EUFOR - POISE AND PROMISE IN CHAD'S TROUBLED EAST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000461

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2012
TAGS: PREL PREF EU UN KPKO CD CT SU
SUBJECT: EUFOR - POISE AND PROMISE IN CHAD'S TROUBLED EAST

REF: NDJAMENA 382

Classified By: CDA RGribbin for reasons 1.4 b&d


1. (C) Summary. The European Peace Keeping Force (EUFOR) in
eastern Chad is operational and robust. Well equipped with
APCs, tracked vehicles and helicopters, but even resorting to
horses during te height of the rains, EUFOR patrols
circulate egularly throughout the operational zone. Troopsassure secuity by their presence and by contact ad
communication with governmental authorities, inernational
humanitarian personnel, camp populatins and local
communities. Becaus this the first "raiding" season with
EUFOR present, it is too early to assess the overall impact
of the peace keepers, especially regarding international
hopes that IDPs might return home. However, EUFOR activities
in Chad notwithstanding, both refugees and IDPs forcefully
stated that insecurity in eastern Chad remains a function of
insecurity in Darfur. end Summary.


2. (C) Charge Gribbin joined a group of 20 diplomats and
senior Chadian officials for a French EU presidency sponsored
trip to observe, learn about and evaluate the European peace
keeping force in eastern Chad. The group visited headquarters
in Abeche and forward battalion commands in Farachana and Goz
Beida. Along the way we met with regional governors,
international humanitarian personnel, refugee and IDP camp
residents.


3. (C) At the end of the rainy season eastern Chad is covered
with light green pasture and thousands of acres of millet,
sorghum, peanuts and other crops nearing harvest. In the area
visited the harvest will be good. In the southern reaches of
the EUFOR zone, the waddis are drying up so that more regular
land movements can re-commence. Yet the southern sector
commander assured us (with photos of an APC sunk in a river
up to its top hatches) that patrolling had continued during
the rains. The central sector commander advised that he had
even rented some horses to patrol during flooded times.


4. (C) Logistically EUFOR has accomplished miracles during
its short seven month life span. Swatches of barren ground
now hum with life - tent and prefab structures abound,
electricity, water, mess halls and even internet are
available. Battalions are fully equipped with the trucks,
jeeps, tractors and heavier armed equipment needed for the
job. MINURCAT personnel are co-locating with EUFOR.


5. (C) Operationally, EUFOR understands its mission - patrol,
protect, observe, assure and communicate. This was clearly
evident in the description of activities undertaken in the
center and southern sectors visited. EUFOR escorts some
humanitarian convoys. Troops patrol out and bivouac on their
own. Soldiers meet regularly with central government and
local officials as well as international organization
personnel. Clearly, the mere presence of such a force has a
dissuasive impact on those who sew insecurity. Yet, all
EUFOR's interlocutors want EUFOR to be more than it is.
International personnel want better protection against theft
and car hijacking, plus punishment of perpetrators. Local
officials want more development projects. Refugees and IDPS
want absolute security on a static basis. Nonetheless,
relations among these groups remain viable. There appeared to
be much less contact and understanding between EUFOR and the
Chadian Army (ANT) and even resentment by the latter of
EUFOR's presence and its obviously superior equipment. But
there too, there has been little friction as the two forces
largely ignore each other. We only saw several ANT pick-ups
in Goz Beida.


6. (C) At the battalion level and below - especially in the
central zone - some of the platitudes of not taking sides in
Chad's internal struggle dissipated. The commander assured us
that his forces have the necessary rules of engagement so as
to protect themselves from all comers and to take action
themselves against any Jajaweed or others who threaten the
camps, the displaced, the crossroads and towns that he must
control to assure his mission. Back at headquarters EUFOR
intelligence personnel carefully track rebel movements, much
via daily mirage reconnaissance flights, or by signal
intelligence. Additionally, EUFOR radar fully covers the
frontier zones.


7. (C) MINURCAT. An expanded MINURCAT presence was evident
throughout. Human rights monitors and civil affairs personnel
are assigned. DIS police buildings are being constructed and
international police personnel, including women officers,
were present in the camps. Dr. Mahamat, the CONAFIT chief who
accompanied the group, advised that the deployment of Chadian
DIS police personnel to the east would begin on October 15.


8. (C) The touring group of diplomats visited the refugee
camp of Djabal and IDP camp of Gourounkoun, both outside Goz

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Beida. Both camps are extensive villages of family compounds
rather than long rows of blue UN tarpaulin shelters. In
existence now for several years, life has taken on a regular
pace. Water systems run, schools educate, the clinics are
full, but not with life threatening maladie due to
malnutrition or terrible sanitation condtions. In town
meetings with camp residents, theonly camp related issue was
a request for more fod from the IDPs. Otherwise
presentations focusedon insecurity in Darfur and the need to
take corective measures there so that peace could be
achieved in Chad as well. IDPs were adamant that they would
not return home to stay - although young men were sent to
plant and harvest - until they felt safe from Jajaweed
raiders. They had little hope that even a robust EUFOR
presence along the frontier would be effective unless there
was a solution in Darfur. Sudanese refugees were even more
strident that the international community must do more to
halt genocide, rape and conflict that caused them to flee and
which continually afflicts family members who stayed in
Darfur. I assured the refugees that the US and international
community understood their plight, were strengthening UNAMID
and committed to pushing political solutions forward. I said
this would not be a quick process, but meanwhile they were
safe in Chad (cheers). The Libyan ambassador remonstrated
that Darfur was an African problem and that international
community ought to keep its hands off (boos). Order could not
be restored and the session broke up.


9. (C) Comment: EUFOR is an impressive operation. It is just
what a PKO ought to be. It has the will, the mandate and the
ability to do the job its been given. It has cost about 100
million Euro so far. Obviously EUFOR does not solve all the
problems - and being mostly all white (and French) it does
cast a neocolonialist shadow, but it is only a Band-Aid, a
year long transition to the yet-to-be fleshed out UN PKO.
Certainly, part of the French reason for asking P-5 diplomats
along was to show us what can be, once blue hats go on. When
that happens, we assume and hope that along with the
operational experience, plus some continuation by French,
Irish and Polish contingents, that the basic camp
infrastructure developed by EUFOR would convey.


GRIBBIN