Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08NAHA25
2008-03-11 08:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Naha
Cable title:  

APPEASEMENT STRATEGY BEHIND REPUTED FRF ENVIRONMENTAL

Tags:  MARR MOPS PGOV PINS JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1153
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHNH #0025/01 0710847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 110847Z MAR 08
FM AMCONSUL NAHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0911
INFO RHMFISS/18WG CP KADENA AB JA
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUSFNSG/CDR10THASG TORII STATION JA
RHMFISS/CG FIRST MAW
RUHBABA/CG III MEF CAMP COURTNEY JA
RUHBBEA/CG THIRD FSSG CAMP KINSER JA
RUHBABA/CG THIRD MARDIV
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMFLEACT OKINAWA JA
RHMFISS/COMMARCORBASESJAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RHMFISS/COMMARFORPAC
RHHMHAA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHOVVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHBVMA/CTF 76
RUYLBAH/DODSPECREP OKINAWA JA
RUESOK/FBIS OKINAWA JA
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 0289
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0971
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/NAVCRIMINVSERVRA OKINAWA JA
RUHBANB/OKINAWA AREA FLD OFC US FORCES JAPAN CAMP BUTLER JA
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0365
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 0321
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0908
RUALBCC/YOKOTA AB HQ USFJ
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000025 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2033
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINS JA
SUBJECT: APPEASEMENT STRATEGY BEHIND REPUTED FRF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROCEDURES DELAY?

CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin K. Maher, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
General, Naha, Japan, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAHA 000025

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/11/2033
TAGS: MARR MOPS PGOV PINS JA
SUBJECT: APPEASEMENT STRATEGY BEHIND REPUTED FRF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROCEDURES DELAY?

CLASSIFIED BY: Kevin K. Maher, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
General, Naha, Japan, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: At the March 6 meeting of the Alliance
Transformation Agreement Working Group for Okinawa, GOJ
representatives raised the possibility that environmental
procedures related to the landfill portions of the replacement
facility for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be extended
and delayed for eight months. Japanese participants assured us
that there would be no insurmountable engineering or political
difficulties with completing the overall project on schedule.
They admitted they anticipated that Okinawan opposition to the
project also might delay land-based work in undetermined ways,
and promised to provide new timelines. Local media in the
weekend papers headlined the story as a year-long delay, while
central government officials here told ConGen Naha privately
that the eight-month delay was a "worst case scenario." The
Okinawa Vice Governor, meanwhile, privately scoffed at these
reports and stressed that only a three-month delay would be
necessary. The Vice Governor also told us that prefectural and
national environmental and defense officials had nearly
completed coordination that would allow the Governor to issue
permits this month which are needed for the next stage of the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) to begin. In view of this
conflicting information, we think it is incumbent upon us to yet
again stress to the GOJ our expectation that the Okinawa base
realignment plan will be implemented as agreed, on schedule, and
as a package. End Summary.


2. (C) At the March 6 Alliance Transformation Agreement
Working Group for Okinawa (ATAWG-O),Japanese participants
presented a new timeline for environmental procedures relating
to the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). Japanese officials
claimed that because a coral survey covering four seasons had
not begun by the end of winter (February 2008),the survey would
have to extend to the end of the next winter (February 2009).

Compared to the schedule presented at the September 2007 ATAWG-O
meeting, the on-site survey and period for drafting the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) both start four months
later, and take four months longer, for a total delay of eight
months. As a result, the expected date for the prefectural
governor's approval for the landfill became late August 2010,
which is nearly a year later than the schedule we have been
shown to date. This new schedule would put the Governor's
permit approval less than 90 days before the next prefectural
gubernatorial election. Under current Japanese law, a landfill
project cannot begin unless the governor approves.


3. (C) ConGen Naha's representative questioned the length of
the delay, and noted the foreseeable difficulty of attaining the
governor's approval for the landfill shortly before the
gubernatorial election. There could be tremendous pressure on
the governor not to approve the landfill, even from the
conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which will want to retain
the seat. The Okinawa left and media will portray the 2010
gubernatorial election as the last best chance for the people of
Okinawa to make their voices heard on the FRF, i.e., to prevent
its completion. Japanese participants claimed that their hands
were tied, as the eight month delay was required by law, and
asked the U.S. side just to trust them and their ability to gain
the governor's approval for the landfill.


