Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NDJAMENA491
2008-10-23 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

SRSG ANGELO ON MINURCAT CURRENT AND FUTURE:

Tags:  PREL UN PKO MARR PINR SU LY FR EU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2381
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0491/01 2971313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231313Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6532
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0488
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000491 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PREL UN PKO MARR PINR SU LY FR EU CD
SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON MINURCAT CURRENT AND FUTURE:
MINURCAT I ABOUT TO DEPLOY TO CAMPS; CHAD PREPARED TO
ENGAGE ACTIVELY WITH REINFORCED MINURCAT II

REF: (a) NDJAMENA 477, (b) NDJAMENA 461

NDJAMENA 00000491 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, 1.4 (b/d).

--------
SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000491

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018
TAGS: PREL UN PKO MARR PINR SU LY FR EU CD
SUBJECT: SRSG ANGELO ON MINURCAT CURRENT AND FUTURE:
MINURCAT I ABOUT TO DEPLOY TO CAMPS; CHAD PREPARED TO
ENGAGE ACTIVELY WITH REINFORCED MINURCAT II

REF: (a) NDJAMENA 477, (b) NDJAMENA 461

NDJAMENA 00000491 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Louis J. Nigro, 1.4 (b/d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) UN SRSG Angelo told Ambassador October 21 that
MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900
personnel; that it was about to deploy the first of
450 Chadian police and gendarmes it has trained along
with their UNPOL mentors
to refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian
President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for
a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the
EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. The GOC was
cooperating fully in current MINURCAT effort and
planning for MINURCAT II. The GOC accepted some "re-
hatting" of some EUFOR contingents in MINURCAT II but
preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops)
than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and
were keen to add Formed Police Units to MINURCAT's
toolbox, especially from African and Middle Eastern
countries. Regarding the CAR, MINURCAT II should have
some 500 UN military there, "perhaps an African
battalion."


2. (C) The SRSG continues to impress with his
strategic approach to problems, breadth of thinking,
and diplomatic skills, especially his adept handling
of relations with the generally suspicious and prickly
GOC. Deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT
II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the
best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in
the area of security, but in relation to the broader
civilian aspects of MINURCAT's mandate -- including
human rights, prison reform, reform of the
administration of justice, and other non-security
sectors. The GOC also deserves more credit than it
has gotten for its serious and purposeful engagement
with both of the PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in

2007. The GOC has consistently pursued a policy that
contributed to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in

2007-2008 and of the more deliberate, but increasingly
effective deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008. SRSG
Angelo evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and
even improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II.
THE UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur
points up just how differently the international
community's key initiatives have been received on this
side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than on the other.
END SUMMARY.

--------------
SRSG UPBEAT ON MINURCAT I AND II
--------------


3. (C) UN SRSG Victor Angelo told Ambassador October
21 that MINURCAT I was up to 750 of its authorized 900
personnel; that the UNPKO was ready to deploy the 450
Chadian police and gendarmes it has already trained to
refugee camps in eastern Chad; and that Chadian
President Deby had substantially approved UN plans for
a reinforced and expanded MINURCAT II to take over the
EUFOR role in Chad after March 2009. Angelo described
Deby and the GOC as "very open" and "very engaged" on
all MINURCAT-related issues. MINURCAT would begin
sending the DIS personnel(the Chadian police and
gendarmes it had trained to police the camps) to
eastern Chad along with their UNPOL mentors (one UNPOL
mentor per five-six DIS personnel). The GOC was
cooperating fully in this effort.

