SOMALIA: MELES'S POST-IGAD EXPECTATIONS FOR THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002581

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: MELES'S POST-IGAD EXPECTATIONS FOR THE
TFG

REF: NAIROBI 2520

Classified By: Counselor for Somalia Unit Bob Patterson. Reasons: 1.4
(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Immediately on the heels of the October 28 -
29 IGAD Extraordinary Summit on Somalia, Assistant Secretary
Frazer discussed with Prime Minister Meles the way forward
with the faltering Somalia Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and its merger with the Alliance for the Reliberation
of Somalia (ARS). As he had in public statements during the
IGAD event, Meles expressed skepticism about the TFG's
prospects. The jury was out on the ARS, he said, but if they
are serious he would expect them soon to reach beyond their
Hawiye base and improve security in Mogadishu. Absent TFG-ARS
progress, Ethiopian troops would withdraw before the end of
the year. And he had agreed with President Museveni that
Amisom would withdraw in advance of ENDF troops. Meles told
A/S Frazer that he had outlined GOE intentions in detail to
TFG President Yusuf. He believed Yusuf understood that
Ethiopia was "serious" this time. Meles told A/S Frazer that
the new, TFG - ARS unity government would have little time to
prove itself; there must be measurable progress by the end of
November, or ENDF forces would withdraw, leaving a security
vacuum. Meles felt the TFG Prime Minister was not capable of
governing, and he described the Deputy Prime Minister as
lacking the necessary clan power base to be effective. End
summary.

Meles Skeptical of TFG
--------------


2. (C) On October 29, immediately following the closing of
the Extraordinary Summit on Somalia (reftel),Prime Minister
Meles shared with Assistant Secretary Frazer his expectations
of the floundering Somalia Transitional Federal Government
(TFG). Meles repeated criticisms he had made publicly at the
Summit, calling the TFG "unable to do anything," and
"disorganized." The TFG lacked cohesion, he said, and it
will need that if the new, TFG - ARS (Alliance for the
Reliberation of Somalia) unity government was to be
effective.

Jury Out on ARS
--------------


3. (C) Meles was somewhat skeptical of the ARS, whose
representatives he said he did not meet, as well. If they
were willing to accommodate non-Hawiye interests "then 90
percent of the security problems" would be solved, including
in Mogadishu. The next few months will show what the ARS can
do, Meles continued. "We will see if they're serious about
fighting crime and al-Shabaab, or if they just want to
negotiate with al-Shabaab." If the ARS created stability in
Mogadishu, Meles added as an afterthought, "then perhaps we
(the ENDF) could have another go at (al-Shabaab controlled)
Kismayo." Even if the ENDF withdrew from Mogadishu, Meles
said, Ethiopian troops would remain near the capital while
TFG and ARS militias took control. (Note: the October 26
Djibouti Cessation of Hostilities Agreement calls for
Ethiopian troops to withdraw from certain parts of
Mogadishu.) If security in Somalia improved under the unity
government, Meles envisioned an extension of the Transitional
Federal Charter, due to expire in fall 2009, "for a few
years."

ENDF Withdrawal Plans
--------------


4. (C) Should the new unity government fail, Meles said, the
ENDF would withdraw, perhaps before the end of the year.
President Museveni and he had agreed that AMISOM troops must
withdraw in that case before the ENDF, which would leave a
security vacuum in Mogadishu. "With the complete failure of
the TFG/ARS unity government, we would be back to square one,
to ground zero," Meles said. Later in the conversation, Meles
recounted that he had told TFG President Yusuf that "unless
(the new unity government) flies, we will withdraw before the
end of the year." The GOE would in that case ensure that
Yusuf was returned safely to Puntland before its troops
departed Somalia. "I think (Yusuf) believes we're serious,"
Meles said. The GOE now understood that it did not need to
be in Somalia in order to counter al-Shabaab. "We can stop
them from Ethiopia," Meles concluded.


5. (C) Still later in the conversation, Meles returned to an
ENDF withdrawal, noting that "if there is hope, perhaps we

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can delay (withdrawal) for a few months into the new year.
There would have to be measurable progress by the end of
November, he said.

Tight Deadlines for Unity Government
--------------


6. (C) After A/S Frazer had noted the ARS wish (septel) that
the TFG parliament be expanded and a new leadership elected,
Meles agreed that the unity government must accommodate the
ARS. "The parliament can be either enlarged or replaced, but
it must change, and the cabinet must be re-organized," he
said. Any re-shuffling of the office of president or prime
minister could not be decided by parliament, however, and a
wholesale replacement of the TFG with the ARS would "simply
displace the violence."


7. (C) In response to A/S Frazer's question about the tight
deadlines established by the IGAD October 29 communique
(reftel),Meles noted only that it was imperative to have the
cabinet act in a coordinated fashion. (Note: the October 29
communique calls for the Transitional Federal Institutions to
"appoint a cabinet. . .within fifteen days...") In the
first two-month review called for in the communique, he would
hope to see progress on a cease-fire and a unity government
well advanced. If not, Ethiopia would convene an IGAD
emergency summit.

PM, DPM Not Players
--------------


8. (C) Asked by Special Envoy for Somalia John Yates if Prime
Minister Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" was capable of
governing, Meles said only "no." Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Abdisalan Aden had the right clan credentials (Habr
Gedr/Ayer) but no power base of his own. Meles acknowledged,
however, that "you can talk to him" and "he's very useful."


9. (C) Meles agreed with A/S Frazer that ARS Chairman Sheikh
Sharif might be a Trojan horse for more radical Islamists.
"It is an issue," he said.


10. (C) A/S Frazer briefly previewed for Meles the prospect
of paying TFG forces. "We are looking at it," she said, and
promised to provide Meles with a concept paper that, if Meles
thought it feasible, could be presented to the Saudi
government. Meles was enthusiastic about the possibility.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) It was clear that Meles, while willing to give the
unity government the benefit of the doubt, expected the new
arrangement to fail. Although Meles gave the UN's Special
Representative due credit for forging the October 26 Djibouti
agreements and bringing the ARS formally into play, his
comments suggested that IGAD for him had superseded the UN in
Somalia. And with IGAD, at least on Somalia, little more
than a figleaf for Ethiopia as the country that has expended
the most energy on its ungoverned neighbor and is the most
impatient with the meager results, Meles is again threatening
to withdraw his troops and re-enter to Somalia when necessary
to counter al-Shabaab.


12. (U) Assistant Secretary Frazer has cleared this message.
RANNEBERGER