APPROVAL REQUEST FOR TRAVEL TO SOMALIA

S E C R E T NAIROBI 000341

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

FOR M, ACTING A/S STARR, AND A/S FRAZER FROM AMBASSADOR

ADDIS ABABA PASS TO A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2018
TAGS: OTRA AMGT PGOV PREL KE SO
SUBJECT: APPROVAL REQUEST FOR TRAVEL TO SOMALIA

Classified By Ambassador Michael E. Ranneberger, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Action Request: Post seeks Department approval and country
clearance for travel of the following DS security personnel and
delegation members to Hargeysa, Somaliland on February 2 and 3.
Ambassador Ranneberger, Ambassador Yates, and Regional Security
Officer Robert Whigham concur with the proposed travel and
operational security plan.

Operational Advance Team (Arrives Hargeysa 2/2)

MSD Team Leader Joe Lestorti
MSD Team Member John Satanek
MSD Team Member Erik Antons
MSD Team Member Michael Fitzpatrick
MSD Team Member Justin Rowan
MSD Team Member Ken Haynes
MSD Team Member James Guanci
MSD Team Member Kip Doan
MSD Team Member Dave Farthing
MSD Team Member Dave Jordan
MSD Team Member Bjorn Sunde

Protective Detail (Arrives Hargeysa 2/3)

MSD AIC Anthony Tortora
MSD Team Member Eric Kriley
MSD Team Member Lawrence Rice
MSD Team Member Brian Wood
MSD Team Member Gerard Brillinates

Protectees (Arrive Hargeysa 2/3 with Protective Detail)

Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer
Ambassador Michael Ranneberger
Ambassador John Yates
Somalia Desk Officer Nole Garey
AF Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh


2. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger strongly supports this travel.
Engagement in Somaliland is required to demonstrate U.S. support for
political reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, and achievement of
U.S. policy objectives.


3. (C) The MSD Security Force and delegation intend to visit the
following location:

Hargeysa

Sites to be visited:

Hergeysa Airport
Ambassador Hotel


4. (S/NF) Threat Assessment:

The MSD Security Force presently views the threat assessment for
Hargeysa, Somaliland as "Medium to High".

Hargeysa is one of the largest cities in Somaliland and it has a
population of approximately 450,000 people. There are no reports of
large scale fighting in and around the city. There are reports of
clashes between the forces of Somaliland and Puntland in the region
adjacent to their common border.

There are no specific threats directed against U.S. interests
planning to visit Hargeysa. However, there are reports of varying
credibility and sourcing that indicate extremists and those linked
directly to Al-Qaida continue to use Hargeysa as a logistics center,
a transit point, a safe-haven, and base of operations for the
planning of future terrorist operations.

Radical religious elements and members of the Council of Islamic
Courts (CIC) remain active in Hargeysa. Some of the tactics used by
these groups encourage an increase in the use of assassinations,
guerilla warfare, ambushes, and the kidnapping of prominent
individuals in order to destroy the institutions of the "infidels".

There is also a concern that the hotels in Hargeysa are 'targeted'
since they are used frequently by Western officials. Al-Qaida and
like-minded extremist groups are aware that foreign officials and
security officers frequent the Ambassador and Mansoor Hotels in
Hargeysa.

The Hargeysa Airport is also considered a threat due to the
uncertainty as to the reliability of the government forces protecting
this facility. It is felt the airport is vulnerable to strikes by
missiles and stand-off weapons. There is also a concern that
extremist groups plan to shoot down aircraft during their final
approach into Hargeysa Airport. The overall threat extends to road
movement from the airport into the center of the city. The use of
"command detonated" land mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (EID)
have been used in Hargeysa.

