KENYA'S POLITICAL ACCORD AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000641

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S, D, P, G, DRL, AND AF A/S FRAZER FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S POLITICAL ACCORD AND U.S. ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. NAIROBI 601


B. NAIROBI 545 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b and d)
.


1. (SBU) Summary. President Kibaki and Raila Odinga have a
positive public tone regarding their commitment to implement
the coalition agreement. When I met with them separately on
March 3 to lay out U.S. plans and to discuss next steps, they
were upbeat. Sorting out the disposition of cabinet
positions will, however, involve tough bargaining. Both
expressed appreciation for the U.S. role in helping to
achieve a solution to the crisis. We continue to receive an
outpouring of expressions from Kenyans thanking the U.S.
U.S. engagement will be critically important to support
implementation of the accord in order to sustain Kenya on its
democratic path. Septel reports my March 1-2 visit to the
Rift Valley to encourage reconciliation efforts. End summary.

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Domestic and Decisive U.S. Pressure Result in Accord
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2. (SBU) The political accord signed between President
Kibaki and Raila Odinga late last week has changed the
political landscape and restored peace. (Septel will provide
a security update.) Although still traumatized by the extent
of the violence that transpired during January and February,
Kenyans are justifiably proud that they have pulled back from
the edge of the abyss and sustained the country on a
democratic path. The prevailing mood is of immense relief
and a positive focus on the way forward.


3. (C) Four factors got the parties to the negotiating table
and resulted in a successful outcome. First, the Kenyan
people sent clear messages to their leaders that they wanted
a political solution to end the violence and return the
country to a path of progress. Kenyans' voices were heard
through civil society, religious groups, the media, and the
private sector. This remarkable democratic spirit placed
immense pressure on the political leadership of both sides.
Second, international pressure complemented this pressure
coming from the Kenyan people, and made clear to both sides
that there was no viable alternative other than a political
accord. U.S. intervention -- particularly through Assistant
Secretary Frazer's January visit, the Secretary's February 18

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visit, and her subsequent tough public statement -- was
decisive. Third, Kibaki and Odinga are essentially pragmatic
politicians who have worked together before. They saw the
value of an accord that gives each one some power, rather
than letting the country slip into chaos and isolation.
Fourth, the negotiations greatly benefited from the skillful
and strong hand of Kofi Annan. Annan called me before he
departed Kenya to ask that I pass his profound gratitude to
the Secretary for her decisive support.


4. (C) The extent of U.S. influence was aptly indicated by
none other than Minister of Justice Martha Karua, the
hardline leader of the government's negotiating team who
repeatedly denounced outside meddling. I met with her early
on February 28, before the meeting later that day between
Kibaki, Odinga, Annan, and Kikwete that sealed a deal.
Karua, who clearly did not know there would be a deal, said
that if it were up to her she would have long since ended the
negotiations, which she characterized as "tom foolery." At
the same time, Karua dropped her normally gruff demeanor and
was exceptionally friendly. She confided that she and the
Foreign Minister had been upset by the Secretary's tough
statement issued just the day before. She said they asked
the President what they could say publicly in response. "Say
whatever you want," the President responded, "but whatever
you do don't get into a quarrel with the Americans." Karua's
account rings true in that President Kibaki was deeply
impressed by his 2003 reception at the White House and has
consistently made clear publicly and privately his great
affection for the U.S.

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Kibaki and Odinga Set Positive Tone
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5. (U) During the signing of the coalition agreement on
February 28, Kibaki and Odinga set a positive tone that
Kenyans across the political and ethnic spectrum have so far
embraced. Noting the great stability that Kenya has enjoyed
and the fact that it has been held up as a model, Kikwete
referred to what happened as "an historical accident." He
emphasized, however, that Kibaki and Odinga must show the
commitment necessary to implement the agreement. Quoting the
national anthem, Odinga urged unity. He heaped generous
praise on Kibaki, saying that without his intervention the
accord would not have been reached. The accord, he said,
opens a new era for Kenya to shift from confrontation towards
cooperation. "The monster of ethnicity must be destroyed,"
Odinga stressed. Kibaki acknowledged that the election had
been divisive, but commented that the negotiation process
"reminded us all that there is more that unites than divides
us." He gave his "solemn commitment" to implement the accord
in order to strengthen social cohesion and foster prosperity.
Echoing Odinga, Kibaki said that the problem of "negative
ethnicity" must be addressed. "Let us join hands to embark
on this important journey," he concluded.

