Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NAIROBI902
2008-04-04 16:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

Tags:  PGOV PREL SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNR #0902/01 0951609
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041609Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5354
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000902 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO
SUBJECT: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000902

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO
SUBJECT: Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia

Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Ambassador and Special Envoy met in Nairobi the
week of March 31-April 4 with senior members of the
Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
(ARS),including Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Executive
Committee Chairman, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan,
Central Committee Chairman. The ARS delegation was in
Nairobi at the invitation of the UN Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah. While the ARS continues to be animated
primarily by the Ethiopian presence in Somalia, we
detected some constructive views.


2. (C) The ARS claims to desire good relations with the
U.S., and all its neighbors; they support a peaceful
dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
and a peaceful political resolution for Somalia. At one
stage, they informally proposed that a national unity
government be formed now for a three year transition but
this was not followed up in subsequent meetings. The
Ambassador and Special Envoy welcomed the participation
of the ARS in the search for a peaceful political
solution for Somalia, and urged the ARS to support a U.N.
peacekeeping operation and to use their claimed influence
inside Somalia to reduce violence and further isolate the
Shabaab, from whom the ARS team claimed total
estrangement. End Summary.


3. (C) The ARS delegation included:

-- Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (Hawiye/Abgal): former
Executive Committee Chairman of the Council of Islamic
Courts and current Executive Committee Chairman of the ARS;
-- Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan (Rahanweyn): former Speaker
of Parliament and current Central Committee Chairman of
the ARS;
-- Jama Mohamed Ghalib (Dir/Isaq): Civil Society
representative to and Deputy Executive Committee Chairman
of the ARS. Intellectual, author, and former police
commander and Interior Minister under Siad Barre;
-- Ibrahim Hassan Addow (Hawiye/Haber Gedir/Sa?ad):
former Foreign Affairs Secretary of the Council of
Islamic Courts;
-- Omar Iman Abubakar (Hawiye/Badiade): former Vice

Chairman of Consultative Council (Shura) of the Council
of Islamic Courts;
-- Mohamed Abdi Yussuf (Darod/Awrtable): Former TFG MP
and also a minister in the previous TNG;
-- Mohamed Sheikh Hassan (Rahanweyn): Former General
associated with military intel; long time assistant to
Sharif Hassan;
-- Mohamed Ali Ibrahim (Hawiye/Badiade): Chairman of the
Constitution and Religious Committee for the ARS. Former
member of the Islamic Courts, affiliated with Al-Islah;
-- Abdirahman Adan Ibrahim ?Ibbi? (Dir/Bimal): Former TFG
MP and Minister, and also a minister in the TNG.


4. (C) Predictably, Sharif Hassan and Sheikh Sharif
focused on Ethiopian actions in Somalia and President
Yusuf?s complicity in their ?crimes? against the Somali
people. Without ever going into any detail, our ARS
interlocutors told us repeatedly that a solution to the
Ethiopian problem will lead easily to the resolution of
all other problems.


5. (C) The ARS portrayed itself as a peaceful
organization committed to non-violent means to achieve a
lasting political resolution for Somalia. Sheikh Sharif
emphasized there is no ARS relationship with al-Shabaab
and that this can be easily substantiated by the public
media reports describing the estrangement. In fact at
one point they implied that merely talking to us could be
dangerous to their health. They claimed much work needs
to be done to convince the people of Somalia that there
will be a peaceful democratic transition. They asked
rhetorically if we really believed the transition would
conclude with elections in 2009.


6. (C) The TFG, they said, has done nothing in three and
a half years on the transition, and therefore they saw no
reason to believe that any significant progress would be
made in the remaining one and a half years. They asked
us to use our influence to avoid any further delay and

NAIROBI 00000902 002 OF 003


support an inclusive transition process. Ibrahim Addow,
in what amounted to almost an aside, acknowledged that
more time would be necessary when he said a transitional
unity government could begin now for a three year
transition process.


