SOMALIA: TFG PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER CONTINUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002586

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER CONTINUE
STAND-OFF OVER INTERIM CABINET

REF: NAIROBI 2554

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Prime
Minister Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" told Ambassador
November 11 that President Yusuf had come under pressure and
appeared to be showing increased flexibility in their
discussions on the composition of an interim cabinet
(reftel),but at a November 12 Nairobi press conference, Nur
Adde's public announcement that he would present his
proposed cabinet to Yusuf later the same day, and that he
expected Yusuf to accept his proposal in order to meet a
deadline established by IGAD in its October 29 communique,
appeared to harden Yusuf's resolve not to cooperate. The
semi-public tug-of-war over a cabinet scheduled to be in
office only until a unity government cabinet could be
created, served to highlight the continuing bad relationship
between the President and the Prime Minister, and followed on
the heels of the Prime Minister's failed efforts, in two
London meetings November 6 - 7, to win Yusuf's agreement to
the same interim cabinet.


2. (C) Nur Adde agreed with the Ambassador that the Joint
Security and High Level Committees had to operate from
Somalia if they were to have legitimacy with the Somali
people. Yusuf and Nur Adde are traveling to Addis Ababa
November 12 - 13 for meetings with the Government of
Ethiopia, and perhaps with one another. Yusuf's continued
unwillingness to cooperate comes against the background of
rumors that his clan was preparing to ease the famously
stubborn President out if he did not cooperate with the
Djibouti process. End summary.

Prime Minister Cautiously Optimistic
--------------


2. (C) In a November 11 meeting, TFG Prime Minister Nur
Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde," accompanied by Somalia's
Ambassador to Kenya Mohammed Ali Nur "Americo," described to
the Ambassador his efforts to win TFG President Abdullahi
Yusuf's agreement to a new interim cabinet since the issuance
of a communique at the October 28 - 29 IGAD Extraordinary
Summit on Somalia. (The Summit called for the creation of a
cabinet within 14 days of the signing of the communique.) In
two London meetings, November 7 and 8, Yusuf had rejected Nur
Adde's list of cabinet members and someone, perhaps from
Yusuf's entourage, had further insulted Nur Adde by
circulating in Nairobi a list of cabinet members that
differed from that proposed by the Prime Minister.


3. (C) Following Nur Adde's London meetings, pressure applied
to Yusuf by influential members of the President's Majertein
clan appeared to have caused Yusuf to temporarily soften his
opposition to an interim cabinet. Amcit and co-clanner
Mohammed Abdirizak described to Special Envoy John Yates some
of the pressure, alleging that there was a growing consensus
that Yusuf should be eased out, and the names of potential
successors were already circulating.


4. (C) At an impromptu November 12 press conference, the
Prime Minister, in response to questions, guessed that Yusuf
would approve his proposed cabinet, which he said he had
composed in order to meet a deadline established by the
October 29 IGAD Summit final communique, and to shore up the
TFG in advance of negotiations with the ARS over the
composition of a unity government. Nur Adde's decision to go
public with his intentions apparently angered Yusuf. In a
November 12 conversation, before his departure for Addis
Ababa, the Prime Minister told us that Yusuf was refusing to
discuss the interim cabinet with him.

Progress on the Ground Necessary
--------------


5. (C) In his meeting with the Ambassador, the Prime Minister
identified two problems confronting the TFG: al-Shabaab's
recent attacks against Amisom, and ENDF, and TFG troops in
Mogadishu; and the need for the High-Level Committee and
Joint Security Committee to operate on the ground in Somalia.
Nur Adde thought it was "still possible to isolate"
al-Shabaab if the TFG - ARS unity government demonstrated
some momentum. He was less certain that the committees would
succeed in taking their joint efforts to Somalia. (In a
separate conversation, TFG Co-Chairman of the High-Level
Committee, Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Abdisalam Aden, told
us from Mogadishu November 12 that the ARS was not

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participating in on-going efforts to create a Benadir local
administration because its security in Mogadishu could not be
guaranteed.)

Dealing with Yusuf
--------------


6. (C) Nur Adde sidestepped a question from the Ambassador
about rumors that Yusuf might be replaced, noting that Yusuf
would have to stay, but that a way must be found to keep him
cooperating with the Djibouti process. A change in the
"facts on the ground" would induce both Yusuf and the GOE to
cooperate, the Prime Minister thought. Ambassador "Americo"
thought that a willingness by the ARS to travel to Mogadishu
would be a necessary step. Nur Adde cautioned that ARS
influence in Mogadishu was limited. It was not clear, he
said, under what circumstances they would be able to travel
to the capital.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) It appears that the President and Prime Minister may
not be able to reach agreement even on a cabinet that would
be in office only briefly before being replaced, in a best
case scenario, by a TFG - ARS unity cabinet. Yusuf and Nur
Adde continue to be at loggerheads, and it seems that the
Prime Minister's decision to air his interactions with Yusuf
before the press was designed to ensure that Yusuf would
remain uncooperative, just at a point where, as he told the
Ambassador, the President was beginning to show some
flexibility.
RANNEBERGER