Somalia -- TFG Divided at the Top

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000566

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO
SUBJECT: Somalia -- TFG Divided at the Top

Classified by Special Envoy John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

REF: A) Nairobi 252 B) Yates/Frazer emails 02/26/2008


1. (C) SUMMARY. Differences between President Abdullahi Yusuf and
Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein threaten to halt the recent
progress made by Somalia's Transitional Federal Government. The
primary issue is how to pursue the process of reconciliation while at
the same time addressing the threats by armed groups. While
President Yusuf is said to favor the use of military force to quell
the violence, Hussein has advocated for restraint and dialogue. The
hard-liners in Yusuf's inner circle argue that incursions into the
presidential palace and insurgents taking the town of Dinsoor
demonstrate that security must be the highest priority. Neither will
engage with terrorists, but they have very different ideas about who
is a "terrorist." Yusuf's definition seems to be quite expansive,
including what many would simply consider opponents, while Hussein
believes such a label would only apply to a very small group of
extremists. While some have intervened to help bridge the gap, the
schism between Somalia's two leaders threatens to undermine recent
progress and could eventually rupture the Transitional Federal
Government. End Summary.

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How to Reconcile?
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2. (C) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi
Yusuf and Prime Minister Hassan Hussein are sharply divided in their
ideas on reconciliation and their approach to dealing with armed
groups. At issue are deep differences about how to proceed with the
reconciliation process. The division has the potential for a
disastrous rupture of the TFG including the resignation or dismissal
of the Prime Minister. In a February 25 conversation with the
Special Envoy, Yusuf characterized the differences in the following
manner: The PM is willing to negotiate with al-Qaeda whereas he did
not agree to negotiate with "criminals and the Shabaab"; the PM was
willing to negotiate now whereas Yusuf said they had to stop the
fighting first and recognize the legitimacy of the TFG and the
Charter; and, PM was not willing to elaborate a plan in order to
obtain Cabinet [or maybe Parliamentary] approval before proceeding
with reconciliation.


3. (C) When they speak privately on the issue of reconciliation,
both Yusuf and Hussein use virtually the same words -- they are
willing to talk to anyone not on international terrorist list and who
renounces violence. Yet Hussein has publicly stated he is willing to
engage in dialogue with all Somalis (Comment: To our knowledge,
Hussein has never met or talked directly with any person in the more
extremist armed groups. Hussein has made indirect contact with
opposition groups like the Association for the Re-liberation of
Somalia (ARS),most recently sending his Deputy Prime Minister to
Djibouti to engage in talks. There is no evidence of dialogue with
al-Shabaab or any of the more extreme elements of the insurgency.
Indeed, we view Hussein as doing what many in the international
community in Nairobi have long advocated - to avoid false roadblocks
say publicly you are open to dialogue with everybody because the
Shabaab and other real extremists will self-select out anyway, and
thereby marginalize themselves. End Comment).


4. (C) Since moving his cabinet to Mogadishu Prime Minister Hussein
has enjoyed high marks for his initial engagement with communities in
the capital (Ref A). While Yusuf was in London, Hussein made notable
progress bringing together actors in south central Somalia and other
"hot spots" who had been engaged in violent opposition to one
another. While in London, all indications were that Yusuf was in
support of the Prime Minister's activities, yet Hussein confirmed to
the Special Envoy on February 25 that when he returned the "President
was angry." Yusuf's February 16 return to Mogadishu also signaled
the return of the hard-liners who advocate for security first.
President Yusuf is once again supporting a heavy-handed approach to
dealing with security which is undermining the Prime Minister's
efforts at reconciliation.

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Security Trumps Reconciliation
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5. (C) Recent armed insurgency attacks have strengthened the
position of those in Yusuf's inner circle who advocate the use of
military force. The February 18 attack on Villa Somalia resulted in
several deaths and injuries among Yusuf's personal militia. After
heavy mortar barrages, the armed insurgents actually penetrated the
defenses of Villa Somalia. In response, on February 19, fierce
fighting broke out when TFG forces made an incursion into the Bakara
market junction. The Prime Minister told SE Yates that at the same
time he was meeting with business leaders, Mohamed Dheere's militia
was looting stores and carrying out retribution for the attack on

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Villa Somalia. Reports indicate that Dheere's forces withdrew after
Hussein appealed to Yusuf to recall the militia.


6. (C) On February 24, Mukhtar Robow launched a well-coordinated
attack with well-armed fighters to "liberate" Dinsoor. The attackers
occupied Dinsoor town (approximately one hundred kilometers from
Baidoa where the Transitional Federal Institutions are based) for the
better part of the day before retreating. The TFG forces were said
to have been taken by surprise and surrendered or fled without many
casualties. This incident, as well as the incursion into Villa
Somalia, is being used against the Prime Minister as evidence that
security has to trump "reconciliation." The PM's detractors claim
his efforts have weakened the TFG resistance or at least the will to
fight. Notable among these advisors who have Yusuf's ear is Canadian
"Adam" Abdirizak, who told SE Yates that Hussein's outreach efforts
have provided a "Trojan horse" to terrorists.

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Planned Intervention
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7. (C) On February 23, Speaker of Parliament Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur
"Adan Madobe" arrived in Mogadishu from Baidoa to help mediate
between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Hussein. Sources close to
the Speaker told us that the three leaders met the night of February
24 until 2:00 a.m. the morning of February 25. They reportedly met
again later in the day on February 25. We understand Mesfin Seyoum,
the Foreign Minister of Ethiopian, is planning to arrive in Baidoa
February 27 to spend at least a day, if not two or three, to address
the rift between Yusuf and Hussein (Ref B) as well as other bilateral
Ethiopia-Somalia issues. Tekeda Alemu, Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs, told SE Yates on February 26 that Ethiopia is fully
supportive of the Prime Minister's efforts. Along with Ethiopia and
the UNSRSG, we are actively engaged with Yusuf and the Prime Minister
to bridge the divide.

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Comment
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8. (C) News about the discord between Yusuf and the Prime Minister
is fast becoming a subject of public speculation. While they differ
in approach, neither side of the divide is in favor of a rupture. SE
Yates emphasized to Yusuf the importance of the TFG maintaining a
unified approach on reconciliation and security. Prime Minister
Hussein is making good efforts at outreach and may have been making
reasonable progress. As evidence we cite Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Abdisalam's comment that for the first time the TFG is posturing (and
view's) itself as the servant of the people rather than the oppressor
of the people - an all too rare ray of hope in this now three
year-old transition. The Prime Minister told the Special Envoy that
he has already offered his resignation but is actively working to
reach common ground with Yusuf's suite. We also believe that he has
been exceedingly responsive to his President's sensitivities and
tried to take measured efforts to avoid any rift without totally
compromising his own beliefs. A collapse of the Hussein government
would almost certainly deal a fatal blow to the transition process.
End Comment.

RANNEBERGER