LIBYAN AMBASSADOR BRIEFS ON TRIPOLI'S "TRILATERAL

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PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS
DEPT FOR AF/C, NEA/MAG, AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF UNAUS EU SU LY FR CD
SUBJECT: LIBYAN AMBASSADOR BRIEFS ON TRIPOLI'S "TRILATERAL
INITIATIVE" TO BRING PEACE BETWEEN CHAD AND SUDAN

Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) Libyan Ambassador Emhemmed Shlback briefed me on
Libya,s recent &Trilateral Initiative8 to bring peace
between Chad and Sudan August 5. Shlback said that Qaddafi
believed that the time was now ripe to try to bring the two
feuding leaders back to the more productive relationship they
once enjoyed. He said that this was the first step in a
two-step process: &First, we want to bring these two
friends of ours together; then we will work on a solution to
the Darfur situation.8 Shlback said he himself understood
more of the details of this first step than of the second
one.


2. (C) I asked why Tripoli believed that an initiative of
this kind could be effective just now, Shlback replied that
Libya believed that Sudan,s President Bashir was ready for a
rapprochement with Chad because he had been weakened
politically by three developments: The near-miss May JEM
attack on Khartoum; the deteriorating situation in Darfur;
and the recent ICCC legal action against him. Shlback said
that Chad,s President Deby was similarly ready because he
greatly feared the possibility of renewed Chad rebel
offensives at the end of the current rainy season, in October
or November, having been shaken by rebel successes in
February and June.


3. (C) Shlback said the Libyan initiative had three main
elements: The two countries must cease all propaganda and
media attacks on each other immediately; the two countries
must reestablish diplomatic relations and reopen borders
immediately; and the two leaders should be prepared to accept
an invitation to a summit meeting in Tripoli as soon as
possible. He placed great emphasis on the necessity for the
two sides to act &immediately, no studying, no analyzing.8
Shlback said Libya was very happy with the initial reactions
of N,Djamena and Khartoum to Dr. Ali Trekki,s diplomacy
over the last weekend.


4. (C) Shlback said that the essence of the Libyan
initiative was to pressure both leaders to end support for
rebel groups on their own territory. It was now up to
N,Djamena and Khartoum to take action that aimed at that
goal. Shlback said that Libya had played a mediating role
between the GOC and Chad rebels before, leading up to the
2007 Sirte Accord. He said that Sirte was still valid, but
when I inquired that in case the Chad rebels needed a
&refresher course8 on what they had signed on to at Sirte,
Shlback relied that he could suggest to Tripoli that they
might be invited there for a few weeks of talks if that were
necessary. Shlback said that he himself was not empowered to
speak to neither Chadian rebels nor Sudanese rebels. But he
emphasized that Tripoli believed that it was well within the
ability of both Deby and Bashir to effectively end support
for rebel groups in their countries. When I asked how Tripoli
would be able to verify compliance with this goal, Shlback
replied, &We will know; we will know.8


5. (C) Shlback said that Libya,s initiative was not/not
intended to replace the implementation process of the March
Dakar Accord. It was rather to reinforce the Dakar Process
that Libya acted &trilaterally.8 He said that Libya
intended to continue to support the Dakar Process and to
participate as a member of its Contact Group.


6. (C) I told Shlback that the USG was in favor of efforts by
African friends of Chad and Sudan to reduce tensions between
them. And of course, we all sought progress toward a
resolution of the Darfur crisis. I asked him to query his
government regarding steps that the wider international
community, including the United States, might consider doing
to support the Libyan initiative, especially things which
could of course be done quietly and in consultation with
Tripoli. I emphasized that I was sure that the United States
would not act in a way that would tend to efface Libya,s
role as protagonist of peace regarding Chad and Sudan, but
might seek to act diplomatically and politically to second
Libyan efforts. Shlback said that he appreciated such a
positive USG view of his country,s efforts in Chad and Sudan
and that he would refer the issue of a possible supportive
stance to his government.


7. (C) Comment: It seems only logical to encourage
Tripoli,s latest initiative, given our support for its
efforts to broker peace between Chad and Sudan, as well as
its efforts to mediate between Deby and the Chad rebel
chieftains, as at Sirte in 2007 and more recently in Tripoli

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with Erdimi,s RFC group. I have tried since his arrival to
build a close working and personal relationship with shlback
and will continue to do so.
NIGRO