Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NAIROBI544
2008-02-25 13:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

Somalia - Revised Travel Request

Tags:  OTRA PREL ASEC PTER MOPS ET SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6373
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #0544/01 0561333
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251333Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4815
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000544 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: OTRA PREL ASEC PTER MOPS ET SO
SUBJECT: Somalia - Revised Travel Request

REF: Nairobi 473

Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000544

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: OTRA PREL ASEC PTER MOPS ET SO
SUBJECT: Somalia - Revised Travel Request

REF: Nairobi 473

Classified by PolOff Mitch Benedict for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (U) This is a revised version of reftel with additional personnel,
new dates, more detailed travel information, and a revised and
expanded security plan. Per DOD requirements, proposed travelers are
concurrently seeking Special Area and Theater clearances. See paras
2 and 24 for action request.


2. (C) Embassy Nairobi requests Department approval for Bradley G.
Anderson, Colonel, Defense Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia; Lisa R. Schade, Lieutenant Colonel, Marine Corps
Attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office Nairobi, Kenya; Steven Chang,
Major, U.S. Analyst, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia; Steve Washington, Sergeant Major, Communication Specialist,
U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; and John England,
Master Sergeant, Medic, U.S. Defense Attache Office Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia to visit Mogadishu, Somalia from March 18 to 21 March 2008.
At the invitation of the African Union, COL Anderson and group will
be traveling with the Addis Ababa-based British, Swedish, Dutch,
French, possibly German Defense Attaches and Colonel George Amamoo,
Chief of Military Planning, African Union, to visit the security
forces of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu.
Additionally they will call on the Somali political leaders, visit
the Port, and possibly meet with the commanders of the Ethiopian
National Defense Forces (ENDF).


3. (C) Ambassadors Ranneberger and Yamamoto strongly support this
proposed travel.

--------------
Travel Details
--------------


4. (S/NF) COL Anderson and group will depart from Nairobi for
Mogadishu along with the delegation on March 18 on a regularly
scheduled Daallo Airlines flight. The delegation will arrive 1000 at
Mogadishu's International Airport and will be met planeside by
AMISOM/Ugandan security forces with wheeled armored vehicles and

armed escort. On arrival the delegation will travel to the
AMISOM/Ugandan headquarters located at the airport for meetings with
AMISOM/Ugandan and Burundian staff. The delegation will return to
the airport and rest overnight in accommodations provided by Ugandan
forces in their billeting there.


5. (S/NF) On March 19, the delegation will travel with wheeled
armored vehicles and armed escort to KM-4, to review the
AMISOM/Ugandan forces there and then travel to the Mogadishu port for
meetings with TFG staff and AMISOM security personnel located there
and finally to the Villa Somalia (presidential offices) for meetings
with Transitional Federal Government (TFG) staff and AMISOM security
personnel located there. The delegation will rest overnight at the
airport in accommodation provided by Ugandan forces.


6. (S/NF) On March 20, the delegation will travel with wheeled
armored vehicles and armed escort to Mogadishu University to meet the
AMISOM/Burundian contingent there and then possibly to ENDF
headquarters for meetings with Ethiopian military staff and security
personnel. Afterward the delegation will return to the airport and
rest overnight in accommodations provided by Ugandan forces.


7. (S/NF) On March 21, the delegation will remain at Mogadishu
Airport and tour the UNDP weapons, ammunition, and UXO storage and
disposal facility. The group will depart Mogadishu International
Airport on the regularly scheduled African Express commercial flight
at 1430, March 21 and return to JKIA, Nairobi, Kenya at 1630. COL
Anderson and the other members of USDAO Addis will rest overnight in
Nairobi on March 21 and depart Nairobi for Addis Ababa on March 22.