Reports indicate the Somaliland President would welcome a visit by a
senior U.S. Diplomat and do everything in his power to ensure its
success. However, there is a concern that t
he members of the
Somaliland Security Service (SSS) are corrupt and relatively
incompetent. They are also known to "look the other way" when they
are properly compensated. They can be influenced to take bribes, and
the turning of their 'blind eye' can be determined by their clan
loyalty. The lack of a well-trained and fully vetted security force
in Somaliland presents a security concern for DS. Likewise, the
arrival of a high level U.S. Diplomat (A/S or Ambassador) could be
publicized locally thus increasing the profile of the visit.

There is little to no threat directed against the members of the
United Nations and the NGOs. From time to time, these organizations
have been known to use clan militias for "security". Having the U.S.
Government use local militias to conduct "security" has the potential
of increasing the influence of the militias thus undermining the
authority of the traditional elders. It is therefore recommended
that the U.S. Government not rely on UN or NGO assets (armored
vehicles, local staff, and lodging) when traveling into Somaliland.
Using these organizations could increase the threat on international
relief personnel since they may be targeted for assisting the U.S.
Government.
The overall security of the MSD Security Force in Hargeysa can be
improved by receiving "real time" security information from the
members of the interagency assigned to AmEmbassy Nairobi.


5. (S/NF) Security Plan:

SUMMARY:

An MSD Advance Team conducted an advance visit to Hargeysa on
Tuesday, January 29, 2008. The visit was a complete success and the
team was well received by Somaliland officials upon their arrival at
the airport. They also received outstanding support from local
officials and security forces during the visit. The experience and
information learned from the advance visit enabled the team to
improve and finalize their operational plan. This plan required
extensive interagency coordination and includes a series of primary,
alternate, contingency and emergency (PACE) courses of action (COA)
for communication, transportation, remaining overnight (RON) and
emergency extraction. The MSD Security Force has ensured its radios
are properly coded and communications tests will be conducted prior
to the conduct of the A/S's visit to Hargeysa. The team has also
prepared a communications plan with the interagency that includes
communication requirements for informing the interagency and the
JTF-HOA Personnel Recovery Force of the Operational Advance Team's
lift off from the Djibouti Airport, the return of their Alternate
aircraft, the departure of the A/S and the Operational Protective
Service Detail's aircraft from Djibouti, the arrival of the A/S's
party in Hargeysa, the Primary and Alternate aircraft departure from
Hargeysa, and everyone's safe landing and return to Djibouti. The
entire MSD Security Force has worked diligently to ensure that every
aspect of preparation for the A/S's visit has been coordinated with
the interagency and that all team members understand every aspect of
the operations plan.

An 11 man Mobile Security Deployments (MSD) Operational Advance Team
will arrive in Hargeysa at 6:00PM on Saturday, February 2, 2008 to
maintain "eyes on" and provide overnight security at the Ambassador
Hotel. A five man MSD Operational Protective Service Detail (PSD)
will arrive at 10:00AM on Sunday, February 3, 2008 providing security
for Assistant Secretary Frazer and four members of her official party
(for a total of ten passengers).

GROUND TACTICAL PLAN: The MSD Security Force will position two (two
man) designated marksmen teams on the roof of the Ambassador hotel
during the A/S's visit. Deployment of these DDM teams has been
coordinated with hotel management and Somaliland security personnel.
The hotel has two access control points (gates). The northern gate
will be locked and two MSD Special Agents will along with two local
security officials will control the southern gate Both gates are
located along the eastern wall of the hotel complex which parallels
the "airport road". The A/S's meeting will take place in a
conference room located on the second floor of the hotel. A
pre-poster will be positioned on the stairwell that is in close
proximity to the conference room entrance. At the completion of the
meeting, a light lunch will be served in the conference room. At
1:15PM the A/S and her party will move downstairs and load the
motorcade vehicles positioned at the hotel main entrance. The
motorcade will then depart the hotel enroute to the airport.
Somaliland security officials will provide security and traffic
control along the route. During the advance visit, travel time from
the hotel to the airport was approximately five minutes in duration.
CONTINGENCY PLANS: The MSD Security Force has established
contingency plans for their actions in the event of ground fire
during flight operations to/from Hargeysa Airport, motorcade
movements to/from the airport/hotel, and hostile fire directed
against the motorcade during travel or arrival/departure from the
airport.

