FRENCH SEE RESPITE FROM EARLY REBEL ASSAULT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000494

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: 10/26/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR UN SU LY FR ASEC CD
SUBJECT: FRENCH SEE RESPITE FROM EARLY REBEL ASSAULT,
AS CHAD MILITARY IMPROVES AND REBELS IN RELATIVE
DISARRAY

NDJAMENA 00000494 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS
1.4(B) AND (D).

REF: (A) NDJAMENA 491, (B) NDJAMENA 396

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The French here doubt that Chad rebels,
discouraged and disunited, will attack in force before
the New Year, and believe that of the rebel
formations, only the Ouaddaian UFCD group led by
Hassabalah was stronger than in February. Intra-
Chadian diplomacy had undermined the Erdimi's Zaghawa-
based RFC, and seemed to be having similar success
with Hassabalah's UFCD, with the Prime Minister,
himself of Ouaddaian origin, active in this effort.
The French also see the Chadian military as stronger
and more confidant than in February, and believe that
senior Chad military benefited from recent French
training aimed at enabling them to utilize their
newly-acquired vehicles, weapons and other platforms
more effectively in the field. The French noted,
however, that President Deby's recent emphasis on
military reform and "nationalization" of the
Presidential Guard, although politically wise, might
weaken the Chad military's ability to fight in the
short term. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador hosted French Ambassador Bruno
Foucher, and his POLMIL and POL Officers at a working
lunch October 25. Acting DCM and Acting DATT also
attended.

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CHAD, SUDAN, AND THE REBELLION
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3. (C) Foucher said that he believed that the Chad
rebels based in Sudan would not attack Chad in force
early in the upcoming dry season. Foucher said that
the rebels were discouraged and disunited. Their
internal correlation of forces had change since the
near-successful assault on N'Djamena last February:
Only the Ouaddaian UFCD group led by Hassabalah was
stronger than it had been in February. The forces led
by Timane Erdimi (Zaghawa, RFC) and Mahamat Nouri
(Gorane, UFDD),and Subiane (Arab, FRS) of Soubiane
were less numerous than before. Intra-Chadian
diplomacy had been successful in undermining Erdimi
and the Zaghawa RFC, and seemed to be having success
with Hassabalah's UFCD, as Prime Minister Youssouff
Saleh Abbas, himself of Ouaddaian origin, has active
in trying to bring the Ouaddaians back into the GOC
fold, as happened when Ouaddaian and Tama rebels led
by Mahamat Nour came back to Chad in December 2006.
Foucher said that he doubted the rebels would mount a
sustained campaign until after the New Year.


4. (C) Foucher said that at that point, another
contingency would come into play. Foucher said that
the bringing of charges by the ICC against Sudanese
President Bashir was "ineluctable." Whenever that
occurred, the Sudanese reaction would be
"imprevisible." The GOS could react by driving the
Chad rebels to attack Chad, but it might also act
against UNAMID in Darfur, or even, Foucher surmised,
marginalize Bashir himself. In any case, once the ICC
had acted, the situation between Chad and Sudan would
be subject to that new condition.

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CHAD MILITARY IMPROVING
--------------


5. (C) Foucher said that the Chad military had
improved its capabilities greatly since last
campaigning season. It had bought great quantities of
new equipment, weapons, and vehicles, especially air
assets, both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Of
particular note were the Sukhoi-25 attack aircraft
recently added to the ANT's arsenal. Foucher said
that the French military had recently conducted
training for Chadian senior military officers,
emphasizing the use of maneuver tactics to exploit the
advantages in mobility that their new equipment gave

NDJAMENA 00000494 002.2 OF 002


them. Foucher said the French believed that their
Chadian colleagues had gotten the message inherent in
this training. Foucher noted that the Chad military
had performed much better in June than in February,
primarily by employing more effective tactical
maneuvering in June than before, which led to
important victories, especially at Am Zoer, which
resulted in driving the rebels driven out of Chad with
heavy losses.


6. (C) Foucher said that President Deby had been
"nationalizing" the DGSSIE, the Presidential Guard,
that had been heavily Zaghawa, trying to make the ANT
more representative of the Chadian people. This was
good politics, but might result in military weakness
in the short run. This was part of a larger effort to
professionalize the Chadian army. Current Defense
Minister Kamougue came to the cabinet claiming that
President Deby had authorize him to carry out a
thorough-going reform of Chad's military institutions,
Foucher noted. Foucher was not very sure of Deby's
motivation for recently naming his nephew, General
Abderahim Bahar Mahamat Itno, Chief of Joint Staff,
but it was clear that the new CHOD was a "warrior" and
an accomplished "troop leader," who had personally led
the armored charge that had repulsed the rebels from
N'Djamena in February.

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MINURCAT/MINURCAT
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7. (C) Foucher said that the GOF was anxious to work
with us on a new mandate for a reinforced MINURCAT II.
Fouccher said that there were strong indications that
UNDPKO in New York does not understand the needs of a
reinforced MINURCAT as well as the SRSG does. Foucher
said it would be important to help the SRSG convince
New York that his vision of a MINURCAT II mandated and
staffed to provide a "flexible response" (i.e.,
through a mix of police trainers, formed police units
of gendarme character, and military forces) is the
right way to go in Chad.

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FRENCH INITIATIVE ON IDPS
--------------


8. (C) Foucher described the French initiative to
make return to homes as attractive as possible to
IDPs, a EURO 105 million program signed between France
and the GOC last week. Foucher said that France
sought to focus attention and resources on one of the
eventual "end-states" of the humanitarian crisis in
Eastern Chad, the return of IDPs to their homes,
farms, and herds.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) The French analysis of Chad rebels tracks with
what we know, especially from Embassy Khartoum's
superb reporting on its conversations with Chad rebel
leaders, and from A/DAS Wycoff's recent telephonic
conversation with a UFCD chief who broached the
subject of the UFCD entering into negotiations with
the GOC along the lines of the Sirte Accord. We see
naming of new CHOD and key senior staff as attempt to
synchronize the "official" military hierarchy with
those leaders who actually lead troops into battle.
We agree that the SRSG's vision for a reinforced
MINURCAT II endowed with police trainers, formed
police (gendarme) units, and appropriate military
forces, will be most effective in Chad. END COMMENT.


10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

NIGRO