--------------
Threat Assessment
--------------


8. (S//NF) Embassy Nairobi RSO: Numerous credible intelligence
reports clearly indicate that the East Africa al-Qa'ida and
affiliated Somali extremists remain operationally active in
Mogadishu. These elements have frequently used suicide bombings,
well planned ambushes and roadside improvised explosive devices in
attacks against ENDF, AMISOM forces and TFG leaders. Members of the
Jihadi militant group, al-Shabaab, are actively engaged in conducting
myriad attacks inside Mogadishu, to include targeted assassinations
of high profile individuals. The Addis Ababa DATT and Nairobi Marine
Corps Attache would present extremely High Value Targets for the East
Africa al-Qa'ida and affiliated Somali extremists. Given the
opportunity, these entities would expend considerable effort and
resources to conduct attacks against any visiting USG personnel
despite the promise of protection by the ENDF.

NAIROBI 00000544 002 OF 003




9. (S/NF) The TFG, AMISOM, and the ENDF cannot be expected to provide
sufficient protection and appropriate security for this visit as
evidenced by the constant attacks they themselves endure in
Mogadishu, which are unpredictable, uncounterable and continue
unabated. Furthermore, any aircraft arriving and departing from
Mogadishu is vulnerable to attack by MANPADS, and/or mortars when
landing and taking off as has happened in the past, and there is no
viable method of deterring these types of threats. Based upon all
currently available information from relevant security and
intelligence sources, both within and outside of the U.S. Mission and
USG, RSO is of the opinion that the dangerous, volatile and uncertain
security situation in Mogadishu does not support the visit of USG
personnel at this time.

--------------
Security Plan: Air Transportation
--------------


10. (S//NF) Air Transportation for the group will be provided by
regularly scheduled commercial airlines or contract air provided by
the African Union. Commercial air is desirable as it lowers the
profile for the trip and there has been no threat to commercial
aviation in recent history. However, contract air will allow the
aircraft to remain on the ground and allow the Attaches to depart
earlier than scheduled if required. Regardless of the origin of the
plane, the AMISOM forces are prepared to provide security for the
aircraft while it remains on the ground.


11. (S//NF) Aviation safety, especially during take-off and landing,
is a concern of all flight operations in this region of the world.
Both the commercial and contract air crew are experienced in
conducting flight operations at this airport and is aware of the
dangers during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the
possible ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons.


12. (S//NF) The use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads)
are known to be used in and around Mogadishu. Accordingly, to
minimize the threat, the aircraft will be instructed to approach the
airport over the water from the south, bank hard to port descending
rapidly to minimize the amount of time over the city and land. On
departure, the plane will take off toward the south and bank quickly
to port, ascending rapidly over the water. No aircraft have been
shot down using these maneuvers. Although one Dyncorp plane
following these procedures may have been hit by unidentified ground
fire in early 2007, it was able to land safely.

--------------
Security Plan: Ground Transportation
--------------


13. (S//NF) Ground transportation will be provided by AMISOM/Ugandan
security officials. Immediately upon arrival at the Mogadishu
International Airport, the Defense Attaches will be met on the tarmac
by wheeled armored vehicles and armed Ugandan escort. All
transportation will be accomplished with these vehicles and security
forces.


14. (S//NF) The first day all meetings will take place at the
airport. The next three days will require travel to Villa Somalia,
Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) headquarters, Mogadishu
University, and the Port of Mogadishu. The times and routes of
travel will be kept secret. TFG security forces will be made aware
of travel only after the AMISOM/Ugandan convoy is actually moving to
minimize the possibility of compromise. Ahead of each planned
movement, AMISOM/Ugandan forces will clear and secure several
different routes to different locations.

--------------
Security Plan: Other Logistics
--------------


15. (S//NF) RON: The Attaches will overnight all three nights in the
AMISOM/Ugandan billeting at Mogadishu airport. The Ugandans have
taken several measures to ensure their security at the Airport;
including the construction of berms, sandbags, concertina wire,
hardened shelters, security perimeter, armed guards patrols, etc.
The Ugandan force will provide an extra security perimeter inside
their regular security force specifically for the visiting Attachs.


16. (S//NF) PERSONAL PROTECTION EQUIPMENT: The U.S. Attaches will be
unarmed but each member of the team will have body armor (soft armor
and hard plates) and Kevlar helmets. Coordination is being conducted
to provide each U.S. Attache with a Blue Force Tracker and
appropriate emergency signaling devices.


