SOMALIA - PRESIDENT YUSUF: I AM A DEMOCRAT, NOT A

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 002643

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - PRESIDENT YUSUF: I AM A DEMOCRAT, NOT A
DICTATOR

Classified By: Somalia Counselor Bob Patterson. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. On November 20, Special Envoy Yates met
with an intractable President Yusuf, who made it clear that
he was unable to work with Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein
and was more interested in assigning blame than moving
forward on a peace process. Yusuf termed the Prime
Minister's determination to confirm a cabinet without him an
"illegal" use of power that was bad for Somalia. In contrast,
Yusuf said, he was abiding by the country's laws and its
Charter in order to avoid becoming the "dictator" that the PM
had become.


2. (C) Yusuf accused Ethiopia and other IGAD countries of
without his knowledge substituting pages in the October 29
final communique that he had signed. Yusuf presented us with
a sheaf of documents to support the legalistic arguments
around his opposition to the PM's choices for a new cabinet.
Yusuf told us he had not been informed of the November 22 -
25 meeting in Djibouti and said he did not know anything
about the composition of the TFG delegation to that meeting
which, he said, anyway represented just the PM's Hawiye clan,
not "all Somalis." While Yusuf professed to support the
emergence of a government of national unity, he presented no
roadmap for achieving one. Yusuf divulged little about his
recent trips to Tripoli and Khartoum. End Summary.

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Accusing PM of Illegal Activities
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3. (C) Special Envoy Yates met with Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf on November 20,
shortly after Yusuf arrived in Nairobi from recent stops in
Tripoli and Khartoum. While friendly and in an almost jovial
mood, it was clear that Yusuf was prepared to fight Prime
Minister Nur Hassan Hussein to the very end. He insisted
that he was unable to work with the PM who "abusing" his
powers. Yusuf recognized that the fact that the President and
Prime Minister could not work together was disastrous for
Somalia but he maintained there was nothing he could do. He
claimed that PM Hussein refused to listen to him or to
Parliament, and that his actions violated the Transitional
Federal Charter (TFC). Yusuf lamented, "I do not know whom he
reports to."


4. (C) When S/E Yates made it clear that the USG fully
supported the Djibouti Process led by SRSG Ould-Abdallah,
Yusuf professed not to know about the November 22 - 25
meetings of the High Level and Joint Security Committees.
Yusuf told the Special Envoy that if he were invited, he
would come.


5. (C) S/E Yates highlighted our consistent support of the
TFG and stressed its mandate to deliver services to the
people of Somalia and engineer a democratic political
transition. The Special Envoy reminded Yusuf that it was
Yusuf who had appointed Prime Minister Hussein. To get
anything done, they must work together, S/E Yates said. Yates
also reminded the TFG President that last year, he was making
the same complaints about then-Prime Minister Gedi that he
now made about Yusuf. Yusuf responded, "Who created this
unfortunate situation? I have never tried to divide the TFG
) I have done nothing wrong."


6. (C) Yusuf accused the PM of leading a reconciliation
process that was focused on one clan only. Yusuf agreed that
reconciliation was necessary, and that ideally a government
of national unity would emerge from the process. However, he
cautioned that this could not be accomplished through the
Djibouti Process if the TFG delegation remained
unrepresentative. Yusuf accused the PM of presenting a new
delegation for Djibouti that he had not approved and that
comprised only the PM,s supporters. Yusuf placed the blame
for the failures of the TFG squarely on the shoulders of the
Prime Minister but stated, "If I am wrong, tell me. It I am
spoiling things, I will stop."
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Pointing Fingers
--------------


7. (C) President Yusuf then began a series of legalistic
arguments. He argued that a Supreme Court ruling concluded

that the new cabinet appointed by the Prime Minister in early
August, after the resignation of ten ministers, was "illegal
according to the Charter." (Note: Somalia does not have a
functioning Supreme Court.) And, Yusuf said, "I am a
democrat. I respect our laws, our Charter. All of us should
abide by our laws. If we do something outside the law, we
become dictators."


