DOHA ACCORD BEST CHANCE FOR MARCH 14 TO REGAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000397

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2018
TAGS: PREL LE MU
SUBJECT: DOHA ACCORD BEST CHANCE FOR MARCH 14 TO REGAIN
ADVANTAGE IN LEBANON

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).


1. (C) Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin
Alawi told the Ambassador June 1 that albeit a
far-from-perfect solution, the Doha agreement offers the
March 14 coalition its best chance for regaining the
political advantage in Lebanon. He urged the U.S. to
continue its support for PM Siniora as well as newly elected
President Sleiman. He recommended against precipitous action
on Shaba'a Farms, arguing that it would be fruitless until
Israel and Syria reach an agreement.


2. (C) Bin Alawi said that the Doha agreement had
effectively stopped the political hemorrhaging within
Lebanon. The government's actions on the airport and
Hizbollah's communication network were a provocation that
neither Siniora nor March 14 was politically powerful enough
to sustain. Hizballah, itself facing internal divisions,
operates best in a crisis and successfully met the challenge
brought on by the government, forcing the confrontation to
the brink and leading to the Doha negotiations. Siniora and
Sa'ad Hariri cannot make "that mistake," i.e., provoking a
crisis, again. They will be bested by Hizballah every time.


3. (C) Instead, argued bin Alawi, Siniora and March 14 must
use the period between now and next year's parliamentary
election to rebuild and to regain the political advantage.
Unlike Hizballah, they operate best when there is sufficient
political space and peace. Done correctly, he proffered, the
March 14 rebuilding effort could lead to success in the
parliamentary elections with a solid parliamentary majority
and to regaining the advantage in the cabinet.


4. (C) Bin Alawi dismissed Shaba'a farms from the political
equation. "It will only make sense once the Syrians and
Israelis reach an agreement." At that point, he said,
Lebanon will fall into place, vis-a-vis a settlement with
Israel, and Sheba'a will "resolve itself." Until then,
neither Israel nor Syria would be willing to let go of this
leverage each has over Lebanon. He said he had told Siniora
this when the two met briefly last week in Beirut during the
election and installation of Sleiman as president.


5. (C) Overall, said bin Alawi, the agreement ultimately
gave Hizballah what it had wanted and, therefore, could
hardly be considered the outcome that other Arab governments
wanted. He concluded, however, that it ended the Lebanese
political crisis, avoided further bloodshed, and offered
March 14 breathing space to reassert itself and win back
popular support. It is the only way they can effectively
confront Hizballah. The minister praised Qatari Emir Hamad
bin Khalifa al-Thani and PM Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr
al-Thani for their efforts in Doha to press for an agreement.
At one point, he said, PM Hamad bin Jassim had telephoned
Syrian President Bashar al Asad to insist that he fully
support the agreement. At one stage, he "undiplomatically"
threatened the Syrian with political isolation, promising
that the Arab Sunnis would never surrender Lebanon.
GRAPPO