The MSD Security Force is prepared to abort the mission and return to
Djibouti if an aircraft receives ground fire while enroute to
Hargeysa. The aircraft will report their situation and return to
Djibouti in order to receive further instructions. If direct or
indirect fire is directed at the A/S's party or MSD members/elements
positions at the airport, they will seek cover/shelter in the
airport's terminal building, report their situation, and await
further instructions from the AIC. The VIP lounge at the airport has
been identified as a defendable area that can serve as a safehaven.
If direct or indirect fire is directed against the hotel, everyone
will seek cover and wait until the firing has stopped, report their
situation and wait until the attack has ended. Rooms on the ground
and third floor of the hotel have been identified as defendable areas
that can serve as safehavens. If possible, the MSD Security Force
will move to the airport and conduct a self-evacuation. However, if
there is hostile activity the MSD Security Force will remain in
place, defend themselves to the best of their ability and wait for
the arrival of the JTF-HOA PRF.

RON: The Operational Advance Team will remain overnight at the
Ambassador Hotel. The Team will establish a security observation and
communications position on the roof of the hotel. MSD has also
reserved a hotel room ("down room") for the advance team. This room
is in close proximity to the access door to the roof. The advance
team will establish around the clock security keeping thirty-three
percent (33%) of the team awake and alert at all times. The advance
team will establish a sleep rotation plan, and conduct a
communications check on their tactical radio with MSD Nairobi and the
interagency every hour on the hour. Their communications plan also
requires them to immediately report any hostile activities or events
that could impact on the arrival of the MSD Security Force and/or the
A/S and her party.

AIR TRANSPORTATION: The MSD Security Force has contracted two
commercial aircraft to provide transportation for A/S Frazer's visit
to Hargeysa. Both aircraft will arrive in Djibouti on February 2,

2008. The Alternate aircraft will transport the Operational Advance
Team departing Djibouti at 5:00PM and arriving in Hargeysa at 6:00PM
on the evening of February 2, 2008. This aircraft will drop off the
Operational Advance Team and return to Djibouti. The advance team
will be transported by Somaliland security personnel to the
Ambassador Hotel where they will remain overnight.

The Operational Advance Team's aircraft will return to Djibouti where
it will remain in position to serve as the MSD Security Force's
Alternate aircraft. This aircraft has the responsibility to travel
to Hargeysa to extract the advance party in the event of an
emergency.

The Primary aircraft will transport the A/S, her official party, and
the Operational Protective Security Detail to Hargeysa on February 3,

2008. The aircraft will depart Djibouti at 9:00AM and arrive at
Hargeysa Airport at 10:00AM on February 3, 2008. This aircraft will
remain on the ground in Hargeysa while the A/S conducts her official
visit at the Ambassador Hotel. The duration of the official visit is
estimated to be three hours. Local security forces will provide
security for the aircraft while it remains at the airport and one MSD
Special Agent and the pilot will remain with the aircraft at all
times.

The Alternate aircraft will remain at the Djibouti Airport along with
the pilot and one DS/IP personnel to provide communications
connectivity with MSD personnel in Hargeysa until approximately
12:00PM on February 3, 2008. At 12:00PM, the Alternate aircraft will
return to Hargeysa and arrive at 1:00PM. The Alternate aircraft will
remain on the ground in Hargeysa with the Primary aircraft. The A/S,
her official party, and the MSD Operational Protective Service Detail
will depart Hargeysa on the Primary aircraft at 1:30PM and arrive in
Djibouti at 2:30PM. Once the Primary aircraft is "wheels up" and has
departed Hargeysa airspace the Alternate aircraft will remain on the
ground for 30 minutes, departing at approximately 2:00PM returning
the remaining members of the MSD Security Force to Djibouti arriving
at approximately 3:00 PM.

