Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NAIROBI893
2008-04-03 09:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

COALITION CABINET STILL NOT FORMED

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1987
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RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2688
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000893 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE
AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: COALITION CABINET STILL NOT FORMED

REF: A. NAIROBI 798

B. NAIROBI 824

C. NAIROBI 855

D. FAX TO A/S FRAZER MARCH 28

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000893

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, R, DS, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE
AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: COALITION CABINET STILL NOT FORMED

REF: A. NAIROBI 798

B. NAIROBI 824

C. NAIROBI 855

D. FAX TO A/S FRAZER MARCH 28

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. The failure of the two sides thus far to
reach agreement on composition of a coalition cabinet
threatens momentum to resolve the Kenya post-elections
crisis. We have been working intensively with both sides to
press for rapid agreement (see ref A which lays out U.S.
engagement). Differences center on a few key ministries and
on the proper size of the cabinet (see competing lists faxed
per ref D). As the discussion on a cabinet drags on, the
media and other observers are starting to see this as a
potential "crisis," even though Kibaki and Odinga have been
positive and responsible in their public statements (their
supporters have not been as responsible). Kibaki continues
to refer to Odinga as prime minister-designate. The Kenyan
people continue to send a clear message to both leaders that
they want to see a cabinet formed quickly so that the country
can move forward. Kofi Annan and I coordinated on the
issuance of public statements on April 2 (see texts in paras
8 and 9). Possibly as a result of this pressure, Kibaki and
Odinga will meet again April 3. There may be progress as a
result of that meeting but, if there is not, we recommend
that the Secretary call Kibaki (and Odinga) on April 4. This
can be followed by another public statement as necessary.
End summary.

--------------
Sharing of Cabinet Positions
--------------


2. (C) The quick action by the Parliament to pass
legislation legalizing the coalition political accord,
coupled with constructive statements by President Kibaki and
Raila Odinga, established positive momentum on political
resolution of the post-elections crisis. Kibaki and Odinga
highlighted their united front when they met together with
donors on March 17 (ref C). That momentum is threatened by
the inability of the two sides thus far to agree on the
composition of a coalition cabinet. Since the passage of the

legislation on March 18, the two sides have been talking and
maneuvering regarding formation of a cabinet. Kibaki and
Odinga have met several times without making much headway.


3. (C) There are three inter-related issues. The first and
most important issue is equitable sharing of ministerial
portfolios. In essence, Kibaki wants his Party of National
Unity and its allies to retain most of the key ministerial
positions, including Finance, Foreign Affairs, Internal
Security, Defense, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and
Local Government. Kibaki is offering Odinga's Orange
Democratic Party (ODM) lesser portfolios and is proposing the
creation of additional ministerial positions (by dividing
ministries like Roads and Public Works, for example). Odinga
insists that equitable distribution of ministries means
sharing of the key, most powerful ministries. Demonstrating
flexibility, Odinga has, for example, indicated that if
Kibaki insists on keeping Finance (Kibaki feels strongly
about this since he was a former Finance Minister and closely
monitors the ministry),then ODM should be given Internal
Security. Both Kibaki and Odinga are under pressure from
their hard-line supporters (on the one hand not to give away
key jobs; on the other to demand powerful positions). Though
no real progress has been made in their meetings, Kibaki and
Odinga have both been careful to avoid provocative public
statements. Their supporters have been less disciplined.

--------------
Two Other Issues: Size and One Contentious Personality
--------------


4. (C) There are two related issues. One is the size of the
cabinet. When the coalition accord was signed, there were 34
ministries. Kibaki's first cabinet-sharing offer to Odinga
proposed expanding this to 44. The reason he wants to do
this is to be able to give Odinga half of the 44 while
ensuring enough positions to accommodate all his supporters.

NAIROBI 00000893 002 OF 004


Odinga has pushed back, pointing out that expanding to 44
would create a bloated government that would be both
ineffective and costly. We and virtually all observers
agree. Odinga could accept expansion by a few ministries
(say to 36 or even 38). The other issue is whether Kibaki
will seek to reject the naming of William Ruto as a cabinet
minister. Kibaki's people have started talking about the
need for a "clean cabinet" (which is pretty outrageous when
one considers the checkered history of some of the current
ministers). Ruto is a key ODM leader who was crucial to the
support the ODM received in Rift Valley and must be given a
position. Kibaki's Kikuyu group accuses Ruto of having
organized the Rift Valley violence against the Kikuyus; Ruto
also has a court case pending against him for alleged
corruption. He has not, however, been charged with
supporting violence and has not been convicted of anything.
There is no technical or legal basis for refusing to allow
him to become a minister. Not allowing Ruto to participate
in the government would be a potential deal-breaker, given
Ruto's importance to the ODM.

--------------
Public Statements of Annan and Ambassador
--------------


5. (C) Ref A laid out our approach to support implementation
of the coalition agreement, including the formation of a
cabinet. I have made clear the continuing strong interest of
the Secretary and President in seeing the agreement fully
implemented. My team and I have been intensively engaged
with both sides to push for rapid agreement on a coalition
cabinet. I have been in close touch with Kofi Annan, who has
also been in close contact with Kibaki, Odinga, and their
teams by phone from New York and Geneva. Annan and I
coordinated on the issuance of our public statements on April

2. The text of my remarks is at para 8; the text of Annan's
statement is at para 9. The two were given prominent
headline coverage in all media.