7. (C) They claimed that the African Union Peace Support
Mission (AMISOM) is not neutral and is viewed by the
people of Mogadishu as part of the same continuum as the
Ethiopian forces. A neutral UN force would be required,
they said, but they questioned whether the resources
required would be better spent on reconstruction and
assistance for the Somali people. Sheikh Sharif said if
agreement could be found for an Ethiopian withdrawal then
?other forces? would not be necessary because the ensuing
political dialogue would lead quickly to peace. However,
he concluded, ?if the U.S. considers a UN force
important, then we can go along.? Addow twice mentioned
an Ethiopian withdrawal from cities as a minimally
acceptable first step that would send a strong message
and permit the Somali people themselves to create peace.


8. (C) The Ambassador laid out U.S. policy. He urged the
ARS to avoid getting bogged down on personality issues,
but rather to focus on the transition, which must include
all views. The Ambassador acknowledged their views on
Ethiopia, and on President Yusuf, but countered that
there must be provisions for security. He suggested the
best way to hasten an Ethiopian withdrawal would be to
support UN peacekeepers; he urged the ARS to issue a
statement in support of a UN peacekeeping operation. The
Ambassador pointed out that such a step would be a win-
win for all involved: it would give the U.S. something
positive to respond to and support; it would make the ARS
appear to be a responsible organization; and, it would
help SRSG Ould-Abdallah and the international community.
With regard to Yusuf, the Ambassador affirmed that the
U.S. will use its influence to support reconciliation and
constructive political dialogue that will further the
transition and help bring peace and stability to Somalia.


9. (C) A sense of urgency permeated the remarks of ARS
members. They seemed eager to go the next step, and to
establish credibility. ?Let me help you minimize
issues,? said Sheikh Sharif, and ?let?s get the TFG,
U.S., and whoever else is essential to the table to begin
dialogue.? He said if the U.S. wanted the ARS to ?share
power? with the TFG then the ARS will fully empower the
U.S. to get all sides to the table. According to Sheikh
Sharif, if the U.S. would change its policy toward the
TFG leadership it would be ?enormously helpful to us and
the Somali people.? Ibrahim Addow urged the U.S. to
adopt what he called an ?even? policy between Ethiopia
and Somalia. He said the Somali people are favorable to
the U.S., and are willing to work with and accept
America, but they need a change in U.S. policy.
Ambassador and Special Envoy made clear that the ARS must
demonstrate credibility through positive actions,
starting with a statement supporting UN peacekeeping.


10. (C) ARS members, particularly former senior Islamic
Court officials Sheikh Sharif and Ibrahim Addow,
acknowledged there has been a lot of mistrust in their
relationship with the U.S. They repeatedly said they
wanted to work together, and they wanted to collaborate
constructively to achieve political solutions. Sharif
Hassan said their objective is a broad based and stable
government that can effectively run the country, and an
immediate Ethiopian withdrawal. ?These are our
intentions and objectives,? he said, and they understand
that only the U.S. can bring this about.


11. (C) In a separate meeting with Sharif Hassan,
representing the former Parliamentarians, the former
Speaker assured us ?the past is past.? Referring to the
former Islamic Court members of the ARS, he said while
their common issue is Ethiopia, ?other issues? can be
accommodated. Sharif Hassan emphasized to us that the
ARS very much wants good relations the U.S. and is eager
for our support, assistance, cooperation. He assured us
he would push for a statement, as we suggested, in
support of a UN peacekeeping operation.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) A lot has changed since our last face-to-face

NAIROBI 00000902 003 OF 003


conversations with the two leaders of the ARS delegation
over a year ago. We found both the tone and substance of
Sheikh Sharif and Sharif Hassan to be much more
reconciliatory and expressive of a willingness to
maintain a serious dialogue with the U.S. and the
international community. We will continue to support
strongly SRSG Ould-Abdallah?s efforts to promote an all
inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and we will
reinforce those efforts with President Yusuf and Prime
Minister Hussein. The ARS will consult and discuss with
their supporters. We agreed on the need to maintain
momentum toward dialogue and peace, and we offered to
remain in contact.
RANNEBERGER