Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NAIROBI2644
2008-11-21 16:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA - YUSUF AGREES TO SEEK COMPROMISE WITH

Tags:  PGOV PINR SOCI SO 
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VZCZCXRO7543
OO RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #2644 3261654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211654Z NOV 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7685
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002644 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - YUSUF AGREES TO SEEK COMPROMISE WITH
PRIME MINISTER

REF: NAIROBI 2643

Classified By: Somalia Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002644

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - YUSUF AGREES TO SEEK COMPROMISE WITH
PRIME MINISTER

REF: NAIROBI 2643

Classified By: Somalia Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In a follow-on to their November 20 meeting
(reftel),Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates pressed
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi
Yusuf to drop his legalistic objections to cooperation with
TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde." Yusuf
initially resisted the Special Envoy's arguments but,
finally, agreed that he would travel to Mogadishu, as soon as
an aircraft could be made available, for meetings with the
Prime Minister. Yusuf predicted, however, that the Prime
Minister would be unlikely to meet him half way. End summary.


2. (C) In a follow-on to their November 20 meeting (reftel),
Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates on November 21 pressed a
reluctant Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President
Abdullahi Yusuf hard to drop his objections to compromise
with TFG Prime Minister Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde." Noting
that "the best way to combat instability, hunger, and piracy
is through a strong government in Mogadishu," S/E Yates told
Yusuf that, instead of contemplating attendance at the
November 22 - 25 Djibouti High-Level and Security Committee
meetings, which would be disruptive, Yusuf should travel to
Mogadishu for meetings with the Prime Minister.


3. (C) S/E Yates told Yusuf that without compromise, the TFG
would not survive to form a unity government with the
Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia. He urged the
President to drop his "legalistic" objections to the Prime
Minister's behavior and to seek to forge a consensus with
him. Signaling to Yusuf that little patience is left, S/E
Yates noted that "no one person in the TFG is indispensable,"
and that the reconciliation process needed to be energized,
as little time remained in the TFG's mandate, "which will not
be automatically extended." S/E Yates agreed with Yusuf that
the Prime Minister would also need to be willing to
compromise, and promised to contact Nur Adde in Mogadishu in
order to ready him for Yusuf's visit, should Yusuf decide to
go.


4. (C) After several more attempts by Yusuf to discuss his
alleged legal objections to the Prime Minister's unilateral
efforts to form a cabinet, and after complaints (reftel)
about alleged Ethiopian behavior at the October 28 - 29 IGAD
Summit, the President told S/E Yates that he "would go to
Mogadishu" as soon as air transportation could be found. "I
will do my best," Yusuf said. "We will do what is best for
Somalia." Still, the President added, he expected little
from his meeting with Nur Adde who, he predicted, would be
unwilling to compromise, and perhaps even unwilling to meet
with him.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) We believe that Yusuf will travel to Mogadishu, and
make at least a formal effort to meet with the Prime
Minister, whom S/E Yates will urge to engage with Yusuf.
Months of interpersonal conflict, however, and Nur Adde's
newfound interest in advancing the Djibouti Process without
Yusuf, will at a minimum complicate their efforts to meet and
find compromise.
RANNEBERGER