Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NDJAMENA413
2008-09-15 14:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

ASMARA CONTACT GROUP MTG ON CHAD/SUDAN: READ OUT

Tags:  PREL SU CD LY KPKO ER SG UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3077
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0413 2591458
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151458Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6455
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000413 

SIPDIS

TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PREL SU CD LY KPKO ER SG UN
SUBJECT: ASMARA CONTACT GROUP MTG ON CHAD/SUDAN: READ OUT
FROM SRSG ANGELO

Classified By: ADCM: RGribbin for reason 1.4 b&d
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000413

SIPDIS

TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2018
TAGS: PREL SU CD LY KPKO ER SG UN
SUBJECT: ASMARA CONTACT GROUP MTG ON CHAD/SUDAN: READ OUT
FROM SRSG ANGELO

Classified By: ADCM: RGribbin for reason 1.4 b&d

1.(C) Summary. UN SRSG Angelo said the recent contact group
meeting in Asmara on Chad/Sudan was "POSITIVE." The Chadian
and Sudanese ministers were cordial, INCLUDING IN INFORMAL
MEETINGS. Under considerable pressure from Libya and Eritrea,
they agreed to exchange ambassadors prior to the next CG
meeting scheduled for Ndjamena probably in late October. The
report to the CG on the creation of a border monitoring force
was vague, yet participants pledged to begin depositing funds
for it by November, with anticipated deployment next spring.
Angelo said Senegalese and Eritrea ministers had a nasty
dispute over force composition, with Senegal arguing for UN
cover and Eritrea insisting on stand alone. Angelo opined
that the CG proposal was doomed to fail prior to launching.
End summary.


2. (C) SRSG Angelo briefed UNSC diplomats resident in
Ndjamena on the recent Contact Group meeting in Asmara. He
characterized the event overall as "positive," and said that
the tone, at least, of exchanges between Chad and Sudan was
cordial. The two ministers seemed to get along, including in
side-bar meetings. Under pressure from Libya and Eritrea -
Angelo said the two delegations worked hand-in-glove with
Eritrea being the spokesman - Chad and Sudan agreed to
proceed with the actual exchange of Ambassadors. Libya
overrode Chadian objections that Sudan was still arming,
training and directing Chad rebel groups, even as it claimed
to seek better relations. Libya threatened to withdraw from
the CG if its demands for concrete results were not met. Chad
and Sudan pledged to do this prior to the next CG meeting,
which Eritrea formally requested Chad to host. Chad agreed
and the meeting will take place after Ramadan and after the
Francophonie summit in Canada. Angelo thought that would mean
mid to late October.


3. (C) The second order of business was to plan for the
establishment of the projected border monitoring force.
Angelo criticized the report to the group regarding the force
as "vague." He said it was clear on intent but without any
scope of operations. Nonetheless, members of the Contact
Group agreed to pony up $10 million to be deposited in a
trust fund beginning in November and another $20 million
later on. Angelo said that the ministers from Senegal and
Eritrea exchanged emotional words regarding force
composition. Senegal backed by Gabon and Congo, argued that
the force might usefully accept international, i.e. UN expert
assistance, whereas Eritrea insisted that it must stand alone
- "No foreign PKOs." Apparently PM Issas also denigrated the
Senegalese proposal saying that some nations (such as
Senegal) only wanted UN money. Obviously, the group came to
no resolution on the point. Angelo summed up giving his
opinion that the CG operation was doomed. There was no
concept, no financing, no sustainability and no management.


4. (C) Angelo said the Libyans distributed a detailed
nine-point list which they said constituted the "Initiative
of the Brother-Guide." It was not discussed, however.


5. (C) Comment: From our point of view, the Asmara meeting
appears to have accomplished little. Although the exchange of
ambassadors has symbolic value and does qualify as a
"concrete" step, its substantive value is debatable. The
Chadians hoped to secure some other Sudanese concession in
return for resuming diplomatic relations. They might still
work to get one before the next meeting. If the next CG
meeting is held in Ndjamena, it could lead the parties to
focusing more directly on the key bilateral issues, i.e.
desisting from support for rebels. Unless Sudan takes some
real substantive steps to reduce aid to the Chad rebels, the
best that a CG meeting in Ndjamena may accomplish is to delay
slightly the start of the campaigning season for the Chadian
Rebellion, long promised for the end of the rainy season.


NIGRO