CODEL PRICE DISCUSSES TRADE SECURITY AND IRAN WITH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000041

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDOE/NNSA FOR WKILMARTIN, MBEDKE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR AWYSOCKI, THORTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETRD EWWT AMGT PTER MU
SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE DISCUSSES TRADE SECURITY AND IRAN WITH
POLICE, PORT OF SALALAH

REF: A. 07 MUSCAT 900

B. MUSCAT 36

C. 07 MUSCAT 387


1. (SBU) Summary: A Congressional delegation (CODEL) led by
Representative David Price of North Carolina -- Chairman of
the House Appropriations Sub-Committee for the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) -- visited Muscat and Salalah January
7-9 to assess DHS's Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)(ref A).
The delegation met with the Inspector General (IG) of the
Royal Oman Police (ROP),discussing Oman's participation in
SFI as well as the January 6 confrontation between U.S. Navy
vessels and Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz. The CODEL
also toured the Port of Salalah, where the Port's Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) briefed it on the difficulties of
implementing the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning requirement in a
transshipment port. The Members and port authorities
discussed various ways to ensure the security of U.S.-bound
cargo. (Note: Post reported septel on the CODEL's January 8
meeting with Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs,
which covered a broader range of bilateral and regional
issues (ref B). End note.) End Summary.

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ROP: Happy with Cooperation...
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2. (SBU) On January 8, CODEL Price met with Malik bin
Sulaiman al-Ma'mari, IG of the ROP, whose Directorate of
Customs has been the USG's main partner in SFI. The Members
thanked al-Ma'mari for the ROP's support to date, stating
that the U.S. has received "no better cooperation (in
implementing the initiative worldwide) than from Oman."
Al-Ma'mari and his staff commented that preparations for
SFI's implementation -- which is scheduled to begin scanning
100% of targeted U.S.-bound cargo at the Port of Salalah in
early 2008 -- seemed to be progressing smoothly. They
mentioned their concern, however, that in the event that
scanning identifies dangerous radioactive material in a
container, Oman does not yet have the resources or know-how
to handle and contain it. The Director General of Customs
stated that an interagency team including ROP Customs and
Civil Defense, as well as the Omani Ministries of Energy and
Transportation, is working with partners in the U.S.
Departments of State, Energy and Homeland Security to develop
an emergency response protocol for Oman. He added that the
ROP needs continued technical assistance, as well as
protective equipment and training for its frontline
inspectors, in order to develop its capacity to deal with
radiological threats (ref C).

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...But Avoiding Comment on Iran
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3. (SBU) In addition to discussing trade security, the CODEL
pressed al-Ma'mari for his opinion on the January 6
confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz between U.S. naval
vessels and Iranian fast boats. Al-Ma'mari was reticent to
speak about the incident in any depth, often repeating that
he did not yet have enough information to comment. At one
point he asked the delegation to understand that Oman is in a
"tough neighborhood," and that it has a long, shared history
with Iran that it must consider before speaking too quickly
about events in the region. He mentioned, however, that he
had discussed the incident with the Iranian Commander of
Police -- who was in Muscat with an official delegation at
the same time as the CODEL -- and that his Iranian
counterpart had confirmed press reports that the boats were
under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC). The IG stressed to the Members that tension in the
region is high, and that "mistakes" by either side could lead
to a quick escalation.

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Transshipment Presents Unique Challenges
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4. (SBU) On January 9, CODEL Price traveled from Muscat to
Salalah for a tour of the Port and a briefing by the Port's
CEO, Gary Lemke. Lemke argued that the nature of the
transshipment business presents unique challenges to
implementing SFI in Salalah. He stated, for instance, that
feeder ships carrying cargo en route to the U.S. often do not
unload all of their containers at the Port. Unless

MUSCAT 00000041 002 OF 002


containers are scanned at the port of load, there could be
instances in which U.S.-bound containers escape scanning
before reaching the U.S. Lemke also showed members of the
delegation a sample stowage plan of a ship carrying
U.S.-bound containers. The containers were scattered
throughout the ship, organized not by port of destination,
but by a combination of factors including a container's
weight, length and need for refrigeration. A transshipment
port like Salalah faces a challenge, Lemke explained, in
identifying U.S.-bound containers among the rest of the cargo
in incoming ships, and then in off-loading those containers
for scanning in a way that does not disrupt or slow down Port
operations.


5. (SBU) Instead of mandated scanning at all ports, Lemke
recommended that the USG focus resources on scanning
containers at the port of load where containers first enter
the international shipping stream. The costs of scanning
U.S.-bound containers more than once at multiple ports of
call outweigh whatever security benefits that might be
gained, Lemke surmised. As long as transshipment ports
comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code and, like Salalah, have had their security
measures assessed and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, the
U.S. can have a high level of confidence that the container
will transit the port without being compromised. While Lemke
admitted that a determined person or group could put
something in a container while it is on board ship, the close
proximity of the containers and the fact that they are loaded
based on criteria other than port of destination would make
it extremely difficult to target and access a U.S.-bound
container. Finally, each container is equipped with a seal
once it has been inspected and scanned, and in most cases,
the next port of discharge would be able to determine if
someone had broken the seal en route and opened the container.

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A Possible Alternative
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6. (SBU) The Members discussed with port authorities the
feasibility of the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning mandate,
especially in a transshipment port like Salalah. Their
concern increased when the Integrated Container Inspection
System (ICIS) lane that DHS and the U.S. Department of Energy
had funded and helped install failed during a demonstration
run, in part because the ROP inspector running the
demonstration had not been trained on the equipment. The
Members and port authorities talked about other ways to
ensure container security, such as security devices that can
detect if someone had tampered with or broken a container's
seal. Lemke warned that seal technology remains experimental
and expensive, and that no system can guarantee a container's
security. The hope was expressed, however, that shippers'
would see it in their financial interest, given the
possibility of expedited access to U.S. markets, to invest in
developing the technology.


7. (U) CODEL Price did not clear this message.
GRAPPO