The contract air crews are experienced in conducting flight
operations at the Hargeysa Airport, and are aware of the dangers
during take-off and landing due to runway conditions and the possible
ground fire from small arms and crew served weapons. The air charter
company has indicated that should MSD personnel require the them to
land in Hargesya in response to an emergency, they are willing to do
so based on an assessment from MSD personnel in Hargeysa that the
security at the airport is sufficient to permit a safe landing. The
use of man portable anti-aircraft weapons (ManPads) and "command
detonated" Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) are known to be used in
and around Hargeysa.

GROUND TRANSPORTATION: Ground transportation will be provided by
Somaliland security officials. A total of ten (10) vehicles will be
provided to the MSD Security Force by the Somaliland Government.
Seven (7) vehicles will be used for movement between the Hargeysa
Airport and the Ambassador Hotel. Two of these vehicles will be
advance vehicles that will run the route in advance of the movement
of the motorcade. Three (3) trail vehicles will travel with the
motorcade. One will be the TST vehicle while the remaining two will
be used as spare vehicles. During movement from the airport to the
Ambassador Hotel, the A/S, her party, the MSD Agent-in-charge (AIC),
and members of the MSD Security Force will travel with Somaliland
officials and security personnel in the seven (7) primary vehicles.
The Tactical Support Team (TST) will have a designated vehicle. When
the motorcade departs the airport or the hotel, the motorcade will
depart first and then the TST vehicle and two trail vehicles will
depart thirty seconds after the motorcade. This thirty second 'gap'
enables the TST Team to observe the movement of the motorcade. This
'gap' provides time for the TST personnel in the trail vehicles to
observe the motorcade's departure, and respond to any attacks or the
initiation of an explosive device (IED or landmine) directed against
the motorcade.

SPE: The members of the advance team will be equipped with
individual sidearms and long rifles (Sig-229Rs and M-4 carbines).
Each member of the team will wear individual body armor. The MSD
Security Force will also be armed with two M-249 automatic weapons,
and two M-203 grenade launchers.

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT: The primary means of communications will be
with the AN/PRC-117F satellite radio. The advance team will be in
constant contact with the MSD Command Center located at Post Two at
AmEmbassy Nairobi. This is actually the interagency command net, and
it will be monitored by the interagency. Assistance from the
interagency Personnel Recovery Force (PRF),elements will be
requested by the advance team to the MSD Command Center at Post Two
(and monitored by the interagency). Each team member will be
equipped with a cell phone that provides cell phone coverage for the
region (Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya). The advance team will also be
equipped with Iridium satellite telephones (2) that provide worldwide
telephone communications. Additionally, the team will carry two BFTs
that will be constantly tracked by the interagency on the JBV. The
JBV will be monitored in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti, and the
interagency. DS will monitor the BFTs via SA-20 and AmEmbassy
Nairobi. NSA will provide a Force Protection Box vicinity Hargeysa,
which allows for an additional security measure.

MEDICAL: The Operational Advance Team and the Operational
Protective Service Detail both will have Emergency Medical Technician
(EMT) qualified MSD personnel assigned to their team. The MSD EMTs
will be equipped with the required emergency medical care equipment,
and capable of stabilizing any injured or wounded advance team member
until they can be medevaced to the field medical hospital located at
Camp Lemonier in Djibouti (approximately a one hour flight from
Hargeysa). In addition, each team member will carry a personal
medical kit equipped for self aid and buddy aid.

OTHER ITEMS:

Uniform of the Day: The members of the Tactical Support Team (TST)
will wear full tactical gear and tan battledress uniforms (BDU). The
Protective Security Detail (PSD) will present a low visibility
appearance wearing khaki 5.11 trousers, shirts, and a tan 5.11 vest
over their body armor.

Water: Each team member will carry water bottles in their individual
backpacks and an additional two (2) gallons per man will be stored on
the team's aircraft. An additional case of water will also be placed
on the aircraft in the event of an emergency or extended stay on the
ground by the advance team.