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Kibaki and Odinga Upbeat on Implementation
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6. (C) I met separately with Kibaki and Odinga on March 3 to
discuss the way forward. I conveyed to both the
congratulations of the Secretary and President. I laid out
U.S. plans to move ahead on the full range of bilateral
programs, including new initiatives like a planned U.S. naval
ship visit to Mombasa in April. In this context, I discussed
the U.S. commitment of 25 million dollars in additional
support, and indicated it would be used to focus on
dialogue/reconciliation; support for return of the displaced
to their homes and resumption of their livelihoods, as well
as related infrastructure and youth agenda programs; support
for implementation of the coalition accord, particularly
carrying through with the reform agenda; and support for key
governance programs, including strengthening the Parliament
and assisting as appropriate the new office of the Prime
Minister. I made clear that we would consult closely with
the coalition government before moving ahead. I also
discussed U.S. intentions to help mobilize other countries
and international financial institutions to provide necessary
support. I explored with Kibaki and Odinga their plans to
move forward and urged them to undertake joint missions
throughout the country to sell the accord.


7. (C) Kibaki and Odinga welcomed all of this. They both
emphasized their view that U.S. support was crucial to
achieve the accord, and will be equally important to help
make it work. Kibaki stressed the importance of returning
displaced Kenyans to their farms very quickly in view of the
need to plant before the impending rainy season begins
(likely in mid to late March). I agreed on the need to
return the displaced to their homes, but made clear that this
must be done in a way that ensures their safety. Kibaki said
that he will work with Odinga to push through Parliament the
legislation necessary to legalize the coalition government.
(Parliament will open on March 6 and is expected to review
and approve the legislation next week.) Kibaki said that,
following passage of the legislation, he and Odinga will
visit key parts of the country to sell the accord. He said
that gaining acceptance of the accord in the Rift Valley
(which was the epicenter of violence) is key to making it
work. The President also emphasized the budget shortfalls
the country is facing given the negative impact the violence
had on the economy. He said he would welcome World Bank and
IMF assistance, as well as support from key countries. When
I told the President I would be seeing Odinga later in the
day, the President said to tell Odinga that "I look forward
to working with him."


8. (C) When I saw Odinga I reviewed my meeting with Kibaki.
Odinga was equally upbeat that the accord will be implemented
successfully. Odinga told me in confidence that he would
likely name Musalia Mudavadi (his vice presidential running
mate) as a deputy prime minister. Odinga indicated he would
see the President on March 4 to begin planning for the
transition to the coalition government. While he has made no
decisions regarding ministerial portfolios, he has divided
the ministries into several baskets (defense, foreign
affairs, security, finance; infrastructure-related
ministries; social service ministries) with the idea that
there should be a 50/50 division within each basket. He
expects tough bargaining over the disposition of ministries.
Odinga stressed his desire to use the Prime Minister's office
to make the government run efficiently, in part by
establishing a cabinet sub-committee system. Moving ahead
quickly with the reform agenda is key, he said. He also
feels a national reconciliation conference is necessary to
highlight the issue and to reinforce efforts at the
grassroots level.

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U.S. Engagement
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9. (SBU) Since the signing of the accord, there has been an
outpouring of appreciation from the Kenyan people for the
role the U.S. played. We are receiving messages in person
from people on the street, through SMS and e-mail, through
letters from individuals and organizations, and through media
commentary. The U.S. is seen as having played a decisive
role in getting both sides to work out a solution. This will
further strengthen our already substantial leverage with both
sides (and their new coalition government) and with all
elements of Kenyan society to keep the process on track.
That the Kenyan crisis was solved so quickly in a way that
sustains the country on a democratic path is in itself a
positive model.


10. (SBU) The crisis that Kenya experienced does not mean
that the enormous positive progress we and others touted
about the country was a chimera. The relative stability that
Kenya has experienced and the democratic progress of the past
five years are real. The fact that Kenyans could work out )
with help from their friends -- a solution to a profound
crisis testifies to the fact that this country has very
significant underlying strengths. The crisis did, however,
highlight the underlying grievances that have festered since
well before independence (particularly with respect to land
issues). The crisis does, therefore, provide an historic
opportunity for Kenyans to build on their strengths and to
fortify institutions and the fabric of their society through
institutional reforms that address these grievances.


11. (SBU) I also highlighted U.S. engagement during a March
1-2 visit to three places in Rift Valley that had been
heavily affected by violence. Septel will report on the
trip, which included remarks made to several thousand
displaced Kikuyus at an IDP camp and, later the same day, at
a reconciliation-builing prayer meeting with thousands of
Kalenjins, not more than a mile from the displaced persons
camp. I laid out what we are doing, talked about the
American experience in dealing with domestic racial and
ethnic crises, and urged reconciliation. The remarks and
trip received extensive media coverage.


12. (SBU) Kenyans will continue to look to the U.S. as their
most important friend and partner. We are moving quickly to
shape policy and programs to support implementation of the
accord and the reform agenda. We need to maintain the strong
support we had been providing before the crisis. The
additional humanitarian assistance we provided in response to
the crisis has been greatly appreciated. Septel will convey
our plans for the $25 million in additional funding that the
U.S. has announced. We will work closely with Kibaki,
Odinga, and their teams to help promote success of the
coalition government in a way that benefits our interests and
those of the Kenyan people.


RANNEBERGER