Somalia Prime Minister and President at Odds

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000878

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: Somalia Prime Minister and President at Odds

Classified by Special Envoy John Yates for Reasons
1.4 (b, d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime
Minister Nur Hassan Hussein confided in SE Yates that he
believes President Yusuf is organizing to have him removed
from office. He asked for our support and advice on how to
handle what he termed as "increasingly aggressive attacks"
against him. SE Yates confirmed our unequivocal support for
the initiatives he had taken and suggested closer
coordination and communication between the offices of the
presidency and prime minister. Yates and the Ambassador
later called Yusuf to voice our support for the PM and
reconciliation, and urge united government. USG support
for reconciliation, peace, and security in Somalia were
subsequently reinforced by the Ambassador using local
Somali media. End Summary.

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Prime Minister Besieged
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2. (C) Special Envoy met with PM Hussein March 28-29 in
three separate pull-asides on the margins of UNSRSG Amadou
Ould-Abdallah's economic conference on Somalia. The PM was
tired and despondent with what he termed very aggressive
attacks on his efforts at reconciliation. He felt
confident he was making real progress on reconciliation.
The Bakara market agreement that was negotiated in great
detail with the local business community was viewed as a
model that could be applied to other districts within
Mogadishu. However, Hussein said the spoilers see his
efforts at reconciliation as a threat; indeed, "the vision
itself" is a threat. The spoilers, he said, are the
warlords, led by the President, and they are organizing to
eliminate him politically.


3. (C) Hussein told us the President was meeting with
Members of Parliament to convince them to pass a vote of no
confidence in the Prime Minister and his government.
According to Hussein, the President's message is simple:
the PM is becoming a difficult and dangerous element, who
is proceeding with his own plan, which is a danger to the
Parliament and the President. The Prime Minister said the
President's plan is first to move against him and then to
orchestrate the removal of the Speaker of Parliament.
Subsequently we learned from some MPs that the President
had organized a lunch at his residence in Mogadishu for
approximately 40 MPs, and he was meeting separately with
smaller groups and individual MPs. Contrary to what the PM
told us, we heard separately that his message to the MPs was
more nuanced: use the constitution to protect your interests,
you are not getting paid, and you don't know what the PM
and his government is doing with the money they have.


4. (C) According to the PM, the President's primary
complaint is that the PM has not consulted with him on a
variety of issues: his travel, his meetings and outreach
with opposition elements, and his efforts at
reconciliation. The PM relayed point-by-point his various
consultations and discussions with the President on the
issues of concern. For example, the PM said he consulted
the President on the question of meeting with Sheikh Sharif
and Sharif Hassan, respectively the Executive Committee
Chairman and Central Committee Chairman of the Alliance for
the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS),and the President
agreed that he could meet with them secretly, but not
openly. Yet, claimed Hussein, since March 27 the President
has been telling MPs and others that the Prime Minister is
meeting with the opposition without his knowledge. "He is
organizing against me," said Hussein. (Comment: In fact,
PM Hussein did not/not meet with any ARS personalities
before he departed Nairobi for Saudi Arabia, nor did he
even contemplate doing so according to several knowledgeable
sources. The TFG reconciliation plan prescribes naming of
a committee to meet with opposition groups but that
committee has not yet been named. End Comment)


5. (C) Hussein told us the President has now seen that the
Prime Minister's approach to reconciliation will lead to
peace in Mogadishu, "but he does not want peace." He
claimed the President wants Mogadishu to remain in a state
of chaos so that he can convince the U.S. and the Europeans
that the Hawiye do not want peace. The President allegedly

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told his security commanders that the Bakara market
agreement is null and void, and that is what sparked the
looting by security forces and the counter attacks.
(Comment: The Bakara market agreement, whereby the Bakara
traders and business association pledged to self-police in
order to prohibit either the Shabaab or Islamic Court
militia to use Bakara as a base in exchange for peace and
security, was a key result of the PM's efforts to improve
security in Mogadishu. If successful, it was to be a model
for the rest of Mogadishu. End Comment).


6. (C) The PM and Mohamed Ali Nur "Americo," the Ambassador
of Somalia to Kenya, told SE Yates they had been unable
over 24 hours to reach the President. Americo said each
time he called he was told the President was in a meeting,
sleeping, or eating. The PM said he was given similar
excuses. Allegedly the President met with Mohamed Dheere
(Hawiye/Abgal/Warsangeli) and other Abgal leaders recently
when the PM was out of town and told them the PM's
reconciliation efforts were useless and they needed to
prepare to fight. The PM claimed the President's health
situation renders him vulnerable and unable to make
decisions freely, such that "he is not in a position to say
no to spoilers." Hussein claimed during a conversation the
President will veer off subject, or digress on a long and
irrelevant rumination, evidence enough for Hussein that he
is losing his grasp on the situation. But, said Hussein,
if you tell him "this is your enemy, he will understand."

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Comment
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7. (C) Bewildered, the PM said he would keep trying to
pursue reconciliation and do what he knew to be right, but
in the meantime this relationship with Yusuf was broken.
More than once Hussein said, "I don't know what is
happening." SE Yates assured the PM of our unequivocal
support for him on his reconciliation efforts, and advised
that all effort be directed toward increasing communication
with the President, who also told us he was on board although
his actions belie that. Toward that end, SE Yates joined a
meeting March 29 between Presidential Staffer Adam Abdirizak
and the PM and Americo. Yates reiterated U.S. support for
the PM, and for President Yusuf and his reconciliation
efforts, and urged both sides to coordinate more closely and
avoid misunderstandings. Abdirizak opined that the
differences between the two sides were more of style than
substance, and caused in part by incomplete or inaccurate
information. SE Yates and the Ambassador later on March 28
called President Yusuf to urge support for reconciliation and
the PM. Yusuf was abrupt and non-committal, but understood
our message on the need for a unified government both to
combat extremism and terrorism, as well as to promote peace
and reconciliation. On March 29 the Ambassador reinforced
these private messages through interviews with local
Somali media.
RANNEBERGER