RESOLVING KENYA'S CABINET IMBROGLIO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000960

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE
AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: RESOLVING KENYA'S CABINET IMBROGLIO

REF: NAIROBI 893 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. President Kibaki and PM-designate Odinga
have still not reached agreement on composition of a
coalition cabinet. The difference between them is over 2-3
ministries. The impasse has heightened tensions. There was
sporadic violence April 8 and 9, but the country is now calm.
Hardliners are constraining both leaders, though the two
seem committed to working out a cabinet deal and making the
coalition government work. I met with Kibaki and Odinga
April 8 to follow up on the Secretary's calls to them, but
neither significantly altered their positions. Both see the
U.S. role as positive and look to us to help encourage a
solution. I engaged the media April 9 to highlight the
Secretary's April 8 statement and to maintain pressure for

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action. Annan remains intensively engaged by phone with the
two leaders, and I am coordinating closely with him. We are
supporting various efforts underway to bring about another
meeting between Kibaki and Odinga to iron out a cabinet deal.
I want to praise my Mission team, which has continued to
work flat out in an extremely well-coordinated and effective
way to support U.S. efforts. End summary.

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Fight Over a Few Key Ministries
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2. (C) Further to reftel, President Kibaki and Prime
Minister-designate Odinga have still not reached agreement
regarding composition of a coalition cabinet. While the
dynamics are complex, the main issue holding up agreement is
how cabinet positions will be divided. Kibaki and Odinga
have agreed on a cabinet size of 40, with each side getting
20 positions. Odinga insists that for the sake of real
power-sharing he must receive at least a few of the highest
profile ministries. Kibaki has not offered any of these, and
insists that what he put forward is fair. Odinga wants at
least 2 infrastructure ministries (preferably Energy and
Transport) and at least 1 policy coordination ministry
(Foreign Affairs, or Justice and Constitutional Affairs, or
Local Government).


3. (C) Kibaki and Odinga held a one-on-one meeting on April
3 that has become a source of contention. Kibaki insists
that at the meeting Odinga accepted Kibaki's proposed list of
ministries (without the 3 noted above that Odinga wants).
Odinga maintains that they agreed on the number of 40
ministries, but that he never agreed to Kibaki's list; and
Odinga says Kibaki agreed at that meeting to cede Local
Government. It is possible that there was a genuine
misunderstanding, but it is more probable that either or both
of them changed their minds after the meeting. Kibaki and
Odinga met again on April 6, this time partly alone and
partly with their teams, and reached no agreement.


4. (C) Both men are buffeted by hardliners in their camps.
Uhuru Kenyatta, who currently holds Local Government and is a
presidential aspirant, does not want to give up this powerful
ministry. Kenyatta is important to the cohesion of Kibaki's
Party of National Unity. Martha Karua, who is also a
presidential aspirant and who was Kibaki's lead negotiator in
the Annan-led talks, holds Justice and Constitutional Affairs
and does not want to relinquish it. Kibaki sees Foreign
Affairs as his personal domain. Odinga is under enormous
pressure from William Ruto, who is key to the crucial support
Odinga has in Rift Valley. Ruto feels threatened by the
government's allegations that he was involved in organizing
and supporting the Rift Valley violence which followed the
election dispute.

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Meetings with Kibaki and Odinga
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5. (C) Following the Secretary's calls to Kibaki and Odinga
on April 7, I met separately with them on April 8. I talked
one-on-one with Kibaki for an hour and a half. Kibaki said
he appreciated the Secretary's call, and he seemed sobered by
the high-level U.S. expression of concern. I emphasized the

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need to make the final compromises needed to form the
cabinet, coming back to this five times during the course of
the discussion. I pressed hard, and discussed the details,
including the ministries at play and possible trade-offs.
Kibaki repeatedly insisted that he has offered all that he
can. He said the problem is that Odinga keeps changing his
conditions and demands for an agreement (moving the goal
posts, though he did not use that expression). Kibaki
sounded patient and exasperated at the same time. "His
behavior has put me in an impossible position," Kibaki said.
"I do not want to create another crisis by being the one who
makes this deal not succeed." Kibaki went on to say that
"I've reached a point where I cannot change, because if I do
I will look useless to my people. I will lose all my
credibility." Kibaki then discussed very frankly the
pressures he is under. He noted that five of his most senior
people are fighting over who will become deputy prime
minister. They and others are insisting that he must not
compromise further.


6. (C) Kibaki did, however, leave the door open. "I want to
move this country forward," he said, "and I know that I
cannot do that without a deal with Odinga. For the sake of
finalizing an agreement, I might be willing to make
additional concessions on ministries," he continued, "but
there is no guarantee that Odinga would not simply take that
and then put on yet more conditions. Please," he almost
pleaded, "do not push me to do more." I stressed to Kibaki
that the U.S. would use its full weight to ensure that Odinga
does not make further demands, if Kibaki gives Odinga the
final 2-3 ministries he wants. I told Kibaki that Odinga had
told me he is ready to do the deal immediately if he gets
those ministries. He needs the face-saving, I argued, and if
Kibaki gives it, the U.S. will hold Odinga to his promise to
do the deal.


7. (C) Kibaki expressed great appreciation for all the
efforts the U.S. has been making to help Kenyans, and asked
me to talk to Odinga to get him to accept what is on offer.
Kibaki asked me to call him with a read-out of my
conversation with Odinga, which I did (see below). I made
clear that the U.S. feels real power-sharing is necessary,
and this does mean that Odinga needs to get some of the high
profile ministries. Kibaki did not yield any ground. He
did, however, ask me to make clear to Odinga that he (Kibaki)
is ready to meet Odinga at any time. Kibaki said that I
could also tell Odinga that he (Kibaki) is willing to make
additional ministerial changes within 2 months following
installation of the cabinet. Having the coalition government
in place, Kibaki explained, will strengthen his hand within
his own party and make it easier for him to make changes.