4. (C) U.S. Military engineers asked what impact delays in
environmental procedures would have on the land-based
construction. Japanese officials from Tokyo initially insisted
there would be no delay, as the EIS applies only to landfill,
but Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) participants said they expected
the prefecture would "be sensitive" to construction. They

NAHA 00000025 002 OF 003


admitted that they had not yet discussed with the Okinawa
Prefectural Government (OPG) any construction that was unrelated
to the EIS. Japanese participants insisted that work, including
demolition scheduled to begin in April, must be kept under wraps
due to "local sensitivities." Note: We found this puzzling,
since the contracts for the demolition work have been let and
this has been widely reported in the local press. The work will
be visible from off-base. End note. The Japanese side agreed
to get back to the U.S. side with detailed timelines for
land-based work. Japanese officials insisted that the revised
schedule would not affect the planned FRF completion date of

2014. U.S. Military engineers expressed grave doubts about
maintaining the completion date if there were serious delays in
sea-based portions of the project, and if the GOJ was hesitating
to move ahead on land-based portions.


5. (C) After the ATAWG-O meeting, Consul General Maher met
separately with MOFA Status of Forces Division Director Iizawa
and ODB Director General Manabe. Japanese participants in the
ATAWG-O had fully explained neither the justification for, nor
the full impact of, the eight-month delay. Iizawa shed no more
light on the reasons for the delay, but assured the Consul
General that the GOJ would endeavor to ensure there was no
overall delay from the 2014 target. The Consul General stressed
to Iizawa that failing to meet interim milestones on the FRF
could put at risk U.S. political support --and funding-- for
other portions of the Okinawa-centered package, including the
move of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.


6. (C) When the Consul General raised the issue with ODB's
Manabe on March 6, Manabe seemed unaware of the central
government's reasoning behind an eight-month long delay in
environmental procedures. He promised to get back to the Consul
General on the issue. On March 9, following headline coverage
of a reputed one-year delay in the local press, Manabe told the
Consul General that an eight-month delay is a worst case
scenario, and ODB is still discussing the start date for the
next stage of the EIA process with the Okinawa governor's
office. Manabe said he believes it will be possible to keep
delays in the environmental process to a minimum. The problem,
Manabe said, was that Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura recently
directed MOFA and MOD to use an "appeasement strategy" in
dealing with Okinawa Prefecture Governor Nakaima. He noted
Foreign Minister Koumura and Finance Minister Nukaga are
opposing the appeasement strategy, but he was curiously silent
on Defense Minister Ishiba's position.


7. (C) On March 10 Okinawa Prefecture Vice Governor Nakazato
told the Consul General that reports of a one year or eight
month delay are nonsense. Nakazato was adamant that the
inability to start coral sampling by the end of February would
delay EIA procedures by no more than three months. The only
delay, he repeated, would be the need to do the "winter" survey
in the next December to February period, vice the immediate past
December to February, so there is only a three month overall
delay. No other EIA procedures would change. Nakazato added
that OPG and ODB officials currently are working the details the
requests for permits from the OPG to begin several surveys (such
as coral sampling) which will begin the next phase of the EIA
process. Nakazato said he expects the details to be
completed-and the governor's permits for the surveys to be
granted-in this month, March 2008.


8. (C) Nakazato said he had spoken recently with Vice Minister
of Defense Masuda about this, and that both Masuda and MOD

NAHA 00000025 003 OF 003


Defense Policy Bureau Director General Takamizawa are well aware
of the current state of play and of the fact that only a
three-month shift in the timeline is required. When asked why
the national government would tell us there will be an
eight-month delay, Nakazato dismissed the idea. While it is
true, Nakazato said, that the Prefectural environmental advisory
committee had asked for a multi-year environmental survey and
other measures that could create delays, the governor himself
had rejected such requests. Governor Nakaima has not given up
on his demand that the runways be shifted seaward, but he
nevertheless wants the FRF to proceed as quickly as possible,
and is careful not to do anything to delay the EIA. Nakazato
said he does not know why, but it appears to him the GOJ is
intentionally misleading ("damashite iru") the USG.


9. (C) Comment: We confess that we are confused by the
explanations, or lack thereof, from GOJ officials about delays
to the EIA process. We are not experts on Japan's EIA
procedures, but from what we know we can find no rationale for
more than a three-month delay. Based on the ATAWG-O meeting
and conversations with GOJ officials, it appeared to us that
some national officials had become too focused on Okinawan
"sensitivities," and the resulting appeasement strategy, and may
have thought it necessary to delay the EIA to satisfy the
Governor. But we now have it on good authority from the Vice
Governor that the governor's office wants the next phase of the
EIA underway this month, and sees no reason for extended delays
in environmental procedures. In light of this, we think it is
incumbent upon us to yet again stress to the GOJ our expectation
that the Okinawa base realignment plan will be implemented as
agreed, on schedule, and as a package.
MAHER