MRE: Each team member will carry two (2) MREs during the advance
team visit. An additional case will be placed on the team's aircraft
for use in the event of an emergency or the visit lasts longer than
the one day in and out advance trip.

Emergency Signaling Devices: Each advance team member will be
equipped with the proper number, color and type of Flares, Parachute
Flares, Smoke Grenades and Star Clusters as stated in team's
operations order.

Operational Funds: During the visit to Hargeysa by the Advance Team
on January 29, 2008 the Somaliland security officials charged $1,000
for the vehicles and assistance provided to the team. The
Operational Advance Team will have an additional $1,500 to pay for
vehicles assistance provided during the A/S's visit on February 3,

2008.

RULES of ENGAGEMENT: DS Firearms Policy will be in effect, and any
hostile fire received will be met with an appropriate escalation of
force in accordance with the DS Firearms Policy.

SAFEHAVEN: Presently, the advance team does not have a dedicated
safehaven. The Ambassador Hotel will be used for the overnight stay
of the Operational Advance Team, for the A/S's visit, and as the
emergency safehaven in the event of a weather delay, mechanical
failure, or violent act preventing the A/S, her official party, and
the MSD Security Force from departing Hargeysa as scheduled.

EVACUATION and PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR): An evacuation and recovery
plan has been coordinated between the advance team and members of the
interagency at AmEmbassy Nairobi. The aircraft used to transport the
advance team into Hargeysa will return to Djibouti and take up its
position as MSD's Alternate aircraft. This aircraft will remain at
the airport. An MSD element equipped with an AN/PRC-117F radio will
also remain with the Alternate aircraft and monitor their radio
during the entire time the advance team in on the ground in Hargeysa.
This aircraft and team will remain at the Djibouti Airport, monitor
their radio and be prepared to fly to Hargeysa and assist in the
event of a mechanical failure, act of violence or accident during the
A/S's visit.

The emergency evacuation plan requires the request for emergency
extraction by the Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) located
at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The JFT-HOA Personnel Recovery Force
(PRF) would conduct an emergency extraction operation of the advance
team and air crew using CH-53 Helicopters. The request for this
extraction would be made by the MSD Security Force to the MSD Command
Center and through the interagency command net.

The MSD Security Force has designated two (2) Designated Areas of
Recovery (DAR) sites to support an emergency extraction from the area
around the city of Hargeysa. The first location is an airfield code
name "BLACK" located approximately forty miles west of the city of
Hargeysa, and a second location is an airfield, code name "GOLD",
located approximately twenty-five miles to the east of the city. In
the event of hostile action in Hargeysa which prevents the team from
departing the airport, the team will move to one of the designated
DAR sites, call for assistance, and have the Alternate MSD contracted
aircraft fly to that location in order to extract those needing
assistance.

The "last case scenario" will have the advance team 'hiring' local
security officials to transport them and air crew using overland
transportation from Hargeysa to the Djibouti or Ethiopian borders.
In the event this scenario would be used, the MSD team members would
contact MSD Team Djibouti and request RSO Djibouti obtain Chiefs of
Mission (COM) Djibouti and Addis Ababa approval for diplomatic
assistance to permit the streamlining of 'border crossing
requirements' from Somaliland into Djibouti and Ethiopia.

RISK:
The risk assessment associated with this mission is medium to high.
Compatible communications with the interagency, approval for the use
of JTF HOA QRF, and the inter-agency and inter-regional coordination
have mitigated risk to our operation. Transporting Diplomats into a
failed state and providing for their protection increases the risks
associated with this mission.

RSO ASSESSMENT: RSO Nairobi has carefully reviewed the threat
assessment for Hargeysa, Somaliland and the proposed operational
security plan to support travel by official U.S. personnel to
Hargeysa. It is RSO Nairobi
's assessment that the proposed
operational security plan represents a viable plan for safely
conducting travel into Hargeysa on February 2 and 3 by official US
personnel.


RANNEBERGER