--------------
Possible Call from the Secretary
--------------


7. (C) Possibly as a result of this pressure, Kibaki called
Odinga for another meeting today, April 3. Odinga had made
clear that he would not participate in a meeting unless there
would be a reasonable prospect of progress, so we are
hopeful. If this meeting does not yield significant results,
then we recommend that the Secretary call Kibaki (and Odinga)
to press him to demonstrate the necessary flexibility to
reach a deal. The calls could be followed, as necessary,
with aother public statement.

--------------
Ambassadors April 2 Public Remarks
--------------


8. (U) Begin text of Ambassador's remarks --

Remarks to Kenyan Media at the EMR ) April 02, 2008

Thank you all for coming. I wanted to take this opportunity
to talk about the views of the United States regarding the
current political situation in Kenya, particularly with
respect to the formation of a coalition government.

As we all know, this country went through a profound trauma
during the crisis that affected various parts of the country
in the wake of the elections. We strongly supported a
political solution to that crisis. The Kenyan people made
their voices heard and the pressure they placed on their
leaders brought about that solution. We, as partners and
friends of Kenya, were able to help. It is in that sphere of
partnership and friendship with the country, with which we
share important mutual interests, that I talk today.

In the wake of signing the political agreement President
Kibaki and Raila Odinga came forward and sent a very clear,
positive message to the nation about the importance of this
agreement in forming this coalition government, and they
acted quickly to then present the proper legislation to

NAIROBI 00000893 003 OF 004


parliament. The messages that they gave in parliament
statements that they made were extraordinarily positive. It
was the first time in Kenya's history that a sitting
president participated in a debate of the parliament, so a
clear message was sent and that was extremely positive.
Their actions also helped to give the Kenyan people a sense
of hope and purpose that the country was on the road to
recovery in every sense.

There was a strong expectation that following the passing of
that legislation in parliament that there would be a rapid
formation of a coalition government and it has not happened
as quickly as some people wanted. There is a temptation to
read into this crisis, that the process of forming this
coalition government has taken too long. Once again the
Kenyan people are sending a strong message to their leaders
on both sides that enough is enough. There has been a chance
for consultation; now let's form the government. Let's put
personalities aside in the interest of the nation once again.


We are in close touch with President Kibaki and Prime
Minister-designate Odinga and both have assured us of their
commitment to make this work. We do know that working out
the details of a coalition government will not be an easy
process obviously ) we are talking of sharing positions but
the legislation passed by parliament is very clear. There is
no ambiguity. It says there should be an equitable sharing
of portfolios of the government based on the relative
strength of the parties in parliament. That's absolutely
clear so it is clear what needs to be done.

The other issue that has been discussed is the size of the
government. Obviously there will be the sharing of
ministries. As most people know when political parties come
together to decide. There were 34 ministerial portfolios
when the agreement was signed. In our view that may not be
the final number but it's a good number. Certainly the talk
of 40 to 44 ministerial portfolios seems excessive. I think
the Kenyan people would see that as a bloated government. We
are not trying to dictate what the exact number should be.
That's for the two sides to negotiate, but we have a
situation where the country needs a tremendous amount of
support to achieve economic recovery, to settle displaced
people back in their homes, rebuilding infrastructure -- and
trust. All of this is going to cost a lot of money.

A couple of weeks ago the government issued an appeal for 31
billion shillings to support the reconstruction and
resettlement. We have already pledged $25 million of support
but we want to see that money used in support of the needs of
the Kenyan people.

Again the main issue is about sharing portfolios. There is
discussion about who is going to get finance who is going to
get internal security. What equitable sharing means is
obvious. It means that the most important portfolios need to
be shared, that the various responsibilities of the
government need to be shared fully to reflect the will of the
Kenyan people, and to make this country an even stronger
democracy with an even stronger economy.

One thing we've said is that we've been impressed with the
way the Kenyan people kept their democracy on track. It is
actually a model model for many other countries. Most other
countries, faced with this kind of trouble would have fallen
into chaos or civil war. That did not happen here so it,s
something we are very positive about.

We remain positive about Kenya's future and confident that
the coalition government will be formed soon and will work
effectively. I want to be clear that our future relationship
with Kenya is very much related to the successful composition
of the coalition government and full implementation of the
political accord.

End text.

--------------
Annan's April 2 Public Statement
--------------

NAIROBI 00000893 004 OF 004




9. (U) Begin text of Annan's statement.

Statement from H.E. Kofi Annan, The Chair of the African
Union Panel of Eminent Personalities

Mr. Annan is seriously concerned by the failure to compose
and announce the coalition government. Mr. Annan draws the
attention of the two signatories, President Mwai Kibaki and
Honorable Raila Odinga, to spirit and letter of the National
Accord and Reconciliation Agreement: namely, that the
situation of the country dictates a coalition government in
which the two parties, i.e. Government/PNU and ODM will be
equal partners. The cabinet will be shared equally with
appropriate potfolio balance, thus enabling each party to
see itself as playing an equal role with the other partner.

Mr. Annan calls on both leaders to implement both the spirit
and letter of the agreement signed and to resolve the issue
of the number and composition of the government
expeditiously, since the main elements for concrete decisions
already feature in the agreement.

The two principals should assume fully their joint
responsibility and come to definite decisions for the sake of
the Kenyan nation. He hopes that the Kenyan people will not
be kept in suspense for much longer.

End text.
RANNEBERGER