Somalia Prime Minister's European Travel and Security

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 000506

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO ET
SUBJECT: Somalia Prime Minister's European Travel and Security
Concerns

REF: A) Benedict-AF/E email 02/15/2008

Classified by Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein briefed the Ambassador
February 15 on his trip to Brussels and Paris. He also outlined his
recent efforts at reconciliation, and spoke of his concerns about
security in Mogadishu and those tasked to ensure it. End Summary.

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European Travels and Travails
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2. (C) Prime Minister Hussein outlined for the Ambassador his
meetings in Brussels February 11-13 with Javier Solana, High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and
Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, Louis Michel,
EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, and other EU
officials and representatives. Hussein updated the Europeans on the
situation in Somalia, discussed his cabinet and priorities for
reconciliation and security, and requested financial as well as
political support. Michel promised 50 million Euro in immediate
assistance, and a minimum of 254 million Euro over the period
2008-2015.


3. (C) Apparently in reaction to the then ongoing British, French,
and Swedish effort at dialogue in Cairo with the Alliance for
Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS),Hussein said he told Solana the TFG
feels more comfortable with Saudi Arabia as an
intermediary/facilitator. The TFG would like "to avoid" Cairo, the
PM told us. He claimed the intention of the Cairo meeting is "not
genuine," and indeed was an effort at "spoiling." A large number of
delegates to the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) traveled to
Saudi Arabia following the NRC, and the Saudis maintain good and
close relations with broad segments of Somalia society. Hussein told
his European interlocutors that the TFG did not want a repeat of a
Khartoum-type process, and he asked that all effort be made to
support the TFG, reconciliation, and the work of SRSG Ould-Abdallah.


4. (C) Based on a request made while in Brussels, Hussein traveled
February 13 to Paris to meet with Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.
In what Hussein described as a short meeting, Kouchner pleaded
financial constraints, but pledged support within the context of the
European Union. In order to address security needs, Kouchner offered
the TFG instructors. However, according to Hussein, he told Kouchner
the TFG has African instructors in the region and "locally well
prepared" training available, as well as training facilities, rather
what the TFG needs is money.

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Reconciliation Efforts
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5. (C) Hussein reported that he is pleased with the progress being
made on reconciliation. Feedback has been positive, though he
admitted it is difficult to identify concrete results. He claimed
Sharif Hassan, former Speaker of Parliament, and Sheikh Sharif, the
former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Islamic
Courts, as well as former Members of Parliament and others associated
with the CIC are interested in dialogue and participating in a
political process. Even some of the Shabaab, he said, are interested
in finding a way out of Somalia's seemingly endless cycles of
violence and chaos. The fact that hard core Shabaab are worried
about losing strength is evidence to the PM that he is making
progress.


6. (C) The PM expects to have a draft constitution ready by July.
Once the draft is completed he plans for an inclusive process of
discussion and dialogue, in which all Somalis would participate,
including the diaspora. Given the short time remaining for the TFG
to continue reconciliation, the PM plans to pursue a locally based
ground up approach. He does not plan on reconvening the National
Reconciliation Congress. Working through Members of Parliament and
local reconciliation councils the PM would like to build strong
community engagement in promoting reconciliation.

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Ethiopians and Security
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7. (C) Asked about the potential for a security vacuum in the wake of
an Ethiopian withdrawal, the PM opined that the Ethiopians "seem to
be somewhat in a hurry to withdraw." (Comment: Hussein had just
arrived from Addis Ababa en route to Mogadishu. End Comment) The
Ethiopians would like a face saving way out, either under cover of an
expanded African Union Peace Support Mission (AMISOM) or greatly
improved and reinforced Somali troops. (Comment: Presumably a UN
force would also serve this purpose. End Comment) Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi told Hussein three years have been lost, and
Ethiopia is impatient "to see something happening."

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The PM's Security Problem
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8. (C) In complete candor the PM admitted "we have a problem" when it
comes to those charged with providing security. He acknowledged "it
is not yet clear" who is in charge of security among the triumvirate
of General Darawish (Chief of National Security),Abdi Qeybdid (Chief
of Police),and Mohamed Dheere (Mayor of Mogadishu). He said
Qeybdid, a former warlord with no experience, is neither qualified
nor capable of running a police force. The PM is working to attract
former experienced police officers from the diaspora to return to
Somalia, not to take over, but to modernize and professionalize the
police force. Darawish is "definitely not fully trusted," and there
is "too much complexity" surrounding Dheere, who maintains his own
active militia. In sum, in an area where Hussein needs both loyalty
and capacity, he has neither.

RANNEBERGER