SOMALIA - URGENT NEED FOR A UNPKO

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002883

SIPDIS

FOR SECRETARY AND AF FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR EAID SOCI USUN SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - URGENT NEED FOR A UNPKO

REF: NAIROBI 2879

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger.
Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: A decision to deploy a United Nations
peacekeeping operation (UNPKO) in Somalia offers the best,
and probably only, opportunity to preserve and advance the
important and hard-won gains our policy has made in Somalia.
Specifically, the Djibouti Process is making serious steps
towards creation of a government of national unity.
President Yusuf's December 29 resignation closes a chapter on
Transitional Federal Government infighting, and opens
prospects for further progress, but the imminent possibility
of an Ethiopian withdrawal will create a power vacuum that
the radical Islamist group al-Shabaab seems poised to
capitalize on. Deployment of a PKO is vital to rehat and beef
up AMISOM, allowing it to fill some of the security vacuum
that will be created by Ethiopia's departure, and to create
space for further progress in the Djibouti process. End
summary.


2. (C) Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President
Yusuf's December 29 resignation (reftel),while necessary to
advance the Djibouti Process given the tensions among the TFG
leadership, occurs against the backdrop of increasing
al-Shabaab pressure and the possibly imminent departure of
Ethiopian forces from Somalia.


3. (C) An Ethiopian departure could trigger the collapse of
the fragile alliance between the TFG and moderates (now
dubbed the ARS) from among its former Islamic Courts
antagonists. This would be a tragedy given the quiet, but
substantial progress that we have --in concert with the SRSG
and others-- made through determined pursuit of the Djibouti
Process. I believe it is essential that we take all possible
steps to avert an implosion and preserve opportunities for
our policy to bear fruit.


4. (C) A UNPKO that would allow for the re-hatting of AMISOM,
and would give AMISOM troops the additional muscle they will
need following an Ethiopian withdrawal, is key to allowing
the Djibouti initiative to survive. Following the departure
of Ethiopian troops and in the absence of a UNPKO, two
scenarios seem likely:

-- the TFG will collapse, and in the ensuing chaos al-Shabaab
and miscellaneous warlords and clans will vie for supremacy.
That struggle for power would worsen the current humanitarian
situation and further complicate the work of humanitarian
NGOs in south-central Somalia. It would also open up
expanded prospects for terrorist exploitation of this
fragmentation.

-- The second and, I believe, more likely scenario is that
the TFG will collapse, and the al-Shabaab will coalesce to
seize power in Mogadishu and consolidate its power elsewhere.
As it has elsewhere in Somalia where it has a firm grip on
power, Al-Shabaab will introduce a very hard-line Islamic
regime -- more radical than the Islamic Courts Union reign
that triggered the Ethiopian intervention in December 2006.
The al-Shabaab regime would be sympathetic to terrorist
elements that will pose a substantially greater threat to us
and to the region.


5. (C) Deploying a UNPKO in concert with steps currently
under way (including the financing and fielding of joint TFG
- ARS security forces and the continued implementation of the
Djibouti accords to include enlarging the Parliament and
forming a government of national unity) by initially
re-hatting and expanding AMISOM will preserve and enhance
prospects for our policy to succeed in Somalia. Creation of
a government of national unity, as envisaged in the Djibouti
Process, will reinforce moderates and help marginalize the
al-Shabaab, in the process paving the way for an eventual
democratic transition.
RANNEBERGER