags:  KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA ZI SF PO CA IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0983
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #1726 1751156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231156Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2361
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 0073
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0062
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0723
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0647
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6565
C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001726 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA ZI SF PO CA IN
SUBJECT: INDIA IN COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES: NOT SATISFIED
WITH HANDBOOK, MULLING ZIMBABWE STATEMENT

REF: A. STATE 62767


B. EHRENDREICH - JORDAN EMAIL 6/13/08 AND SUBSEQUENT

Classified By: A/DCM John Davison for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NEW DELHI 001726

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA ZI SF PO CA IN
SUBJECT: INDIA IN COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES: NOT SATISFIED
WITH HANDBOOK, MULLING ZIMBABWE STATEMENT

REF: A. STATE 62767


B. EHRENDREICH - JORDAN EMAIL 6/13/08 AND SUBSEQUENT

Classified By: A/DCM John Davison for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (SBU) In response to Ref A, A/PolCouns delivered reftel
demarche on India's role in the Community of Democracies (CD)
to Joint Secretary (UN Political) Sanjiv Arora. On June 20
Arora contacted A/PolCouns to provide India's position on the
withdrawal of Indian support for the Diplomat's Handbook and
the statement on Zimbabwe.


2. (SBU) Generally cryptic in discussing India's reasoning
on withdrawing support for the Diplomat's Handbook, Arora
started by stating that objections to the Handbook shouldn't
be seen as a reflection of India's support for the CD in
general. He then said that when Foreign Secretary Menon gave
India's support in principal to Under Secretary Dobriansky at
the Global Issues Forum in April, he (Menon) also said India
wanted to see the specific text before co-signing. However,
Arora maintained, India never got to see the text until just
recently, when it started to give its objections at Convening
Group (CG) meetings. As A/PolCouns tried to zero in on the
objections, Arora repeatedly said "if you look at the
handbook, you won't be surprised at what our objections are."
After a lot of pressing, an evasive Arora referred to the
passage on Burma, which he said isn't the official name of
the country and not what India refers to it as; he hinted
that there were other similar references in the handbook
which India finds objectionable, but would not specify,
claiming they were "obvious." A/PolCouns stressed that in
fact India's objections were not obvious to us, and we were
frustrated by the Indian delegate to the Convening Group's
unwillingness to explain India's position. Arora disagreed,
saying he had been in consultation with the Indian Convening
Group delegation and that India's position was clear.


3. (SBU) With regard to the statement on Zimbabwe, Arora
confirmed the External Affairs Ministry had received the
latest version of the text and would now consult internally.
The Indian Embassy in Washington had told Arora that they
have until June 23 to respond, so Arora planned to convey
India's position to the Indian Mission around opening of
business, June 23, Washington time. Arora would not say
would not say whether the new text looked acceptable to him
or not.


4. (C) Comment. Post believes India's lack of support for
the Zimbabwe statement likely stems from India's close
relations with South Africa. It is unlikely that India, as a
member of IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa dialogue) and the
G4 (seeking permanent UN Security Council membership, again
with South Africa),will part with Pretoria on this issue,
however disappointing that may be from a supposed leader of
the CD. Recent events may provide an opportunity for us to
put more pressure on India for the need for a statement on
Zimbabwe, however, we see the key to India's support stemming
from the South African position (as described in Ref A,
paragraph seven).
MULFORD