8. (C) Yusuf told S/E Yates that the next day, he would go
to Mogadishu. (Note: The Prime Minister arrived in Mogadishu
on November 20 with several MPs and other supporters he took
with him from Nairobi). Yusuf said, "If you tell me the TFG
is useless, I will go. We want the TFG to survive, but we
must find out what is wrong." By Yusuf's own analysis, the
faults of the TFG lie with the Prime Minister, Parliament,
and IGAD.


9. (C) Yusuf said that the Parliament's confirmation of the
Prime Minister's cabinet in September had been illegal. In
recognizing the current cabinet, IGAD and the international
community were supporting an illegal arrangement. Yusuf
strongly criticized IGAD for encouraging all of Somalia's
Transitional Federal Institutions to come to Nairobi for the
October 28 - 29 IGAD Summit. IGAD decisions, he said, were
made by Ethiopia alone. Finally, Yusuf accused IGAD of
showing him one version of the final IGAD communique and then
presenting him with another for signature.


10. (C) While Yusuf focused on the minutiae of the "illegal"
decisions others had made, S/E Yates pressed him on the need
for compromise and advancing the Djibouti Process. S/E Yates
argued that if the negotiation team in Djibouti was indeed
representative of all Somalis, it could succeed. Yusuf
implied that the Prime Minister had loaded the delegation
with members of his fellow Hawiye clan. (Note: Yusuf's
advisor, Abdirashid Said, who repeatedly interjected himself
into the conversation with S/E Yates, offered detailed
footnotes to the legalistic arguments Yusuf was using to
discredit the Prime Minister. Said was more direct in a later
conversation with Poloff, telling us that PM Hussein, Sheikh
Sharif, ARS/Asmara's Hassan Dahir Aweys, former Merka warlord
Indra-Adde, and the al-Shabaab were all Hawiye. The Hawiye,
he said, were dominating the Djibouti Process and preventing
"everyone else" from being included. Said accused the PM of
negotiating with the likes of Indra-Adde; thereby preventing
any real progress.)

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Need for Compromise
--------------


11. (C) S/E Yates emphatically stated that the most
important thing for the TFG was compromise. Yusuf replied,
"I am willing to compromise, but the Prime Minister is not )
people are pushing him not to compromise." Yusuf claimed
that he would be happy with the establishment of a government
of national unity as soon as possible. Although the Special
Envoy urged Yusuf to share his vision for a unity government
and the future of the TFG, Yusuf did not. Instead, he
detailed how the Prime Minister had violated the Addis
agreement by choosing not to follow the criteria established
for the selection of new ministers.


12. (C) Yusuf declined to provide significant details about
his recent visits to Tripoli and Khartoum. Yusuf stated only
that he was invited by Libyan President Qadafi who shared his
commitment to reconciliation and to a solution to Somalia's
problems. Yusuf said that Qadafi stood ready to solve the
crisis within the TFG. Yusuf said he had met with the
Tanzanian President and AU Chairman Kikwete while in Tripoli.
He divulged nothing of his November 19 meeting with Sudanese
President Bashir in Khartoum.


13. (C) As the discussion ended, President Yusuf implored
S/E Yates to read the documents he had presented of the
history of the "illegal" actions that were allegedly plaguing
the TFG. Yusuf agreed that the upcoming meeting in Djibouti
could be important, but insisted that the TFG must have
"legitimate" representation. He said that the United States
and the UN should decide who is representing the TFG. S/E
Yates cautioned that it was not the role of the USG to
determine who the TFG included in its delegation. The TFG
must act to implement the October 26 cessation of armed

conflict agreement and negotiate the establishment of a unity
government. The November 20 meeting with S/E Yates strongly
suggested that Yusuf was not prepared to address any of these
vital next steps.
RANNEBERGER