8. (C) Kibaki spoke as frankly and as passionately as I have
ever heard him. "I don't know what to do," he said. "Why
can't Odinga see that I actually want to help him because it
is in my interest to do so." Kibaki explained that it is in
his interest to help Odinga because this will undercut
hardliners within Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement,
particularly William Ruto. Odinga, Kibaki said, will get
much of the credit for the progress to be made in the coming
years. Kibaki talked at length about how he will need to
work effectively with Odinga in order to carry out
institutional reform and bring about economic and social
progress. Kibaki claimed that there will be more Kalenjins
(people from Rift Valley) in the government once Odinga is
prime minister than there has ever been before. This, Kibaki
maintained, would benefit Odinga and strengthen his
credibility by showing results.


9. (C) I discussed the state of play with Odinga over lunch.
I briefed him on my conversation with Kibaki and stated my
view that Kibaki is committed to reaching a deal, but is
under enormous pressure from hardliners. Odinga agreed with
this assessment saying that, in some respects, it mirrored
his own situation. Odinga insisted he and Kibaki did not
reach the agreement (that Kibaki described to me) during
their one-on-one meeting; rather, there was an agreement, but
it was that Kibaki would cede the Local Government ministry
as well as Energy and Transport. Odinga said he believes
Kibaki will give up the Energy, Transport, and Local
Government ministries. Odinga said he is reluctant to meet

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with Kibaki again unless there is a strong prospect of
reaching agreement. He proposed having two people from each
side meet to work out a final agreement. I expressed
skepticism about the utility of this, noting that only he and
Kibaki can make the necessary decisions. I talked at length
with Odinga about the advantage he will have once he becomes
Prime Minister, almost regardless of the specific nature of
the cabinet appointments. He agreed with this, but said that
accepting a deal without the 2-3 ministries he wants would
risk splitting his party and thus weakening his leverage
within the government and within Parliament. I told Odinga
that we will move quickly to bolster his role as Prime
Minister once the coalition cabinet is formed.

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Annan Engaged
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10. (C) While I was at lunch with Odinga, Annan called him.
In recent days Annan has spoken repeatedly with Kibaki and
Odinga to urge them forward. He spoke with Kibaki on April 8
before calling Odinga. Annan urged Kibaki and Odinga to meet
again, and he urged Kibaki to yield at least a couple of the
high profile ministries. I have been in frequent touch with
Annan, and we are closely coordinating efforts. The evening
of April 8, Annan told me it may become necessary for him to
come to Kenya at some point to press Kibaki and Odinga to
finalize a cabinet deal. He had planned to come for the
planned April 12 swearing-in of the new cabinet and Prime
Minister. Annan expressed great appreciation for the
Secretary's continued engagement, saying it is essential to

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moving Kibaki and Odinga forward.

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Public Posturing and Sporadic Violence
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11. (C) After the unsuccessful Kibaki-Odinga meeting on
April 6, both sides went public. That evening, Kibaki and
Odinga made positive statements emphasizing their commitment
to reach a cabinet deal and urging the Kenyan people to
remain calm. (When I praised Kibaki for his very
constructive statement, he said that he had to personally
rewrite the statement his team had drafted, which had been
very hardline.) Following these public statements, however,
Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement made a very negative
statement on April 7. Following a meeting of the ODM's
parliamentary group, the ODM secretary-general issued a
statement calling for suspension of the talks with Kibaki,
and reopening a number of issues already resolved (like the
size of the cabinet). The statement also labeled Kibaki's
current partial cabinet "illegal and unconstitutional." I
called Odinga to emphasize how unhelpful the statement was
and to insist that he clarify his commitment to reaching
agreement on the cabinet. Odinga sought to place the blame
for the statement on his people, and to some degree it
reflects the tremendous pressure he is under from hardliners.


12. (C) The impasse over the cabinet has heightened
tensions, and sporadic violence flared in several places on
April 8. This did not become generalized violence, and the
country is currently calm. A very positive corollary to
these rumblings of unrest, however, is the mounting chorus of
voices from supporters of both sides, and indeed from Kenyans
everywhere, echoing our pressure and demanding that their
leaders resolve this impasse immediately.

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Next Steps
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13. (C) I and my team remain intensively engaged with Kibaki
and Odinga, and their teams, to press for a cabinet deal. On
April 9, I spoke with the media to highlight the Secretary's
April 8 statement. Continued intensive U.S. engagement will
remain essential to push for conclusion of the cabinet deal
and effective functioning of the coalition government.
Although everyone agrees it is preferable for Kibaki and
Odinga to work out a deal by themselves, a visit by Annan may
also become necessary to push them together to make the final
compromises. The Secretary's calls and statement taken

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together are generating some momentum for a last, successful
push to get the cabinet deal. People on both sides who want
to see a deal are working to get Kibaki and Odinga to meet
again. I have orchestrated with Odinga a meeting with him
and several of his hardliners on April 10 for the purpose of
laying out to the hardliners hard realities on the need for
compromise, and having Odinga make clear his position in
front of them and then with the media that he is ready to do
the deal if he work out with Kibaki the remaining few cabinet
positions. I hope to see Kibaki again on the 11th.


14. (C) While the impact of hardliners constraining both
Kibaki and Odinga is troubling, I believe that both men are
capable of making the final tough decisions to put the
cabinet deal in place. They proved their ability to do so
with the signing of the February 28 political accord. They
both see the U.S. and Annan as the only interlocutors who can
help them bring this about.

RANNEBERGER