17. (S//NF) COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The primary means of
communications will be with the AN/PRC-117F satellite radio. The US

NAIROBI 00000544 003 OF 003


Attaches will be in frequent contact with the command center located
at Embassy Nairobi. This is actually the interagency command net,
and it will be monitored by the interagency. Assistance from the
interagency Quick Reaction Force (QRF),CSAR and Personnel Recovery
elements will be requested by the Attaches to CJTF-HOA PRCC (and
monitored by the interagency). Each team member will be equipped
with a cell phone that provides cell phone coverage for the region
(Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya). Additionally, the team will carry
two Blue Force Trackers (BFTs) that will be constantly tracked by the
interagency on the JBV. The JBV will be monitored in Nairobi, Addis
Ababa, Djibouti, and the interagency. Coordination is being
conducted with NSA, requesting them to provide Force Protection Box
vicinity Mogadishu, which allow for an additional security measure.


18. (S//NF) MEDICAL: The U.S. Marine Attache from Nairobi is a
physician assistant, trained in orthopedic trauma and surgery. She
will be equipped with emergency medical care equipment, and capable
of stabilizing any injured or wounded team member until they can be
medevaced to the AMISOM/Ugandan field medical hospital located at
Mogadishu Airport. Additional medical support will be provided by
the AMISOM/Uganda medical doctors. In addition, each team member
will carry a personal medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy
aid.


19. (S//NF) MEALS/WATER: Meals and water will be provided by
AMISOM/Uganda officials. However, all Attaches will carry water
bottles and two MREs in their individual backpacks and an additional
two (2) gallons per person will be stored on the aircraft.
Additional cases of water and MREs will be placed on the aircraft in
the event of an emergency or extended stay on the ground by the team.


20. (S//NF) SAFEHAVEN: The Attaches will use AMISOM/Uganda at the
airport and AMISOM/Burundi at Mogadishu University as safehavens.
However, in the event neither location is tenable, presently the team
does not have a dedicated safehaven identified. The team is
coordinating contact information with the United Nations, ENDF and
AMISOM officials in Mogadishu for this purpose. In the event of an
emergency and until a Western-owned house, office, or compound can be
identified for use as an emergency safehaven, coordination is being
conducted with the United Nations Development Program to use their
compound for this purpose with AIMSOM/Uganda security forces and
internal team security procedures to protect the team.


21. (S//NF) EVACUATION/PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR): An evacuation and
recovery plan is being coordinated between the team and members of
the interagency at Embassy Nairobi. In the event of a mechanical
failure, act of violence or accident, the AU representative will
request an emergency extraction aircraft to fly to Mogadishu to
recover the air crew and team. As a back-up, the US Attaches will
coordinate for the contracting of a stand-by emergency
self-extraction charter aircraft to fly to Mogadishu to extract the
team and air crew. In the event of severe weather conditions, the
team and air crew will be prepared to remain overnight at the
AMISOM/Uganda billeting in Mogadishu Airport for additional nights.
In the event of a mechanical failure, the same procedure will be
followed and the team will wait for the arrival of the interagency's
emergency extraction aircraft or the team's contract aircraft. In
either case, the team will provide an internal security force at the
airport billeting and request the local security official to provide
security for the compound.


22. (S//NF) In the event that the Attaches cannot be extracted by
air, coordination is being conducted to utilize the RHIB boats
provided to the AMISOM/Ugandan forces for port security. The
Attaches would embark on the RHIB and rendezvous with coalition ships
currently on station in the area


23. (S//NF) Finally, coordination is being conducted to develop an
emergency evacuation plan with Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
(JTF-HOA) located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. As a last resort,
the JFT-HOA Quick Reaction Force (QRF) could conduct an emergency
extraction operation of the advance team and air crew using HC-130
aircraft/MH-53 helicopters. The request for this extraction would be
made by the team to the CJTF-HOA JOC and through the interagency
command net.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


24. (C) Action Request: Embassy Nairobi requests M approval of this
proposed travel to Somalia as soon as possible. Once approved, the
final travel itinerary will be forwarded to AF and DS.
RANNEBERGER