--------------
GOC OPEN AND ENGAGED ON ALL MINURCAT ISSUES
--------------


4. (C) SRSG Angelo emphasized that President Deby
considered a post-EUFOR UN military presence in
MINURCAT II "indispensable;" agreed that UN troops
should escort, patrol, and protect refugees, IDPs,
humanitarian workers, UNPOL and DIS personnel
"actively;" agreed that UN military be mobile via air
capabilities; that MINURCAT II would be politically
"neutral;" accepted that the MINURCAT II military
element should "react to attacks or direct threats" on
camps and sites where humanitarians lived; and

NDJAMENA 00000491 002.2 OF 003


understood that MINURCAT II military were not there to
defend Chadian territory against rebels. Angelo cited
increasingly close collaboration between MINURCAT and
the Chad military in eastern Chad as a promising sign.
He highlighted that the GOC was firmly in favor of
Formed Police Units being added to MINURCAT II's
toolkit, especially gendarme units from African,
Middle Eastern, and South Asian countries. The GOC
would accept some "re-hatting" of some EUFOR
contingents in MINURCAT II. He noted that Chad
preferred a smaller military element (3,000 troops)
than did the UNDPKO (6,000 troops) in MINURCAT II and
that there were outstanding questions regarding DIS
pay, intelligence gathering and sharing, among other
things.

--------------
THE SHAPE OF MINURCAT II
--------------


5. (C) Angelo said that MINURCAT II's position vis a
vis the Chad rebellion would be clear. MINURCAT II
will tell the rebels to stay clear of MINURCAT II
assets and the camps and towns where humanitarians
lodged, or suffer the consequences of UN military
response, while reporting such contacts with rebels to
the GOC. MINURCAT II will reiterate that rebel
violence is "unacceptable and contrary to
international law." Regarding CAR, MINURCAT II should
have some 500 UN military there, in addition to
whatever numbers were arrived at for Chad. He foresaw
an African battalion presence in CAR. Angelo said
that to relieve pressure on Abeche town, MINURCAT II
would seek to develop a second logistical base at Goz
Beida or Am Timan. Angelo speculated that the French
might agree to provide logistical support to MINURCAT
II, much as it had to EUFOR, but this was not yet
agreed. EUFOR contingents that might offer a "re-
hatting of troops" included Ireland, Poland, and
Finland. The Italians and Dutch were getting out.
Norway was considering assuming the Italian medical
role in MINRCAT II and the Libyans had agreed to
contribute three personnel to MINURCAT II.

--------------
CURRENT CHAD REBEL STRENGTH
--------------


6. (C) Angelo offered some impressions of current
rebel strength. He said that there appeared to be
some 3,000 rebels 25 kilometers from the big Chad
border base of Adre, and another 1,200 near the border
town of Modeina. No Chad rebels appeared to be inside
Chad. Angelo said his military advisors believed that
the Chad military were better prepared to repulse
rebel attacks than they had been in February and June,
and were conducting robust training exercises along
the border.

--------------
COMMENTS
--------------


7. (C) SRSG Angelo continues to impress us with his
strategic approach to MINURCAT issues, his breadth of
thinking, and his diplomatic skills, especially his
adept handling of relations between MINURCAT and the
generally suspicious and prickly GOC. We believe that
the deployment of an expanded and reinforced MINURCAT
II under SRSG's effective leadership offers one of the
best hopes for progress in eastern Chad, not only in
the area of security, but in relation to the civilian
aspects of MINURCAT's mandate, including human rights,
prison reform, reform of the administration of
justice, and other non-security sectors.


8. (C) The GOC also deserves more credit than it
generally has gotten over the past year for its
serious and purposeful engagement with both of the
PKOs authorized by UNSCR 1778 in 2007. The GOC has
not exactly rolled over for EUFOR and MINURCAT II, but
it has consistently pursued a policy that contributed
to the very rapid deployment of EUFOR in 2007-2008 and
of the more deliberate, but increasingly effective
deployment of MINURCAT I in 2008. SRSG Angelo
evidently sees this GOC posture continuing and even
improving in the future vis a vis MINURCAT II. THE
UNSYG's October 17 report on UNAMID in Darfur points

NDJAMENA 00000491 003.2 OF 003


up the vastly different kind of reception that the
international community's key initiatives have
received on this side of the Chad/Sudan frontier than
on the other. END COMMENTS.


9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

NIGRO